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Research on the effect of intergroup cooperation on intergroup 
relations has produced contradictory results. The functionalist 
proposition that cooperation leads to the reduction of intergroup 
discrimination has not been widely supported by empirical 
evidence. An emerging trend indicates that cooperation reduces 
bias only in circumstances where the distinction between ingroup 
and outgroup can be rendered less salient. 
The cognitive-motivational theory of intergroup relations (Tajfel 
and Turner, 1979) provides a framework through which intergroup 
bias and the salience of group distinctiveness may be understood 
as a function of the group's ppsition on a status hierarchy and 
""i 
the perceived legitimacy of that status order. This study 
considered the effect of intergroup cooperation, compared with no 
cooperation and with intragroup cooperation, within this 
framework. 
A 3x2x2 factorial design was employed to investigate the 
interactive effects of Cooperation {no cooperation, intragroup 
cooperation and intergroup cooperation); Status {high and low); 
and Legitimacy {legitimate and illegitimate). 126 undergraduate 
psychology students were randomly assigned to the various 
conditions of the study. The procedure closely paralleled the 
standard ·methodology of the 'minimal group paradigm': two groups 
were created within the laboratory situation, one of which was 
,. 
endowed with high status, the other with low. The Subjects were 
cognizant of their own group membership but not of the other 
Subjects. Prior to completing the matrix booklet, the instrument 
•. 
measuring ingroup bias, Subjects performed a computer-~ontrolled 
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maze task which they either did alone, or in cooperation with an 
unseen member of the ingroup or outgroup, in an endeavour to win 
money. The matrix task required Subjects to distribute money 
between anonymous members of the ingroup and outgroup. The 
proportional distribution between these was the measure of bias. 
A Prisoner's Dilemma Game was also completed as a means of 
determining the Subjects' preference for the competitive versus 
cooperative strategy. 
The results failed to reveal an effect due to cooperation, and did 
not support the general predictions of the cognitive-motivational 
theory. This was attributed to the presence of an extraneous 
variable - subjective identification with the assigned group. 
Subsequent analysis of this factor in conjunction with the 
variable, status, mirrored previous findings 
marginal identity on intergroup discrimination 
1979). 
of the effect of 
(Breakwell, 1978, 
The findings are discussed in terms of the problems of variable 
manipulation within the laboratory, and with reference to the 
short-comings of Tajfel's theory. It is concluded that further 
replications are required to elaborate the effect of cooperation 
on intergroup relations. The need for a closer alliance between 
theory and research is emphasized. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Ethnocentrism and ingroup bias 
English and English (1958) define ethnocentrism as: 
1. The. tendency to exalt the superiority of the group (esp. 
the national or ethnic group) to which one belongs and to 
judge outsiders, often contemptuously, by the standards of 
one's own group. 
2. A hypothesized syndrome of underlying attitudes that 
involve the following: division of the social world into 
in-groups with which one identifies and to which one submits, 
and out-groups to which one is hostile: positive stereotypy of 
the former and negative stereotypy of the latter: and the 
arrangement of the in-groups and out-groups into an evaluative 
hierarchy in which the former are always dominant and the 
latter always subordinate. 
(English and English, 1958: 189) 
Nationalism, sexism, racism, prejudice and stereotypy are thus 
instances of this general syndrome, · in which the over-riding 
feature is a favourable bias towards the ingroup and 
discrimination against the outgroup. This discrimination may 
manifest in behaviour, attitudes, evaluations and frequently in 
the allocation .of resources within a society. Cross-cultural 
research on ethnocentrism has shown that irrespective of the 
groups in question, and their historical and proximal relations, 
perceptions of the outgroup are remarkably similar. The outgroup 
is inevitably viewed as morally inferior in comparison with the 
ingroup, with attributions such as pride, loyalty, honesty, 
trustworthiness, cleanliness bein·g applied to the ingroup and 
egotism, dishonesty, slyness, aggressiveness, immorality and 
uncleanliness to the outgroup (Campbell, 1967: Brewer, 1979b: 
Sunar, 1978). But this pattern of positive bias towards the 
ingr~up is not inevitable. Negative ethnocentrism, where the 
pos-itive 'bias is towards the outgroup and negative -toward the 
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ingroup, frequently occurs in dominated or minority groups (Fanon, 
1970: Bloom, 1971: Milner, 1973: Vaughan, 1978b). Essentially, 
negative ethnocentrism involves the 'inferior' group's acceptance 
and introjection of the denigrating stereotypes placed on them by 
the 'superior• group. 
Ingroup bias is the laboratory equivalent of ethnocentrism (Tajfel 
and Turner, 1979). A number of other terms intergroup bias, 
intergroup discrimination, ingroup favouritism are used 
interchangeably with ingroup bias. All describe the tendency to 
favour the group to which one belongs, which is almost inevitably 
accompanied by discrimination against the group to which one does 
not belong. Understanding 
.) 
this behaviour is one of the primary 
aims of a social psychology of intergroup relations. 
1.2. Social psychology and ingroup bias 
There is a conspicuous lack of attention paid to intergroup 
·relations, including ingroup bias and ethnocentrism, in most texts 
of traditional social psychology. When considered, prejudice and 
stereotypy are characteristically explained in terms of 
intra-psychic factors or as an instance of inter-individual 
perception and attitudes. The focus of analysis is invariably the 
person who is prejudiced and rarely the victim of this prejudice 
{Harrison, 1974). This failure to take into account the social, 
intergroup nature of prejudice is indicative of the lack of social 
context in traditional social psychology {Tajfel, 1972: Resler and 
Walton, 1974: Steiner, 1974). 
Boutilier et al {1980) distinguish between the two streams of 
social psychology: psychological social psychology and 
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sociological social psychology, both of which are in a •state of 
crisis•. Psychological social psychology typified by a 
positivis~ic approach in the American tradition - concentrates on 
intra-group interindividual behaviour and generally employs a 
tight experimental methodology. This social pyschology has been 
·criticized on a number of counts. Firstly, the emphasis on 
methodological exactitude has led to detailed and technically 
sophisticated investigations of sterile and often insignificant 
phenomena (Billig, 1977). Aside from the current sceptism about 
the validity of psychological experiments (Orne, 1970; Boutilier 
et al, 1980), this approach lacks theoretical direction (Tajfel, 
1972; Taylor and Brown, 1979). Thus the •mini-theories• that have 
emerged tend to be generalizations of experimental findings rather 
than theories per se. Secondly, psychological social psychology 
tends to ignore the social context within which behaviour occurs. 
This social context does not merely provide the backdrop against 
which behaviour takes place, but is strongly instrumental in 
eliciting and shaping social behaviour (Tajfel, 1972 ; Resler and 
Walton, 1974; Steiner, 1974 ; Billig, 1976). Moscovici (1972) has 
further criticized traditional social psychology as reflecting 
only the American reality. Speaking of European social 
psychologists vis-a-vis the work of Americans, he reports: 
As we read them and try to understand and assimilate the 
principles that guide them we must often conclude that they 
are strangers to us, that our experience does not tally with 
theirs, that our views of man, of reality and of history are 
different. 
(Moscovici, 1972: 18) 
This criticism that psychology reflects the cultural bias of the 
practitioner and, in fact, promotes and maintains the status quo, 
has become a theme of ip9reasing concern (Inries and Fraser, 1971; 
Sampson, 1977, 1978; Ingleby, 1974, 1981). 
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Sociological social psychology, or the 'new social psychology•, as 
termed by Billig (1977) is constituted by three approaches 
ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism and ethogeny. These 
approaches are basically anti-positivistic, rejecting a 
mechanistic model of man in favour of a more dynamic one. Their 
main concern is with the processes of social interaction; how 
with people create, maintain and understand social reality 
particular reference to such things as language, symbolism, norms 
and social rules. While sociological social psychology has moved 
away from the narrow focus and rigid methodology of traditional 
social psychology, a number of criticisms may still be levelled at 
this alternative. The three 
philosophical orientation 
any theories of 
approaches constitute a different 
and research disposition, but h~ve not 
social behaviour (Billig, 1977; presented 
Boutilier =e~t~~a~l~, 1980). Further, it is doubtful whether they can 
lead to an understanding of intergroup relations or social change, 
as they focus on the minutiae of social behaviour, often 
diregarding the broader social context. Taking the topic of 
fascism as a case in point, Billig (1977) illustrates how the 
research orientations of each of the approaches would fail to 
"foster a discipline which is capable of combining empirical 
inquiry to social critique" (pp 429). 
Billig (1977) suggested that an alternative, more productive 
approach to intergroup relations is presented by 'action 
research'. Deriving from Lewin (1946), this orientation seeks to 
understand the various forms of social behaviour with a view to 
stimulating 
methodology 
social action. While 
of action-research is 
not anti-positivistic, the 
far broader than mainstream 
social psychology. But its primary advantage is its commitment to 
relevant social research with a focus on intergroup rather than 
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interpersonal phenomena. 
Theories of intergroup behaviour have emerged from both the 
psychological social psychology and action-research traditions. 
The 'new social psychology• has not (as yet) given rise to such a 
theory. These theories may be dichotomized according to whether 
they employ interindividual or intergroup modes of explanation. 
1 .• 3. Inter-individual theories 
These theories confine themselves to two levels of analysis: 
either 'focusing on individualistic intra-psychic processes~ on 
individual, face-to-face interactive processes~ or most commonly 
on a combination of both. But no attention is given to large scale 
social or group processes. Purely intra-psychic modes of 
explanation posit innate factors or instincts as the basis of 
intergroup discrimination, eg. aggressive instincts (Lore~z, 1966) 
or territorial instincts (Ardrey, 1966). These theories have not 
.achieved wide acceptance in social psychology. The majoritY of the 
theories which deal with prejudice and ethnocentrism tend to 
hypothesize both intra-psychic and interpersonal variables, the 
intra-psychic variables deriving (often tenuously) from Freudian 
concepts. A number of these are briefly outlined below. 
1.3.1. Frustration - aggression hypothesis 
Dollard et al (1939) first proposed the frustration aggression 
hypothesis in an attempt to link certain Freudian concepts with 
learning theory principles (Billig, 1976). The basic premise of 
this theory is: when an action or desire is blocked, ie. 
frustrated, the energy which motivates the behaviour does not 
simply dissipate but remains as 
frustration instigates aggression. If 
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a form of arousal. This 
the aggression cannot be 
directed against the cause of the frustration it is displaced onto 
another object or person. The aggressive act, whether directed at 
the •proper• target (the frustrater) or at the •improper• target 
(the scapegoat) results in a catharsis, dissipating the 
accumulated energy. This basic formulation, frustration aggression 
- displacement, has been modified to acknowledge the role of 
certain mediating external cues. The need for this arose from the 
demonstration by social learning theorists that aggression is a 
learned response which is selectively reinforced through childhood 
by the various socializing agents (?andura et al, 1963; Bandura 
and Walters, 1963). Experimental research on the frustration-
aggression hypothesis has failed to produce any consistent trends. 
A major reason for this is the frequent inability of the research 
design to distinguish between generalized host1lity and displaced 
aggression. 
The frustration - aggression hypothesis has been extrapolated to 
intergroup relations by postulating_ that outgro~ps are the objects 
for hostility displacement. There is some support for this, eg. 
Hovland and Sears (1940) found there was a strong negative 
correlation between the annual per-acre value of cotton (cause of 
frustration) and the number of Negro lynchings (displaced 
aggression) in Southern u.s.A. between 1882 and 1930 (cited in 
Ashmore, 1970). However, while the hypothesis may be used to 
explain instances of hostility when prejudice already exists, it 
cannot explain how these prejudices develop nor predict when 
hostility will occur. Dollard et al (1939) suggested that the 
hostility which arises from frustrations within the· · ingroup must 
necessarily be displaced onto the outgroup if the social-order is 
-9 
to be maintained (Billig, 1976). This postulation that outgroup 
hostility leads to ingroup cohesion is not fully supported by 
research. Evidence from a number of studies on group cohesion 
suggest that ingroup cohesion in itself leads to outgroup 
discrimination (Dion, 1973, 1979; Louche and Magnier, 1978). Thus, 
while the frustration aggression hypothesis may be useful in 
understanding certain aspects of inte~group relations, eg. Gurr 
,-, 
(1970) and Berkowitz (197@) proposed that it constitutes the 
motivational link between relative deprivation and social 
revolution (Billig, 1976), it fails to provide an adequate 
~xplanation of all intergroup discrimination. 
1.3.2. The authoritarian personality 
The authoritarian personality hypothesis also derives its basic 
premise from Freudian concepts. Broadly speaking, Adorno et al 
(1950) proposed that. prejudice is entrenched in the individual's 
character structure. The authoritarian - personality explanation 
of prejudice rests on three basic hypothesis: 
..• intergroup attitudes (1) are part of a broader ideological 
framework and are thus correlated with other political, 
social, and economic beliefs (as well as with one another), 
and {2) this correlation exists because all beliefs and 
attitudes are caused by more basic personality factors 
(3) ..• the personality sources of prejudice are shaped by the 
quality of parent control used during the formative period of 
personality organization. The ultimate major cause of 
prejudice, therefore, is the practices parents use to control 
their children. 
(Ashmore, 1970: 272-273) 
The authoritarian person is typically someone who idealises 
her/his parents, while subconsciously holding hostile feelings 
toward them. This pattern is paralleled in her/his attitudes to 
all authority figures. The authoritarian is thus excessively 
concerned with rank and status, bei~~ highly deferential to 
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superiors while venting his/her aggressiveness on inferiors, 
especially outgroups considered inferior. Characteristically, the 
authoritarian individual is conforming, rule bound, intolerant of 
ambiguity and unable to handle ambivalent emotions, especially 
within interpersonal relations. 
Adorno et al {1950) developed a number of scales which measured 
different aspects conventionalism, authoritarianism and prejudice. 
One of these, the F scale, has since come into use as a instrument 
to measure prejudice and ethnocentrism. Research on the link 
between childrearing 
contradictory findings. 
practices and prejudice has produced 
A number of studies have found that 
children raised in a rigid, strict manner tend to be highly 
prejudiced (Ashmore, 1970). However, it has been argued that even 
if this were consistent, there would be no way of discerning 
whether the childrearing practices caused the prejudice or whether 
the prejudical, authoritarian attitudes were learnt directly from 
the parents (Pushkin and Veness, 1974). Similarly, since 
conformity is an attribute of the authoritarian personality, it 
may be questioned whether prejudice is caused by the personality 
structure or simply a norm to which s/he conforms (Sanford, 1974). 
In conclusion, it is important to note that while Adorno et al 
(1950) saw personality as a causal factor in intergroup 
discrimination, they did not negate the importance of social and 
ideological influences (Billig, 1977). 
1.3.3. Belief similarity and congruence 











dissimilarity. According to this theory, it is not the fact that 
outgroup is of a different race or ethnicity to the ingroup that 
leads to prejudice, but it is rather the assumption that the 
members of the outgroup hold different beliefs and are not 'like' 
the ingroup. Members of th~ ingroup are assumed to hold similar 
beliefs. This hypothesis has been confirmed by numerous studies 
(Ashmore, 1970; Taylor and Guimond, 1978). However, these studies 
have been cri tici,~)ed on a number of methodological issues. Ashmore 
(1970) pointed out that in many of the studies comparing the 
influence of race with belief, it was questionable whether the 
race and belief manipulations were given equal emphasis. The 
finding that belief similarity was more important than race may 
then be attributable to demand effects. The kind of evaluation of 
prejudice also affects the relative importance of race and belief. 
Boyanowsky and Allen (1973) found that highly-prejudiced subjects 
who discriminate against blacks in social behavioural 
circumstances do not necessarily do so in non-behavioural 
situations, such as on pencil-and-paper measur~s. 
Aside from the methodological controversy, there remains the 
question whether this theory could feasibly be extrapolated to 
large social contexts. 
it would be bordering on the absurd to suggest, to take a 
more important example, that the hostility between blacks and 
whites in southern Africa today is caused principally by a 
perception of belief dissimilarity. · 
(Taylor and Brown, 1979: 176) 
There are a number of other inter-individualistic explanations of 
ingroup bias. The main criticism of these theories along with 
those discussed above, is the fallacy of proposing a linear 
extrapolation fofm individual to group situations (Tajfel, 1972, 
1979; Sherif and Sherif, 1979). Contrarily, Taylor and Brown 
\ ·. 
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(1979) argued that many of these theories would have considerable 
validity for intergroup relations if they were integrated with the 
social context. This argument was rejected by Tajfel (1979a) who 
illustrated the implausibility of this, and reiterated that what 
is needed is not patchwork adjustments of these ideas, but a 
completely different theoretical orientation. 
1.4. Intergroup theories 
Intergroup theories focus on the group as their unit of analysis, 
where the group is perceived as more . than a collectivity of 
individuals. Tajfel (1979a) notes that to understand social 
behaviour: 
we must know (i) something about the ways •groups• are 
constructed in a particular social system, (ii) what are the 
psychological effects of these construction ; and (iii) how 
the constructions and their effects depend upon, and relate 
to, forms of reality. 
(Tajfel, 1979a: 185) 
This does not imply that the individual is ignored, it simply 
acknowledges that there are processes which derive from the group 
context which do not exist between individuals. The manner in 
which these manifest within individuals as members of a group is 
implicitly the primary subject matter of a social psychology of 
intergroup behaviour. 
Two theorists who have proposed explanations using the group level 
of analysis, are Muzafer Sherif - realistic group conflict theory 
and Henri Tajfel cognitive· motivational theory. Tajfel•s 
theory constitutes the framework of this study so will be 
considered in some detail in the next chapter. Befor~ outlining 
Sherif•s theory, a brief examination of how the two theorists 
conceptualize. a •grO·l1P 1 is expedient. 
. .. . . . . . . '~: . ' . 
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Sherif (1966} defines a group as a structural social unit in which 
the members have · definite role and status relations, and have a 
set of norms and values which regulate their attitudes and 
behaviours. Yet ·earlier in the same book he says: 
' Speaking generally, the mere awareness of other groups within 
the range of our designs generates a process of comparison 
between "us" and the others .... In this comparison process, 
we evaluate and categorize other groupings of people, 
comparing them with our notions of ourselves, our conceptions 
of our place in life and the places of others. 
(Sherif, 1966: 3} 
Thus, Sherif implicitly accepts the existence of groups without 
the structural relationships specified earlier. Tajfel•s (1978} 
definition of a group carries no requirements for structure of any 
sort. He sees a group as a collection of people who perceive 
themselves, or are perceived by others as belonging to the same 
social category. Along with this categorization process there is 
the connotation that members: 
... share some emotional involvement in this common definition 
of.themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus 
about the evaluation of their group and of their membership of 
it. 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 40} 
From the above two quotes it can be seen that the two theorists 
share a basic conceptualization of a group as fundamentally a 
linguistic category, whose members share evaluation and 
perceptions of their category vis-a-vis others. The more stringent 
definition of Sherif (1966} fits certain circumscribed 
face-to-face groups, but is difficult to apply to large scale 
social groups such as nations or races. Thus, it maybe argued 
that the two theories are essentially comparable. 
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1.4.1. Sherif: realistic group conflict theory 
The realistic group conflict theory hypothesizes that intergroup 
behaviour · is determined by the functional relationship the groups 
bear to each other (Sherif, 1966, 1979). If groups are in 
\ 
competition for some scarce resource or goal, hostile relations 
will evolve. Ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination, with 
their numerous outlets .over-evaluation of ingroup products, 
negative attitudes to the outgroup, increased group cohesion - are 
thus seen as the result of intergroup competition. If, on the 
other hand, the groups are cooperating to attain some 
superordinate goal there will be little intergroup discrimination 
and relations between the groups will be friendly. 
The basic evidence on which this theory is built comes from a 
series of experiments, termed the Robbers• Cave Experiment, 
performed with pre-adolescent boys at a holiday camp. In its 
entirety this experiment entailed four stages. During the first 
stage the boys were left to develop natural friendships. After a 
few days the experimenters divided the boys into two groups, 
deliberately cutting across these friendships. These groups were 
then physically separated they ate, slept and had activities 
apart. In the third stage the groups were brought together in 
competitive circumstances competitions and tournaments were 
held. During this stage the various indicators of intergroup 
discrimination and hostility became apparent. Then at the fourth 
stage a superordinate goal was introduced the groups had to 
cooperate in an operation to rescue a broken-down food truck. 
Consequent to this it was observed that the previous intergroup 
hostility decreased and gradually friendship·s .: a~.r.oss .. the groups 
were formed. Doise (1978) describes a number of studies that 
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support, to various degrees, Sherif's ·· formulation: Blake and 
Mouton (1962) working with adults on an executive training course, 
found ingroup bias in th~ evaluation of group products when the 
groups were placed in a competitive relation. Bass and Dunteman 
(1963) also found intergroup discrimination when groups were in 
competition, but which lessened when an opposing group became a 
cooperative one. Diab (1970) replicated the Robber's Cave 
Experiment with Lebanese Moslem and Christian children. This 
study found a slight tendency for the created groups to exhibit 
ingroup bias, which supported Sherif's findings, but this tendency 
was not statistically significant. The failure to reach 
significance was attributed to the influence of religious 
membership which intersected with the created groups. 
However, a number of studies fail to verify Sherif's theory. 
'Rabbie and Wilkens (1971) did not find stronger ingroup bias in 
competing groups compared with non-competing groups; and Brewer 
and Silver (1978) and Doise et al (1972) found no difference in 
the bias of competing and cooperating groups. It may be 
significant that these studies employed laboratory groups which 
did not have a social structure. However, Hendriques (1977) 
reports a 'naturally' occurring intergroup situation which fails 
to support Sherif's hypothesis that a superordinate goal reduces 
hostility. Discussing the Rhodesian War of Independence, he 
details how the conflict between the two guerilla organizations, 
ZANU and ZAPU continued unabated throughout the war despite their 
shared goal - the overthrow of the white regime. This goal clearly 
fulfilled the definition given by Sherif: 
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Superordinate goals are defined as goals that encompass all 
parties caught in dispute or conflict (eg, mutual survival), 
which cannot be fulfilled by the resources and energies of the 
parties separately, but require the concerted efforts of all 
parties i~volved. 
(Sherif, 1979: 258) 
Yet, the intergroup hostility remained despite its debilitating 
effect on the war effort. Furthermore, the numerous experiments of 
Tajfel (discussed in the next chapter) indicate that categorizing 
people into groups is sufficient to elicit intergroup 
discrimination. This questions whether the competitive 
relationship between the groups is the causative factor. Billig 
(1976) pointed out that Sherif has neglected to consider the role 
of the experimenters in the Robbers' Cave Experiment. They 
constitute a third group who institutionalize the competitive or 
cooperative situations. So the paradox is raised: does the 
functional relations between the groups lead to intergroup 
discrimination, or has already existent intergroup behaviours been 
channeled into a pattern determined by this third group. 
The realistic group conflict theory presents an explanation of 
intergroup behaviour which is neither reductionistic nor 
indifferent to the social context. However, it is unable to 
account for certain intergroup variables, eg. the effect of 
status; or the occurr.!tnce of negative ethnocentrism. Sherif (1966) 
discusses these in an ad hoc manner, but does not place them 
within a theoretical interpretation. These limitations, plus the 
growing evidence throwing doubt onto the role of functional 
relations in determining intergroup behaviour, has resulted in the 
realistic conflict theory receiving less attention than the 
cognitive-motivational theory. 
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2. TAJFEL: COGNITIVE-MOTIVATIONAL THEORY 
Tajfel's cognitive-motivational theory of intergroup relations 
attempts to move away from intra-psychic explanations of social 
behaviour towards an account based in the social context. The 
essential distinction of this mode of explanation is that social 
behaviour is conceived as more than the agglomeration of a number 
of individualistic behaviours. In reply to the criticism by Taylor 
and Brown (1979) that his theory does not differ fundamentally 
from the more traditional approaches since his explanations still 
rest on individual behaviour, Tajfel stated that the substantive 
innovation in his theory is not t~at individuals are disregarded, 
but that the central processes considered "cannot be conceived to 
originate outside of their social context" (Tajfel, 1979a: 185). 
2 .1. Intergroup Relations 
Intergroup relations are a dynamic process, not a static 
condition. Tajfel (1975, 1978, 1981) describes a continuum of 
behaviour, ranging from the purely interindividual to the purely 
intergroup. On the interindividual side, people are perceived and 
interacted with in terms of their personal characteristics. People 
are seen as individuals, diverse in personality, attributes and 
motivation. On the intergroup pole, people are encountered as 
members of a group or category, typically perceived as an 
homogeneous whole, having, similar attributes and motivations. 
Tajfel (1978) is careful to point out that occurrences of 
behaviour on either extreme are very rare. This is certainly the 
case on the interindividual side,- .since this would mean that an 
interac-tion must be completely devoid of influence from Sl.lGh. 
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things as gender, race, class or nationality. As these all infuse 
a person's manner and appearance, such a situation is improbable. 
The only instance of purely intergroup behaviour offered is that 
which may occur in a highly technical war, eg. the bombing of 
enemy populations using remote control (Tajfel, 1978). The 
'minimal group' experiments establish a situation on the 
intergroup extreme. 
Ingroup bias (ethnocentrism) is correlated with the position that 
the intergroup relations takes on this continuum; the closer to 
the intergroup pole they fall, the 
discrimination. Ingroup bias may 
different behaviours. Some that have 
stronger the 
manifest in a 
been considered 




(i) subjective ratings - where the ingroup and/or outgroup are 
rated as a group per se (Daise et al, 1972; Daise and 
Sinclair, 1973; Skevington, 1980); or individuals from these 
groups are evaluated on trait scales (Tajfel et al,l964); 
(ii) rating of the product, or quality of the process of the 
ingroup and/or outgroup (Turner and Brown, 1978; Hinkle and 
Schopler, 1979); 
(iii) behavioural measures which usually involve the distribution 
of resources (money, points, etc.) (Tajfel, 1970a, 1981; 
Dion, 1973); 
(iv) differential memory for faces, statements made or actions of 
the ingroup and outgroup (Eiser et al, 1979; Howard and 
Rothbart, 1979); and 
(v) differential inclination to help members of the ingroup and 
outgroup (Sole et al, 1975). 
Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations ·rests on three basic 
, 
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concepts; social categorization (~epresenting the cognitive 
component) , social comparison and social identity (the 
motivational components). In this chapter, a brief exposition of 
the theory will ·be made, with consideration of relevant empirical 
evidence. This account has been informed by the numerous books and 
papers authored by Tajfel and his associates. 
2.2. Social Categorization 
The categorization process not only enables the individual to 
organise his subjective experience of the social environment 
but also, and perhaps more importantly, constitutes a process 
by which social interaction is structured, differentiates 
among, and shapes individuals. 
(Do is e, 19 7 8: 1 51 ) 
The process of social categorization can be understood as a 
combination of the cognitive operations: category differentiation 
and perceptual over-estimation. Tajfel (1981) reviewed a number of 
findings in the realm of perceptual over-estimation, leading to 
the synopsis that: 
in a series of stimuli where value changes concurrently with 
the dimension subjected to investigation, the differences 
. between the stimuli of the series will be perceived as larger 
than the objectively equivalent differences between the 
stimuli of a neutral series, where no such association exists 
between value and magnitude. 
(Tajfel, 1981: 77) 
A typical example of this is: subjects required to estimate the 
size of coins (where the size is postively correlated with value) 
perceive the difference in size between smaller and larger coins 
as much greater than they do when required to judge the size of 
equivalently dimensioned discs (Tajfel, 1981). 
The process of category differentiation acts in an analogous 
fashion. While categorization is a necessary function for making 
sense of the world, it has certain consequences: 
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(a) Objects of the same category are perceived as being more 
similar to one another than is actually the case ; and 
(b) Objects of one category are perceived as more different and 
distinct from those in another category than is warranted. 
These effects have been demonstrated, to occur in the judgement of 
attributes both of physical objects (Tajfel, 1959; Tajfel and 
Wilkes, 1963), and of people (Taylor et al, 1978; Daise et al, 
1978). 
In social categorization, ~he social environment - people - are 
differentiated into groups on the basis of criteria which have 
relevance to the classifier. Common criteria in Western society 
are sex, race, 
While these 
religion, class, nationality, 
are not the only criteria 
language and age. 
(eg. hair colour, 
temperament, body structure, rugby team allegiance are others), 
they are characterized by a strong emotive and evaluative 
component. Thus the •value• dimension is added to the general 
categorization process resulting in an enhanced polarizing effect, 
accentuating similarities within groups and differences between 
groups. These operations have been elaborated as the cognitive 
basis of stereotyping and prejudice (Tajfel, 1963 1969a,l974b: 
Lerner, 1976; Taylor et al, 1978) 
The link between social categorization and ingroup bias was made 
quite fortuitously by Tajfel when attempting to establish a 
situation devoid of discrimination (Tajfel, 1978). It led to the 
emergence of a methodology which has proved extremely useful in 
the study of intergroup relations. This methodology is commonly 
known as the 'minimal group paradigm•, though the term 'minimal 
intergroup situation• is gaining popularity. 
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2.2.1. The minimal group paradigm 
This methodology involves the creation of an intergroup situation 
in the laboratory which has the following features: 
1. The groups are (allegedly) created on the basis of irrelevant 
attributes. 
2. The subjects are actually randomly assigned to these groups. 
This ensures there is no instrumental link between group 
attributes and the subsequent behaviours. 
3. The subjects are informed of their own group membership but do 
not know to which group the other subjects belong. Thus there 
can be no history of intergroup hostility. 
4. There is no face-to-face interaction between members of the 
various groups or between members of the same group. 
5. The behavioural responses, generally allocation of money or 
points, have no direct utilitarism value to the subjects 
themselves. 
This paradigm is best illustrated by the classic 'Klee-Kandinsky' 
experiment of Tajfel (1970a): 
The subjects of this study were a class of Bristol schoolboys. In 
the first phase of the experiment the subjects were shown slides 
of pairs of modern art pictures. They were required to state their 
preference for one of each pair. The subjects were told that in 
each pair one painting was by the artist Klee, and the other by 
Kandinsky, and were given to believe that people consistently 
preferred one or other of the artists. Thus groups or categories 
were created purportedly on ·the basis of preference for either 
artist - a criterion which in this context and among these 
subjects was scarcely likely to have much importance. The 
experimenter ostentatiously pretended to score the subjects' 
responses prior to the next phase. In the second phase of the 
experiment the subjects were treated individually. Each subject 
was taken to a cubicle where he was told he was in the group that 
preferred Klee (or Kandinsky). The subject was in fact randomly 
assigned to this group. The subject was then given the task of 
distributing money between pairs of his fellow subjects, where 
each was identified only by a code number and group membership. 
Thus the subject had no way of determining who was in the ingroup 
or outgroup. It was made.clear that the subject would never be 
giving money to himself. S<Y the subject's ·Qec.is.iqn was not 
-22 
motivated by personal gain. The method of money allocation was the 
matrix booklet (similar to the one described in chapter 4). 
The results indicated a strong tendency for subjects to favour 
people in their own group, though it was noted that this was 
tempered by the fairness norm. A later study (Tajfel et a!, 1971) 
demonstrated that subjects would frequently sacrifice higher 
ingroup profits in favour of larger gain relative to the outgroup. 
This fundamental finding, that social categorization is a 
sufficient condition for the arousal of intergroup bias, has been 
replicated in a number of studies (Billig and Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel 
and Billig, 1974; Billig, 1973; Brewer and Silver, 1978). This 
categorization efffect has been shown to have as strong an 
influence as personal friendship commitments (Vaughan et a!, 
1981) •. An exception is the study by Rabbie and Horwitz (1969), 
..------who aYd ~c~ find ingroup bias in their created groups. However I it 
has been argued that this was due to the methodology, in that 
there was insufficient accentuation of the notion of 'groupness' 
(Tajfel et a!, 1971). Tajfel's claim, that it was the social 
categorization per se that elicited ingroup bias in the minimal 
group experiments, has been contested and a number of alternative 
explanations postulated. These are discussed below: 
2.2.2. Artifactual effects of the experiment 
Numerous authors have commented on the imprudence of taking 
responses in the psychological experiment as reflective of 
'natural' behaviour. These 
meta theoretical criticisms 
arguments 
(Bannister 
emerge both from 
and Fransella, 1971; 
Heather, 1976) as well as from demonstrations of the demand 
characteristics of the experiment (Orne, 1970). This latter source 
of criticisms will be considered in this context. 
One possible source of confounding error examined was the 
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strangeness of the experimental situation. Tajfel and Billig 
( 1974) refuted this · by (de·n'fonstrating that subjects who were -.._____.:,....; 
familiarized with the experimental environment discriminated 
between the ingroup and outgroup more than the unfamiliar 
subjects. 
Another possible source of distortion is the bias introduced into 
the experimental situation by virtue of the experitmenter's 
personality, behaviour, attitudes and expectations. This 
experimenter effect has been well documented (Rosenthal, 1968, 
1970a; Innes and Fraser, 1971), tnough there has been little 
apparent attempt to control for it in current research (Suls and 
Gastorf, 1980). 
Gerard and Hoyt (1974) suggested that the intergroup bias found in 
the minimal group experiments was a function of perceive demand 
characteristics of the methodology. This criticism has been 
countered in a number of ways. Billig (1973) investigated this by 
performing a typical minimal group experiment (cf. Billig and 
Tajfel, 1973) using one set of subjects, then required that set of 
subjects to instruct a subsequent set on the use of the matrix 
booklet. It was hypothesized that if the first 'generation' of 
subjects perceived the demand that they should make intergroup 
discriminations, this would be communicated to the second 
generation of subjects, and further should result in an increased 
degree of bias. Only one instance of such a communication 
occurred, and there was a nonsignificant tendency for the second 
generation to exhibit less ingroup bias. 
Turner (in press) reported that postexperimental enquiries by both 
Billig (1972) and Turner (1975b) did not discern a perceived cue 
to discriminate on the part of the subjects. Turner (in press) 
also· cites ·the findings of a study by St. Claire and Turner (in 
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preparation) that the socially desirable strategy in the 
intergroup situation is, in fact, fairness. 
Tajfel argues that if intergroup discrimination is perceived as 
the •demand• of the experiment, this in itself is a heuristic 
finding: 
The experimenter effect cannot, by definition, be considered 
here without its collateral, the •subject effect•. The former 
effect could have worked within our experimental procedures 
only through the salience for the Ss of the relevant normative 
background and of the expectations consequent to it. 
(Tajfel et al, 1971: 174) 
2.2.3. Similarity 
An alternative explanation for the ingroup bias, elicited in the 
minimal group experiments, is that subjects may have assumed that 
they were more similar to members of their ingroup than to members 
of the outgroup. A number of studies have considered similarity as 
a variable with or without categorization (Dion, 1973; Billig and 
Tajfel, 1973; Allen and ~lilder, 1975; Sole et al, 1975; Brewer and 
Silver, 1978, Hewstone et al, 1981). The general finding was that 
categorization alone was sufficient to arouse ingroup bias and 
this was enhanced by perceived similarity. But similarity alone 
was not sufficient to elicit bias. The exception to this is the 
study of Hewstone et al (1981) who found bias in the condition 
where subjects thought they were similar to their colleagues but 
were not classified into groups. However, the subjects in this 
study were required to allocate penalties not rewards which may 
have been an influential variable. 
In her review on the effect of similarity, Brewer (1979a) 
summarizes: 
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Results from all of these studies are consistent in indicating 
that explicit dissimilarity within the in-group reduces 
in-group bias but that information on similarity between the 
~ubject and out-group members makes no difference. 
(Brewer, 1979a: 318) 
2.2.4. Competition 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the functionalist approach 
suggests that ingroup bias results from intergroup competition for 
scarce resources (Sherif, 1966, 1979). Hence, a possible 
explanation for the bias in the minimal group experiments is that 
there was an implicit assumption of intergroup competition on the 
part of the subjects. It is important to note that competition in 
this section refers to 'real' competition (conflict of group 
interests) as opposed to social competition which is discussed 
later. The studies which have considered competition or 
anticipated competition have not, in general, indicated that 
competition is a sufficient condition for the arousal of ingroup 
bias (Rabbie and Horwitz, 1969; Doise et al, 1972; Brewer and 
Silver, 1978). A further contradiction has been the demonstration 
that intergroup bias also exists, though to a lesser degree (often 
insignificant) in situations of cooperation or coaction (Doise et 
1972; Brewer and Silver, 1978; Turner, in press). An 
interpretation of this enhancing effect has been that competition 
makes group differentiation more salient (van Knippenberg, 1978; 
Turner, in press). 
In summary, it would seem that none of the alternative 
explanations discussed - perceive-demand effects, similarity and 
'real' competition- provide an adequate account of the minimal 
group experimental results. 
. ' 
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2.3. Social comparison and social identity 
The cognitive process of social categorization divides the social 
environment into 'ingroups' and 'outgroups', 'wes' and 'theys', 
upon which the motivational components act to determine the 
structure of intergroup relations. But this does not only 
determine people's attitude to others, it also provides a means of 
self-reference and self-definition: 
••• in any complex society an individual confronts from the 
beginning of his life a complex network of groupings which 
presents him with a network of relationships into which he 
must fit himself. One of the most important and durable 
problems that is posed to an individual by his insertion into 
society is to · find, create and define his place in these 
networks. 
(Tajfel, 1974a: 67) 
The term, social identity, refers to those aspects of the 
~individual's identity and self-concept which are associated with, 
and to a certain extent determined by her/his group memberships. 
Most people belong to a large number of groups - age group, sex, 
race, nationality, religion, peer group, etc. - but these group 
memberships differ in their importance and salience to the 
individual and hence in the degree to which they contribute to 
her/his social identity. This contribution may be positive or 
negative, which in turn is determined by the process of social 
comparison. The concept of social comparison derives from 
Festinger (1954). In his theory of social comparison, Festinger 
sets out a number of hypotheses, the most important of which is: 
There exists in the human organism, a drive to evaluate his 
opinions and his abilities. 
(Festinger, 1954: 117) 
Festinger's theory refers primarily to comparisons between 
individuals of the same group, though he does concede the 
.. ; - .... ·. ~ .. 
importance of group comparisons. Tajfel (1974a, 1975, 1978) adapt's 
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this theory to the intergroup situation, arriving at three basic 
assumptions with regard to social identity: 
1. Individuals strive to maintain or enhance their selfesteem: 
they strive for a pos~ive self-concept. 
2. Social groups or categories and the membership of them are 
associated with positive or negative value connotations ••. 
3. The evaluation of one's own group is determined with 
reference to specific other group through social 
comparisons in terms of value-laden attributes and 
characteristics 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 40) 
A prototypical sequence of events may be presented. In accordance 
with Festinger's (1954) hypothesis, the individual seeks to 
evaluate his/her group (since group membership contributes to 
social identity) through comparision with other group(s). If the 
comparison is favourable, the individual's need for a positive 
self-concept is gratified. However, if the comparison is not 
favourable, the individual must attempt to achieve positive social 
identity, either by leaving his/her present group and joining a 
more positively distinct group, or by reconstruing the present 
existing group as more positively distinct. 
For the social comparison process to take place, certain 
conditions must be present. Firstly, membership of the group in 
question must actually contribute to the individual's social 
identity. Thus there must be some identification with and 
internalization of the membership. Secondly, the group to which 
the individual is compared must be considered relevant and 
accessible (in a psychological sense), and thirdly, the dimensions 
or attributes on which the comparison is made must be accepted and 
have importance to both groups. 
The social comparison process establishes a graduation which is 
termed a status hierarchy (Tajfel, 1978). Tf the ingroup is judged 
to be superior to another on some relevant dimension, it has high 
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status: if judged inferior - low status. This status determines 
whether or not the group membership contribute positively to the 
individual's social identity, and provides positive group 
distinctiveness. 
2.4. Social status·and security of social identity 
The nature of intergroup behaviour, ie. to which side of. the 
interindividual - intergroup continuum it swings, is a function of 
both the social context and the individual's subjective 
identification with the group. This identification is determined 
by the emotional investment in and salience of the group 
membership to the individual, in conjunction with the evaluation 
of the group's status and the consequent effect on self-concept. 
There is an interaction between situational determinants and 
subjective identification which may influence the arousal of group 
distinctiveness. For instance, in a social context where group 
membership is primary (eg. a situation of conflict), group 
distinctiveness may be aroused in people who previously possessed 
weak group identification. Similarly, strong intergroup behaviour 
may occur without there being any contextual emphasis on group 
membership in cases where subjective identity is high. Empirical 
studies that manipulated group salience have confirmed that 
greater intergroup discrimination occurs under conditions of high 
salience than under low (McKillip et al, 1977: Louche and Magnier, 
1978: Taylor et al, 1978). 
Inextricably linked with the interindividual intergroup 
. continuum is the social mobility - social change continuum. This 
--~'::._: · .. - ., ., .... 
' ·:. . :. . .... ~ . . - .. 
· .. ·.··of· ·the social comparison,process (Tajf-el, 197'5, ,. 1'97'8, · 1981). 
. : · latter . ·'··. . .. dimension is· important ·f~i ·understan<Ung. th~ consequences 
If 
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the outcome of a comparison confers low status on the ingroup, the 
individual is faced with a negative self-identity infringing on 
his/her need for a positive self-concept. The individual's 
response to this predicament will be positioned somewhere along 
the social mobility social change ~ontinuum. On the social 
mobility pole, the response would be to attempt to leave the 
negatively valued group and enter a more positively distinct one. 
·On the social change extreme, attempts will be made to change the 
intergroup situation that has led to the negative evaluation. The 
social mobility option is a purely individualistic one which 
leaves the intergroup situation unaltered, whereas the social 
change option attempts to remedy this. Thus, it is to be expected 
that the interindividual mode of behaviour.will be associated with 
social mobility tendency, and the intergroup mode with the social 
change side. 
Tajfel's discussion on the outcome of the social comparison 
process concentrates on the situation of groups which are 
evaluated as inferior. Moscovici and Paicheler (1978) suggest that 
there is another process of identification besides social 
comparison called social recognition. This process enables an 
understanding of positively evaluated, 'superior' groups. 
The fundamental idea is that an individual or a group who are 
deeply involved in their opinions and certain of them, or who 
feel safe about their material or intellectual resources, seek 
the consensus of other individuals or groups. The aims of 
actions trying to establish this consensus are to obtain a 
confirmation of the singularity of one's opinions, of the 
entitlement of one's resources and to see them shared out with 
others In this way, a common goal is achieved: that of 
being identified, listened to and individualized. 
(Moscovici and Paicheler, 1978: 224-5) 
Moscovici and Paicheler (1978) distinguish between two forms of 
group distinctiveness: a $.S e·:t: t; i ve dist·inctivene·s.s· ·<:~.nd. de.fensive 
-: .. -.... :_: 
distinctiveness. Assertive distinctiveness occurs when there is a 
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reaffirmation of the group and a rediscovery of a possible 
positive group identity. Defensive distinctiveness, on the other 
hand, occurs in situations df perceived threat or uncertainty for 
the group, which results in an avoidance or rejection of the 
outgroup in order to preserve the group•s identity. Both forms of 
distinctiveness give rise to ingroup favouritism. Brewer (1979a), 
reviewing studies on intergroup bias, reports mixed findings in 
analysing the locus of bias, ie. whether bias stems from enhanced 
favouritism towards the ingroup or from increased discrimination 
against the outgroup. The differentiation between assertive and 
defensive group distinctiveness may account for the diverse 
opinions, since enhanced ingroup favouritism is characteristic of 
assertive distinctiveness and increased outgroup discrimination of 
defensive distinctiveness. 
A number of factors determine whether a social mobility or social 
change response will occur. Firstly, the permeability of group 
boundaries is an important determinant. The social mobility option 
is only available where stratification between groups is not rigid 
and movement between groups is possible. Social mobility may be 
prevented by both internal and external factors. External factors 
are such things as authoritative legislative {eg. state laws such 
as those maintaining apartheid in South Africa) or religiously 
based edicts (eg the religious stipulations maintaining the caste 
system among Hindus). Internal factors are such things as 
emotional commitment and loyalty ties to the group. In the 
circumstances where group boundaries are rigid and actual social 
mobility is not possible, a form of •psychological• mobility may 
occur. This involves the psychological dissociation of the 
individual from his/her group, frequently accompanied by a mental 
alignment with the outgroup. Secondly, the security of the 
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individual's social identity is a crucial determinant. 
In this context, secure social identity refers to the belief that 
the present intergroup situation the status hierarchy and 
consequent social manifestations is stable and immutable. 
Insecure social identity results when cognitive alternatives to 
the present intergroup situation are recognized. A number of 
concepts have been used to circumscribe this factor, both in 'real 
life' situations and in laboratory studies: 
1. Fluidity of relations and imminence of social change (Vaughan, 
1978a, 1978b; Skevington, 1980, 1981). In all the cited 
studies a natural situation was tapped. Vaughan worked in New 
Zealand over a number of years, where the different regions at 
certain times presented different forms of relations between 
the European and Maori groups. The rural regions studies were 
described as feudal in nature, with limited prospects of social 
change, whereas in the urban areas there was more fluidity in 
the relations between the groups and hence held the 'promise' 
of social change. Skevington used an event of current 
importance in the nursing profession, a parliamentary debate on 
whether State Registered Nurses (higher status group) and State 
Enlisted Nurses (lower status group) should be trained together 
(ie. merged). Proposals for this were presented in the Briggs 
Report in 1972. 
2. Stability and legitimacy (Turner and Brown, 1978). In this 
study legitimacy was manipulated by impressing on subjects the 
notion that the status situation was either reasonable and fair 
or unreasonable and unfair. Stability was manipulated by the 
experimenter specifying that he either expected or did not 
expect the status hierarchy to be validated. This closely 
follows Tajfel's (1978) definition of perceived legitimacy/ 
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illegitimacy of status differences in terms of values such as 
fairness, justice, equity and rightness; and of perceived 
stability/instability in terms of whether the status positions 
could be reversed or not. 
3. Nomic and anomie groups (Moscovici and Paicheler, 1978). A 
nomic group is a group which is sure of its position. and 
opinions and is accustomed to success. An anomie group is one 
which is threatened, unsure of its position and is accustomed 
to failure. Thus, almost by definition a nomic group is one 
with a secure social identity, and an anomie group one with an 
insecure identity. In their study, Moscovici and Paicheler 
(1978) manipulated this by leading their subjects to believe 
that they were either in the majority group or the minority 
group. This makes use of the implicit connotation that majority 
groups are the 'in' group, while minority groups are the 
outsiders : 
Tajfel 
..• when one speaks of "minorities", one is not referring 
to their number (sometimes minorities are, from the 
demographic point of view, as important as the majority) -
one is referring to the inequality of the distribution of 
power, to the logic of domination. 
(Moscovici, 1976: 19) 
does not claim that the social categorization and 
comparison processes alone are sufficient to explain the relations 
between existing social groups. He accepts that various 
sociological, economic and historical considerations are necessary 
for such an understanding (Tajfel, 1978). Billig (1976), however 
argues that cognisance of the role of ideology is essential for a 
social psychological analysis of intergroup relations: 
The basic point is that social categorizations do not arise in 
a social vacuum, but are integrated to serve pparticular 
ideological ends. 
·(Billig, 1976: 361) 
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Tajfel also does not detail how the security of the social status 
quo comes to be questioned. Du Preez (1980) suggests that: 
Factors such as the collapse of an ideology in other 
countries, war, news, the failure of the ruling classes to 
perform their central functions, a relative rise in the 
self-esteem of the excluded class (due to better performance 
or comparison with like people in other countries and capacity 
to wring concessions out of those who rule), will contribute 
to questioning the legitimacy of a social order. 
(du Preez, 1980: 40) 
However, using his basic formulation, Tajfel is able to predict 
the intergroup behaviour of groups under the various conditions of 
status evalution and identity security. These predictions may be 











A: Groups in this category are deemed superior, and this status is 
viewed as unalterable. Tajfel suggests a possible example of 
such a group is the position of men relative to women which 
prevailed in some cultures at certain historical periods 
(Tajfel, 1974a). Tajfel considers such groups to be rarities, 
since the conditions which would enable this superiority to be 
perpetuated, free of threat from the inferior group are 
extremely difficult to maintain. In consequence, he refrains 
from making conjectures about their intergroup behaviour. 
However, the nomic majorities defined by Moscovici and 
Paicheler (1978) may be argued to fulfil these criteria. These 
authors hypothesize that such a group will exhibit the 
interindividual mode of behaviour, being able to tolerate the 
existence of a different group and to decentre its own 
identification. Thus, little intergroup bias is anticipated. 
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This was in fact confirmed by the results of their study 
(Moscovici and Paicheler, 1978). 
B: Low status groups, in circumstances where the status relations 
is perceived as static, are considered in this section. Two 
contingencies are distinguished, depending on whether or not 
conditions are condu?ive to individuals leaving the group. 
(i) Conditions condu9ive to leaving: Typically, the social 
mobility response will occur, with members attempting to leave 
the group to enter the more highly valued one. These members 
tend to direct their 'positive relations' (ie. expressions of 
admiration ~nd approval) to the higher status group and their 
'negative relations' to their own lower status group (Thibaut, 
1950; Mann, 1961; Skevington, 1981). 
(ii) Conditions not conducive to leaving: Examples of this are 
•/ 
the lower castes of India, and the Negroes of Southern U.S.A. 
and colonized Africans at certain periods in history. Under 
these conditions the group members will seek to enhance their 
self-image through individual means. This may be achieved 
through comparing their individual positions with other members 
of the group (eg. attaining relative status through becoming 
'chief' slave), or through psychologically dissociating 
th~mselves from the group Und~r both these conditions there is 
likely to be a denigration of the ingroup and esteem of the 
outgroup, ie. negative ethnocentrism. Characteristically, there 
is little ingroup favouritism and frequently there is bias in 
favour of the outgroup (Tajfel et al, 1970; Tajfel et al, 1972; 
Asher and Allen, 1969; Milner, 1973; Skevington, 1980). 
C: This_ca"t:t;:90J:y r~fers to high status groups with insecure status 
r-elations. T~'j fel Cl9'7'8')" defi:n.e.s t:.;.,o .c.ondit.i.on~D·.··i·~~-d.~:Flg ··to· "this ' 
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insecure identity: 
(i) The group's position i's under threat from another lower 
status group. 
(ii) The superior status embodies a contradiction of moral 
values some members may perceived their status as based on 
unfair advantages, injustice or exploitation. 
Exit from the group, under either condition, is not a frequent 
occurrence, though possible examples may be found in the 
'hippy' movement (dropping out of the middle class life style) 
and the radical left movement where working class status is 
adopted by (former) members of the bourgeoisie. 
The more characteristic response is for defensive 
distinctiveness to arise, with the resultant increase of 
intergroup discrimination. This has been illustrated in a 
number of studies (van Knippenberg, 1978: Moscovici and 
Paicheler, 1978: Commins and Lockwood, 1979: Skevington, 1980) 
D: This pertains to low status groups where the status hierarchy 
is perceived as mutable. Members of such groups will tend to 
enhance their social identity through social action. Two basic 
strategies may be used: 
(i) Social creativity - This refers to the attempt to establish 
equality with the superior group by (a) redefining as positive 
group characteristics which were previously negatively valued 
(eg. the 'Black is Beautiful' movement): or creating new 
dimensions on which the group is seen as positively distinct 
from the superior group (Lemaine et al, 1978: Turner and Brown, 
1978). 
(ii) Social action - This includes the various tactics used in 
attempting to change the social order e.g. giving 'voice' 
· ·.(·Ta:j·:~:e-_r:i:':T:97s), ·political protest~·· strikes, revolution. 
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These groups characteristically exhibit strong ingroup 
favouritism, emerging from assertive distinctiveness (Hraba and 
Grant, 1970; Branthwaite and Jones, 1975; Lemaine et al, 1978; 
Branthwaite et al, 1979). 
The previous discussion may be clarified by the following 
graphical representation of the relative degrees of ingroup bias 










There are a number of criticisms that may be levelled at the 
cognitive-motivational theory. Most of them pertain to Tajfel's 
basic formulation of the social categorization - social identity -
social comparison tripod which specifies that (a) the outgroup 
must be perceived as a comparison group; (b) that the individual 
must subjectively identify with the ingroup; and (c) the dimension 
of comparison must be recognized .and shared by both comparison 
groups •...... .· ...... :.·. 
. ·#:···· 
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Tajfel and Turner (1979) suggest that the relevance of the 
comparison outgroup is determined by such variables as similarity, 
proximity and situational salience. However, there has been little 
systematic attempt to identify the factors and processes 
circumscribing the acceptance of comparison groups, though a 
number of findings do suggest that these variables are important. 
Turner (1978b) found more ingroup bias when the outgroup was 
perceived as similar to the ingroup, but this occurred only under 
conditions of secure status. When the status differences were 
unstable there was a tendency for subjects to be more biased when 
the outgroup was dissimilar. A number of studies have also 
demonstrated that there is more ingroup bias when the outgroup has 
high salience than when it has low salience (McKillip et al, 1977; 
Taylor et al, 1978). It is, however, questionable whether these 
findings have direct relevance to the issue, since the comparison 
groups in these studies were determined and imposed by the 
experimenter. It is clear that a more rigorous investigation into 
factors determining comparability is required, which would include 
a careful analysis of the ideological and societal forces that 
influence this process among real groups. 
The question of what factors determine 
with a group is largely glossed 
subjective identification 
over by Tajfel. There is an 
implicit assumption that subjective identification is subsumed 
within the social categorization process. Tajfel (1969b, 1970b) 
notes that children internalize their national and ethnic 
identities and attitudes before they cognitively understand the 
meaning of these categories. The existence of intergroup bias in 
children is explained in terms of their tendency to dichotomise 
along the lines of 'good' and 'bad', 'like' and 'dis·like'. These 
dichotomies are superimposed on social categories leading to bias, 
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which is further reinforced by numerous social influences. Thus, 
the categorization process together with socialization effects may 
be used to account for the development of subjective 
identification in 'natural' groups. But this cannot explain 
identification within the minimal group paradigm. It is assumed 
that since the subjects exhibited ingroup bias, they must have 
identified with the provided categories. Initially, Tajfel 
(1970a) considered the ingroup bias a result of a 'generic norm' 
of Western society, whereby the inculcated norms of general 
intergroup behaviour (ingroup favouritism outgroup 
discrimination) is extrapolated to any group situation. This 
explanation was later discounted as tautologous (Tajfel, 1978). 
Turner (1975a, 1978a) suggested that the subjects did not identify 
with the categories, as such, but rather used them as a vehicle 
through which they could exercise their social competitiveness. 
Turner (1975a) distinguishes social competition from real 
competition real competition refers to rivalry for concrete 
rewards, whereas social competition refers to. the drive for 
positive social identity. This is exemplified by the finding that 
if subjects are allowed to allocate money/points to themselves and 
another, they will frequently sacrifice personal real gain in 
favour of relative superiority over the other person (Turner, 
1975a, 1978a; Turner et al, 1979). However, this concept of social 
competition does not contribute to the understanding of 
subjective, often emotive identifications with a group. If social 
competition alone was the primary determinant, it would presumably 
be a simple matter to take on or cast off social group 
affiliations. This is palpably not the case. 
Zavalloni's (1971, 1975) research further complicates matters by 
demonstrating that it is possible for a person to identify with a 
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group, associate certain traits with that group and yet not see 
her/himself as possessing these traits. Thus the nature and means 
of · the contribution that group membership provides -to 
self-identity remains an important question. It is, perhaps, 
fitting to end this discussion by pointing out that Freud himself 
could not shed much light on this question : 
In the preface to the Hebrew edition of 
again in his address to the Society of 
(1926, Vol, 20), Freud recognises his 
admits his inability to explain 
identification. 
Totem and Taboo, and 
B'nai B'rith in Vienna 
Jewish identity, but 
the nature of this 
(Billig, 1976: 325) 
The issue of how dimensions of comparisons come to be recognized 
and shared is also not dealt with in Tajfel's theory. Various 
authors have noted that the dominant group determines what 
attributes are considered important and used for comparison 
(Moscovici and Paicheler, 1978; Billig, 1976). This has been 
demonstrated empirically in a study by van Knippenberg (1978) in 
which he found that the group valued the dimensions on which it 
was superior far more than the comparison group. However, in this 
study the dimensions of comparison was provided by the 
experimenter. To understand how these dimensions arise and are 
instituted in societal groups, it is necessary to consider the 
role of ideology and the linguistic system perpetuating it 
(Billig, 1976). 
From the above discussion, it is clear that further research is 
required to elaborate these inadequacies. At present, there is no 
evidence that would dispute the theory as a whole, though a number 
of alternative interpretations have been proposed. Two of these 
alternatives are presented below. 
·.~ .. 
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2.5.1. Cognitive versus motivational explanations 
Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations incorporates both 
cognitive and motivational aspects. Doise (1978), however, 
proposes a model of intergroup relations based entirely on the 
cognitive process of category differentiation. This model 
maintains that the social categorization operation leads members 
of the ingroup to perceive themselves as more similar to each 
other and more distinctly different from the outgroup, through the 
polarization accentuation principle discussed earlier. This in 
turn gives rise to behavioural, evaluative and representational 
differentiation in treatment between the ingroup and outgroup. 
This explanation is based fundamentally on the supposition of a 
general norm of behaviour in society leading to such 
discriminations. As mentioned previously, this assumption was 
initially proposed by Tajfel (1970a) but later rejected as a 
tautologous and non-heuristic explanation (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 
1980). Although Do~se (1978) has interpreted many of the findings 
of both Sherif and Tajfel in terms of this model, there are 
certain forms of intergroup behaviour that it cannot explain. 
This inadequacy became apparent in the study by Doise and Sinclair 
(1973). To explain why the lower status 'apprentis' show a bias in 
favour of the higher status 'collegiens', the researchers were 
forced to postulate the existence of two scales. They 
hypothesize, 
place on the 
in a rather ad hoc manner, that categorization took 
'social status scale·• and on the 'ethnocentric 
scale'. Furthermore, van Knippenberg and Wilke (1979) have argued 
that the results of this study are better explained using the 
social identity-social comparison theory. An important criticism 
that may be made is that the category differentiation model is a 
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very static view of society and cannot suitably account for 
processes of social change. 
Turner's position is one which largely discounts the importance of 
the cognitive process of categorization and focuses almost 
exclusively on the motivational aspects (Turner, 1975a, 1978a; 
Turner et al, 1979). As mentioned previously, he interprets the 
role of categorization as providing a means through which the 
individual can exercise social competitiveness. Turner (1975a, 
·1978a) demonstrated that if the matrix task is adapted so that the 
subject is able to allocate points to him/herself as well as to 
members of the ingroup and outgroup, the subject will not use the 
group categories as a basis for discrimination. This supports his 
view that ingroup bias only occurs if the subject has no other 
means of competing. However, if the subjects are first required to 
distribute points between the ingroup and outgroup before being 
allowed to allocate money to themselves, they will continue to 
exhibit intergroup discrimination, tempering their 
self-favouritism with ingroup favouritism (Turner,· 1978a). This 
would appear to indicate that once subjects had identified with 
the ingroup this identification persists (Billig, 1976). Thus 
social competition on an individualistic basis was not strong 
enough to reverse the social categorization tendency. In view of 
1 
; 
this, a reinterpretation of Turner's first results could be made, 
hypothesizing that the opportunity to award points to oneself 
resulted in a three group situation being established - the self, 
the ingroup and the outgroup. This, in a sense, creates a 
situation of cross-category membership. Research on 
cross-category membership has shown that ingroup bias is reduced 
under these conditions (Deschamps, 1977; Deschamps and Doise, 
1978), which would concur with Turner's finding. Brown and Turner 
\ 
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(1979) contested this interpretation, proposing that the reduced 
ingroup bias in the latter study was due to the complexity of the 
task required of the subjects in the crossed-category condition, 
not to the lessening effects of categorization. Further research 
is required to settle this dispute. 
Oakes and Turner (1980) found higher self-esteem in subjects who 
had performed the matrix task than in subjects who performed a 
neutral task, which was interpreted as evidence that motivational 
processes were involved in the intergroup discrimination task. 
There is little doubt that motivational processes are an important 
feature of intergroup relations, but it is questionable whether 
they can account for much of intergroup behaviour without the 
framework of social categorization. 
From the preceeding discussion it may be concluded that neither a 
wholly cognitive nor a wholly motivational model can suitably 
account for intergroup behaviour. 
This chapter has presented the basic propositions of the 
cognitive-motivational theory, concentrating on the theory's 
prediction for ingroup bias under the different status and 
security of social identity conditions. The empirical evidence 
reviewed provides considerable support for many aspects of the 
theory, though further research is clearly required. But, despite 
I 
the short-comings discussed, the theory provides an excellent 
framework· for understanding intergroup relations. 
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3. RATIONALE 
The underlying motivation for this study emerged from an interest 
in the psychology of women, in particular from the position of 
women as a minority group. The cognitive-motivational theory 
therefore, provides a means of understanding and predicting their 
intergroup relations. However, women are faced with a number of 
unique influences by virtue of their position in society. This 
study represents a preliminary investigation into the effect of 
possible factors. 
3.1. Women as a minority group 
The definition of a 'minority• group presents a number of 
difficulties. While many definitions have been proposed, none can 
adequately include all minority groups at their various stages of 
development (Tajfel, 1979b). There is general agreement that 
minorities are not necessarily numerically smaller than 
majorities; that they are negatively evaluated and discriminated 
against by the dominant group and that this has psychological 
repercussions for members of the minority groups. 
Women have been widely recognised as constituting a minority 
group, though they have rarely been studied as such in the 
behavioural sciences (Hochschild, 1973). The similarities between 
the position of blacks and of women are plain. Both are 
discriminated against in terms of limitation on education, 
confinement to traditional jobs, deprived of political importance 
and suffer social and professional segregation. ·similar 
stereotypes 
:·:.·;· ... ·. .. . . are ....... as.c.r.ibed· to bo:t:h· · -· inferior intelligence, 
. . ' ... 
emotional and moral weakness, etc~ (Hacker, 1951; Hochschild, 
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1973; Sunar, 1978). The psychological effects of their minority 
status also bears certain similarities the accommodation to 
their positions through differential attitudes towards the 
dominant group as well as their subjective feelings toward their 
own group. Firestone (1972} goes further than drawing analogies 
and proposes that racism is merely an extension of sexism. Marx 
and Engels also recognized sexism as the first instance of class 
oppression: 
The first class opposition that appears in history coincides 
with the development of the antagonism between man and woman 
in monogamous marriage, and the first class oppression 
coincides with.that of the female sex by the male. 
(Engels, 1974: 480) 
Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations is relevant to the study 
of women as a minority group. The consequences of a negative 
social identity in secure social orders has been well documented 
in the theory - the denigration of the ingroup, acceptance of the 
negative evaluations and stereotypes and consequent learned 
helplessness. These anticipated reactions have been observed to 
occur in women (Hacker, 1951; Pheterson et al 1971; Goldberg, 
1974; Goldberg et al, 1975). The 'Queen Bee' syndrome, in which 
highly achieving women psychologically dissociate themselves from 
their group and use males as their reference figures, is also a 
typical strategy. These patterns typify the weak group 
identification and consciousness prevalent among women (Gurin et 
al, 1980; Kalmuss et al, 1981). But some women do perceive the 
illegitimacy of the situation and are moving towards the social 
action strategy. Williams and Giles (1978) detail numerous 
instances of this: attempts to gain equality in work, education, 
social status; attempts to redefine women's 'inferiority' through 
objecting to the negative image of women perpe·tua·ted in the 
· .. ' ··eu·lture, ·~nd th:~;~~gh. ·emphasizing the .. positive attributes of women. 
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The defensive reaction of the dominant group, men, is also 
~vident: the denigration of women's attempts to change the status 
quo, eg. the anti-'women libbers• jokes; the denunciation of 
feminists as being sexually, emotionally or physically deficient. 
Brownmiller (1976) further suggests that rape is covertly 
sanctioned by all men as a means of 'keeping women in their 
place •. 
However, there are factors which militate against women forming 
strong identification with their group and hinder the move towards 
social action. Women as a minority group are unique in that their 
lives are completely enmeshed with members of the outgroup: 
• 
" 
Women have played a specific role in male-led society in ways 
no other suppressed groups have done. They have been entwined 
with men in intimate and intense relationships, creating the 
milieu the family - in which the human mind as we know it 
has been formed. 
(Miller, 1978: 1) 
Women are socialized to define themselves in terms of men and 
existing only in conjunction with men (Friedan, 1963; Angrist~ 
1969; Weitz, 1977; Weinreich, 1978; Weitzman, 1979). To understand 
how this affects the development of women's subjective 
identification with their group and their movement towards social 
action, it is necessary to consider these factors within the 
'framework of the cognitive-motivational theory. A number of 
variables may be isolated from women's social position for 
consideration: 
1. Cooperation: Women are in constant cooperation with men, 
within the family and elsewhere, throughout life. This factor 
is discussed at length below. 
2. Crossed category membership: Women are invariably members of 
other groups, which may also be minority groups within the 
society e.g. subordinate race or ethnic groups. Mitchell 
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(1966) identifies women's involvement with other political 
movements, eg. civil rights and new left movements, as one of 
the factors which retarded the development of the feminist 
movement. Cock (1980) illustrated how the race-cum-class 
divisions in South Africa obstructs the development of group 
consciousness as women. 
Studies on crossed membership have given contradictory 
results'. Deschamps (1977) and Deschamps and Doise (1978) found 
that ingroup bias decreased under these conditions. Brown and 
Turner (1979), however, found evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that ingroup bias is additive, ie. there is more 
favouritism towards people who share both one's category 
memberships, less towards people who share only one and least 
to those who share none. More research is required to 
determine which prediction is correct and to elaborate the 
implications for women. 
3. Individuation of outgroup: women's continual personal contact 
with men prevents perception of the outgroup as a dehumanized 
unit which is dissimilar from the ingroup. Studies by Wilder 
(1978) and Wilder and Thompson (1980) have shown that ingroup 
bias decreases as outgroup contact increases, and when the 
outgroup is seen as individuated. Skevington's (1980) findings 
indicate that the subordinate groups are more influenced by 
this factor than dominant groups. 
4. Psychodynamic and ideological influences which counteract the 
formation of a subjective identification with women as a 
group. 
As a first step in attempting to understand the position of women 
within .. :t,he. cognJ tiye-motivational theory of in-tergroup relations, 
···. ·.: .. .. 
this study·wiTl focus on.the variable, cooperation. However, this 
does not negate the possible 
While other minority groups 
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importance of the other factors. 
are subjected to the influence of 
crossed category membership and individuation of the outgroup, 
cooperation to the degree experienced by women is rare. 
3.2. Cooperation 
Research dealing with cooperation as a variable falls into four 
basic categories. These are studies which investigate: 
1. The effect of cooperation within groups on intragroup 
relations. These studies typically focus on problems such as 
decision-making, leadership, group organization and group 
processes (cf. Davis et al, 1976). 
2. The effect of cooperation between groups on intragroup 
relations. Investigations into the effects of cooperation, 
usually contrasted with competition, on variables such as 
intragroup cohesiveness, conformity and interpersonal 
attributions fall into this category (cf. Dion, 1979; Stephan 
et al, 1979). 
3. The effect of cooperation within groups on intergroup 
relations. These studies have focused on the effect of 
competition 
attitudes to 
versus cooperation between group members on 
the outgroup. Results indicate that the effects 
dependent upon whether the group is perceived as are 
successful and strong, or unsuccessful or weak. Competitive 
groups displayed high ingroup bias, but this was significantly 
lower when the group was weak or unsuccessful. Cooperative 
groups were more positive towards the outgroup, especially 
when the ing.roup was weak or unsuccessful ( Rabbie et al, 1974; 
Kennedy and Stephan, 1977). 
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4. The effect of cooperation between groups on intergroup 
relations. This category is of primary interest in this _study. 
Research on the effect of intergroup cooperation on ingroup bias 
has produced contradictory results. The work of Sherif (1966), and 
Blake and Mouton (1962) led to the conclusion that intergroup bias 
and nostility result from competitive interaction between groups, 
·, and this is reduced or even revoked by intergroup cooperation. 
However, other studies have found that either the same degree of 
ingroup bias was elicited in cooperative as in competitive 
conditions (Doise et al, 1972; Brewer and Silver, 1978), or a 
lesser though still significant degree was elicited in the 
cooperating groups (Kahn and Ryen, 1972; cited in Turner, in 
press). Reviewing the work on intergroup relations, Turner (in 
press) observed that all intergroup interaction: competitive, 
cooperative or coactive, whether actual or anticipated, elicits 
ingroup bias. He argued that intergroup contact enhances the 
salience of the ingroup-outgroup distinction, resulting in 
intergroup discrimination. 
However, cooperation has been found to reduce ingroup bias under 
certain conditions. Worchel et al (1977) compared the effect of a 
successful versus unsuccessful cooperative endeavour on the 
outgroup attitudes of groups which had previous experience of a 
cooperative, competitive or independent interaction with that 
outgroup. The results indicated that when the outcome was 
successful there was a reduction in ingroup bias regardless of the 
previous experience. When the outcome was not successful, the 
reduction only occurred when the previous experience had been 
cooperative. Worchel et al (1977) suggested that the success 
experienc.ed. allowed th·~· 'ingr6up.:...o·u1!g::t:ou:p. d{stincti.on to fade. This 
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explanation was supported when the study was repeated, while also 
manipulating the visibility of the ingroup-outgroup (Worchel et 
al, 1978) . In the high visibility condition, cooperation failed 
to reduce ingroup bias. Worchel and Norvell (1980) also found that 
if environmental conditions could be blamed for the failure of the 
cooperative endeavour, ingroup bias was reduced in groups with a 
J . 
previous history of competition. From the above studies it may be 
In summary, it appears that the simplistic functionalist argument 
that cooperation per se reduces intergroup discrimination - may be 
( . . 
d1scounted. However, there 1s a trend emerging from the work of 
Worchel and his associates, which indicates that cooperation 
reduces ingroup bias only in circumstances where the salience of 
the intergroup distinctiveness is de-emphasized (Worchel, 1979). 
It is significant to note that none of the studies on cooperation 
have considered the effect of status and of security of social 
identity. The various conditions of status and security result in 
different degrees of salience of intergroup distinctiveness. 
Hence if the above hypothesis is correct, it may be predicted that 
cooperation will interact differentially with status and security 
' 
~n its effect on intergroup bias. Two studies indirectly support 
this prediction. Weigel et al (1975) described a teaching 
programme designed to reduce interracial conflict in a newly 
~ 
' desegregated school consisting of black, white and AmericanMexican 
... 
children. In their results, the authors report increased positive 
attitudes and behaviour between the white and American-Mexican 
children, but not between the blacks and the other two groups. It 
could be argued that the lower status o·f the black children may 
have been a significant factor. Skevington (1980) reported that 
the cooper-ative nature of the (high status) SRN' s and (low status) . 
. . . . . . 
SEN's work was viewed with more hostility by the lower status 
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nurses (SEN's). Thus, there are indications that a more formal 
investigation of the variable, cooperation within the framework of 
the cognitive-motivational theory is needed. 
3.3. Aims of the present study 
This study was designed to investigate the effect of cooperation, 
in conjunction with status and security of social identity, using 
the minimal group paradigm. In accordance with the paradigm, the 
following specifications were met : 
1. Subjects were randomly assigned to the different groups. 
2. Group membership was anonymous - subjects knew their own group 
membership, but not that of any other subjects. 
3. There was no face-to-face interaction between subjects. 
4. The behavioural response required of the subjects had no 
direct utilitarian value to them. 
To establish the status hierarchy, the groups were allegedly 
created on the basis of certain personality dimensions. This 
differs from the usual practice of creating groups on the basis of 
irrelevant attributes. 
Insecurity of the status hierarchy, ie. of social identity was 
manipulated by questioning the validity of the means of 
determining the status group. This was conceived as a function of 
legitimacy rather than stability. However, as Tajfel (1979b) 
points out: 
... a theoretical separation of perceived instability and 
illegitimacy cannot be taken very far without losing touch 
with social reality. 
.(Tajfel, 1979b: 9) 
This factor was therefore termed legitimacy (or illegitimacy) 
throughout the study. 
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Three cooperation conditions were established: no cooperation, 
co~peration with the ingroup and cooperation with the outgroup. 
The no cooperation condition acted as a control condition, and 
t 
also allowed for a test of the effects of status and legitimacy 
a~one. In accordance with the cognitive-motivational theory, it 
J 
i~ anticipated that there will be an interaction between status 
and legitimacy in this condition. As described in chapter 2, there 
should be high ingroup bias, and strong group distinctiveness in 
both the illegitimate high status group (emerging from a defensive 
position) and the illegitimate low status group (resulting from an 
assertive position). The legitimate high status group is expected 
to exhibit ingroup bias, but less so than the illegitimate groups, 
since their secure social identity obviates the need for 
assertiveness or defensiveness. The legitimate low status group 
should exhibit negligible ingroup favouritism, since the negative 
evaluation of the group, which adversely affects the members' 
self-concept, is perceived as unalterable. 
~ 
Cooperation with the ingroup was expected to result in an 
a6centuation of the above effects. If, as predicted, the effect of 
ihtergroup cooperation is related to salience of group 
distinctiveness, it is expected that ingroup bias will be more 
reduced in the legitimacy conditions than in the illegitimacy 
conditions. In summary, it was hypothesized that there would be: 
(a) An interaction between the three factors; status, legitimacy 
and cooperation, in their effects on ingroup bias. 
{b) An interaction between status and legitimacy, with stronger 
ingroup bias being evident in the illegitimate {high and low 
status) conditions than in the legitimate, occurring in both 
the no cooperation and intragroup cooperation cond~tions. 
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(c) A reduction of ingroup bias in the legitimacy conditions after 
intergroup cooperation, but not in the illegitimacy 
conditions. 
A number of indices of ingroup bias were measured. The most 
important of these was ingroup favouritism, defined as a strategy 
attempting to achieve highest profit for ones own groups as well 
as maximizing 
indicated the 
be fair, or 
recipients • 
.... . . . . ··· 
the 'win' over the outgroup. Other measures 
relative pull this strategy had over the motive to 





126 first year Psychology students were subjects in this study, 
which was offered as one of the options available in their 
·Practical Programme. Thus participation in the experiment 
contributed towards their Course credits, as well as offering 
monetry reward. 12 subjects, 8 women and 4 men, were used for the 
control study; and the remaining 114, 
participated in the main experiment. 
4.2. Apparatus 
4.2.1. Barron-Welsh Art Scale 
70 women and 44 men, 
The Barron-Welsh Art Scale, which is derived from the Welsh Figure 
Preference Test, is essentially a test of artistic potential and 
creativity. The test consists of a book containing eighty-six 
8x5cm black and white drawings. Testees are required to .indicate 
whether _they like or dislike each of the drawings on a standard 
answer sheet. As the Scale was not used as a measuring device, but 
as a 1 blind•, the properties of the Barron-Welsh will not be 
detailed. 
The function of the Barron-Welsh Art Scale in this study was to 
provide the means by which the Subjects were (allegedly) divided 
into two groups, and a status hierarchy e~tablished between these 
two groups. Subjects were told that the Scale distinguishes two 
. . • 
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"types of artistic potential, one called Gamma and the other 
called Delta". In the status conditions, they were told that 
certain personality traits were linked with the different types of 
artistic potential: 
People with 'Delta type potential' tend to be highly creative, 
innovative, individualistic, unpredictable, energetic and 
questioning. 
Whereas 
People with 'Gamma type potential' tend to 




The terms 'Gamma' and 'Delta' were fabricated, though the 
personality traits mentioned were selected from a number reputed 
to be correlated with various subscales of the test (Barron; 1952, 
1953). To a cert.ain extent the dichotomy mirrors that of the 
Complexity-Similarity dimension detailed by Barron (1953). 
However, the actual traits used were selected on the following 
basis: The one set had to be more desirable than the other (i.e. 
have higher status); and at the same time the 'low status' set 
could not be too negative. This was in view of certain ethical 
considerations. Debriefing could not take place immediately due 
to the risk of disclosure to untested Subjects. Thus some Subjects 
would have to live with the unfounded belief that they possessed 
the 'negative' Gamma traits for up to a month, the time taken for 
all testing to be completed. Within these limitations, three pairs 
of Gamma-Delta traits were formulated and a survey of independent 
judges asked to select which of each pair of personality traits 
was most desirable. The pair in which the Delta set was 
unanimously selected was used in the study • 
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4.2.2. Maze task 
This task was designed to create a situation requiring cooperation 
between two Subjects, in the sense that they had to work together 
t"owards a common goal (maximizing their monet~<y gain), while at 
the same time keeping their identities hidden. It was also 
necessary that the same task be performed by a lone Subject 
without much adjustment. 
The apparatus consisted of five pieces of equipment: 
(i) a Data General MicroNova Computer; 
(ii) a Visual Display Unit (VDU); 
(iii) a closed-circuit television; 
(iv) a control box consisting of a panel of 4 different 
coloured light bulbs and a set of 4 touch sensitive 
pads; and 
(v) a signal box consisting of 4 switches and a cancel button. 
The television was used only in the Control and No Cooperation 
conditions, to relay the display on the VDU to the appropriate 
room. The,VDU and the touch pads of the control box were wired to 
the computer, and the switches of the signal box were connected to 
the light bulbs of the control box through an independent 
electricity source. The buttons on the signal box each turned on 
one of the light bulbs on the control box, while the cancel button 
switched them all off. The touch pads, the light bulbs and the 
signal box switches were appropriately labelled 'UP', 'DOWN', 
'RIGHT' or 'LEFT'. The VDU and signal box, along with the 
computer were situated in Room A; and the control box, and the 
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Figure 4-1. Maze Apparatus 
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Three different mazes were used, one as a practice example and two 
' 
on which measurements were recorded (See Appendix B). The mazes 
were individually displayed on the VDU with a movable marker •x• 
at the start point. The marker had to be moved through the maze to 
an exit on one of the other sides. This marker was controlled by 
the touch pads on the control box. Each pad moved the •x• one step 
in one of four directions - up, down, left or right. An attempt to 
direct the •x• into a barrier resulted in a tone sounding in both 
experiment~! rooms, but no movement. This constituted an error. 
The time taken for the Subjects to complete the two mazes, and the 
number of errors made, was recorded and immediately filed on the 
floppy disc under the Subject•s name as part of the computer 
programme. 
In the Control and No Cooperation conditions, the screen of the 
VDU was relayed on the television screen in Room B. Subjects 
directed the •x• through the mazes using the control box while 
watching the maze on the television. The light bulbs and signal 
box were not used at all in this condition. In the Cooperation 
conditions, the Subject in Room A observed the maze on the VDU and 
instructed her/his partner how to move the •x• by switching on the 
appropriate light bulb. The Subject in Room B responded to the 
lighted bulb by touching the corresponding pad. 
4.2.3. Matrices 
These constituted the instrument with which intergroup bias was 
measured. Five sets of matrices were selected from the various 
experiments of Tajfel and his co-workers (Tajfel, 1970: Tajfel et 
al, 1971: Billig & Tajfel, 1973: Tajfel & Billig, 1974). These 
matrices, which consist of 13 or 14 vertical pairs of numbers, 
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were each presented in four different ways. Each presentation is 
set out on a separate page of the matrix booklet in a manner that 
makes it clear that the top set of points were to be received by 
one person, and the bottom set to be received by another. These 
recipients were identified only by a code number and a group name, 
Delta or Gamma. The distinction between Delta and Gamma group 
members was reinforced by using code numbers from 1 to 80 for 
·Gamma members and from 600 to 680 for Delta members. An example of 







Figure 4-2. Matrices 
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The four presentations of each matrix varied the possible 
combinations of group membership of the two recipients: 
(i) both· recipients were members of the Subject's group, i.e. 
the ingroup (I/I): 
(ii) both recipients were members of the group to which the 
Subject did not belong, i.e. the outgroup (0/0): 
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(iii) the top recipient was a member of the ingroup, the bottom a 
member of the outgroup (I/O); and 
(iv) vice-versa (0/I). 
For each presentation of the matrices,.the Subject was required to 
select one of the boxes containing a pair of numbers, knowing that 
the top number's worth of cents would be given to the upper 
recipient, and the bottom to the lower recipient. In selecting 
the box, there were four main strategies the Subject could employ: 
1. Fairness (F): selecting the box which most nearly gives both 
recipients an equal amount of points (money); 
2. Maximum Joint Profit (MJP): selecting the box which maximizes 
the totalled points to be given out, irrespective of the 
relative distribution among the two recipients; 
3. Maximum Ingroup Profit (MIP): selecting the box which gives the 
ingroup member the most number of points; and 
4. Maximum Differentiation in favour of the ingroup (MD): 
selecting the box which gives the largest discrepancy between 
the points of the two recipients, the most being allocated to 
the ingroup member. 
4.2.4. Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
This classic 'non-zero-sum' game, which presents players with the 
option of making either a competitive choice (confessing) or a 
cooperative one (not confessing), was presented using standard 
instructions (Freedman et al, 1970). Five different situations 
were presented varying the amount of reward or penalty that could 
result from the different combinations of choices. The situations 
are represented below. 
The two people playing are termed A and B; and their choices are X 
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(not to confess) or Y (to confess): 
Figure 4-3. Prisoner's Dilemma Game Outcomes 
I) A II) A 
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Each of these situations was presented on a separate page of a 
booklet. The front page of the booklet detailed the 'story' behind 
the game and explained how the decision to confess or not would be 
converted to a gain or loss of money for the two players. (See 
Appendix D). 
The Subject's partner in this game was either another Subject 
randomly assigned (Control and No Cooperation conditions), or the 
same person with whom the Subject did the maze task (Cooperation 
conditions). 
The number of times (out of 5) the Subject chose to confess was 
used as a measure of competitiveness. 
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4.2.5. Subjective questionnaires 
After each stage in the experiment the Subjects were required to 
complete a questionnaire: 
A.l was completed immediately after the Barron-Welsh Art Scale 
had been filled out and removed. 
A.2 was completed after the 'purpose' of the Barron-Welsh had 
been explained to the Subject. (See Appendix A). In the 
Control condition this questionnaire was given at the end of 
the study, after Questionnaire D. 
B was completed after the maze task. Slightly different forms 
of the questionnaire were presented to the'Cooperation and No 
Cooperation conditions. 
C was completed after the matrix booklet had been filled in and 
removed. 
D was completed after the Prisoner's Dilemma Game was removed. 
Again, slightly different forms of the questionnaire were 
given to the Cooperation and No Cooperation conditions. 
E was completed after leaving the experimental situation. 
Aside from providing a general notion of how the Subjects viewed 
the study (i.e. what they thought it was about, what they felt 
affected their responses, etc), the questionnaires had a number of 
specific functions. 
Question No. 2 of A.2 asked the Subject to decide to which of the 
two groups, Delta or Gamma, s/he thought s/he belonged. This was 
intended to ensure the Subject connected the given characteristics 
to the group name, underlining the 'status' differences. 
In questionnaire B the Subjects were asked to rate, on a 5 point 
scale: 
(a) how well they felt they, personally, had performed on the maze 
task; 
(b) how well they, working with their partner, had done; and 
(c) whether they thought they could have done better with a 
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Subjects were also asked to rate (in D) whether their previous 
partnership (on the maze task) with the other 'prisonner' affected 
their decisions on the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. It was hoped that 
these measures might give an indication as to whether the 
condition manipulations had succeeded. 
In Questionnaire C the Subjects were asked to articulate the 
strategy they had used in making their choices on the matrices, as 
another possible source of useful information. 
4.3. Design 
4.3.1. Control study 
A simple two group design was used. In this study, the terms, 
'Delta' and 'Gamma' were used as category names without any status 
connotation. All the dependent variables discussed below were 
analyzed in this design. 
4.3.2. Main study 
· .. 
A 3x2x2 factorial design was used. The variables manipulated were: 
A. Cooperation- No Cooperation (N.C.}; Cooperation with a member 
of the Ingroup (C.I.); and Cooperation with a 
member of the Outgroup (c.o.). 
These conditions were established using the maze 
task. In the N.C. condition the task ·was done 
alone; in the C.I. condition the Subjects were 
t010 that their partner was a member of the same 
\ .... ' 
group (Gamma or Delta), and in the c.o. condition 
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the Subjects were told their partner was a member 
of the 'opposite' group. 
B. Status- High Status (H.S.) and Low Status (L.S.). The status 
hierarchy was established through the personality 
traits associated with each group. As mentioned 
previously, the traits linked with Delta group had 
been assessed as more desirable those associated with 
Gamma group. The Delta group thus represented H.s. and 
the Gamma group L.S. 
C. Legitimacy (of the status hierarchy)- Legitimate (Leg.) and 
Illegitimate (Illeg.). This condition was 
manipulated through the information given to the 
Subjects about the Barron-Welsh. In the Legitimate 
condition the Subjects were given to believe that 
the association of the personality traits with the 
groups was a well validated and replicated research 
finding. In the Illegitimate condition, Subjects 
















Figure 4-4. Main Study Design 
STATUS 
4.3.3. Dependent variables 
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The following variables were measured using the appropriate 
' 
matrices: 
1. Ingroup Favouritism (Fav) - This is defined as the combination 
of Maximum Ingroup Profit (MIP) and Maximum Differentiation 
(MD). The I/O and O/I presentations of matrices A and B were 
used to measure this. The distance of the chosen box from the 
point of maximum fairness (i.e. midway between the 7th and 8th 
boxes) was calculated for each of these 4 matrices. The 
distance was counted as negative if this box gave more money to 
the outgroup member. The mean of these 4 scores represented the 
measure of degree of Ingroup Favouritism. 
2. Pull of Maximum Differentiation on Maximum Joint Profit and 
Maximum Ingroup Profit (MD on MJP+MIP). This was assessed using 
the I/O and 0/I presentations of matrix c. The measure of the 
degree of this pull was the difference between the boxes chosen 
- <OJ1:. th~ ·:two .. p.res~pt.ations. 'Phi·~: score was negatively signed if 
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the outgroup was favoured. 
3. Pull of Ingroup Favouritism on Fairness (Fav on F). This was 
assessed using the I/O and 0/I presentations of matrix D. The 
degree of this pull was again measured as the difference 
between the boxes chosen on the two presentations. A negative 
score occurred if the difference favoured the outgroup. 
4. Pull of Ingroup Favouritism on Maximum Joint Profit (Fav on 
MJP). The I/O and 0/I presentations of matrix E was used for 
this variable. The degree of pull was measured as the 
difference between the choices on the two presentations, with 
the negative indicating that the outgroup was favoured. 
A detailed illustration of the method of calculating these 
variable scores is given in Appendix C. 
5. Competitiveness. This fifth variable was assessed as the number 
of times the Subject chose to confess on the Prisoner's Dilemma 
Game. In this game, competitiveness is the inverse of 
cooperativeness. 
4.4. Procedure 
Subjects were tested individually during the course of an 
afternoon, with approximately 10 being tested concurrently. As 
far as possible, Subjects were prevented from seeing one another. 
Their times of arrival were staggered and they were discouraged 
from leaving the room in which they were placed. Their progress 
through the stages of the experiment was monitored using signal 
lights located outside their rooms. As they finished each task the 
Subjects would switch on the signal and wait. •', 
Each $ubject experienced a similar sequence of events. On arrival 
..... 
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they were given a brief introduction and taken to a room, where 
they completed the Barron-Welsh Art Scale. This·was then removed-
allegedly to be scored and they were left to answer 
Questionnaire A.l. When finished, the Experimenter entered and 
explained the function of the Barron-Welsh Scale. In the Control 
condition this was an account of how the Scale distinguishes 
between two types of artistic potential termed Delta and Gamma. 
Care was taken not to allow any connotation of value to be 
associated with the terms. Control Subjects were taken to do the 
maze task immediately after the explanation. In the main study, 
this explanation included a description of the personality traits 
correlated with the Delta and Gamma artistic potentials, thus 
establishing the status hierarchy. These Subjects were then given 
Questionnaire A.2 to complete. 
Before taking the Subjects to do the maze task, the Experimenter. 
informed them that their Barron-Welsh responses had been scored 
and specified the group, Gamma or Delta, to which they belonged. 
Subj~cts were actually assigned to these randomly. At this point, 
Subjects in the Illegitimate condition were told that there was 
some 'controversy' surrounding the .Barron-Welsh Scale, and a 
number of criticisms which threw doubt onto the validity of the 
Scale were listed. Subjects were then taken to one of the compute~ 
rooms (A or B) to do the maze task. 
The Subjects in the Control and No Cooperation conditions 
performed the task alone, observing the maze on the television 
screen. In the Cooperation conditions two Subjects performed the 
task in partnership. These Subjects were told their partners were 
either members of the same group or of the other group, depending 
on · whe·t·her. they w.~re in the c.r. qr .c.o. condition. On completion .. · ... ~ : . 
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the Subjects were returned to one of the original testing rooms 
and given Questionnaire B to answer. 
The Experimenter next brought in the matrix booklet and 
demonstrated its use with two surrogate pages. It was emphasized 
' 
that this was the method by which the Subjects' money was to be 
allocated. In the maze task and the Prisoner's Dilemma Game the 
.rewards were calculated as a percentage of this basic allocation. 
This was intended to enhance the relevance of the matrix task. The 
surrogate pages contained matrices which did not appear in the 
booklet and which were addressed to members of groups called •x• 
and •y•. When Subjects finished the matrices, the booklet was 
removed and they were given Questionnaire C to complete. 
In the next task, the PrisOner's Dilemma Game, Subjects in the 
Control and No Cooperation conditions were told that they would be 
randomly paired with another Subject. In the Cooperation 
conditions they were told the other 'Prisoner' was the same person 
with whom they had done the maze task. Questionnaire D was 
completed when the booklet had been removed. 
When they had completed D, the Subjects in the Control condition 
were informed of the personality traits correlated with the 
groups. They were then given Questionnaire A.2 to complete. This 
made their experience equivalent with the other students, enabling 
them to do the required assignment. 
In conclusion, the Subjects were asked to complete Questionnaire E 
at home. When all the testing was finished a debriefing meeting 
was held. Subjects were informed of the deceptions involved and 
the true hypotheses of the study dis.cu·s·sed. Their earnings from 
·>-the.· ··: ~xl?er l.me!lts, which wer·e calcuL:tted · as specified, were .. .. ·· . . . . . .. 
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distributed along with details of how long they had taken to do 
the mazes (with the number of errors); how much they had been 
allocated, and how much they had won or lost in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game. 
The different conditions specified in the design were, by 
necessity, arranged in a systematic fashion. The Control study was 
completed first. The Legitimate conditions were tested next, 
followed by the Illegitimate conditions. It would have been 
preferable to randomize these conditions, but this was not 
feasible due to the risk that a tested Subject might tell a 
prospective Subject the details of the study. Such a disclosure is 







5.1. Control study 
For each of the dependent variables, an independent t test was 
performed to test for a significant difference between Delta and 
Gamma. Single sample t tests were also used to establish whether 
the variables 'existed', ie. were significantly greater than 0. 
The scores of the two groups were combined for this analysis. 
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Table 5-l. · Control Study: T Test Results 
Delta Gamma Combined T test T test 
Mean (2 samples) (1 sample) 
1. Ingroup Favouritism 
Mean 0.5000 2.7500 1. 6250 t=l.8904 + t=2.4581 * 
S.D. (1.6279) (2.4187) (2.2900) df=lO df=ll 
2. Pull of MD on MJP+MIP 
Mean 2.6667 2.8333 2.7500 t=0.0602 t=2.0822 + 
S.D. (3.7238) (5.67t6) (4.5751) df=lO df=ll 
3. Pull of Fav on F 
Mean 1. 6667 3.5000 2.5833 t=0.8287 t=2.3694 * 
S.D. (4.6332) (2.8107) (3.7769) df=lO df=ll 
.4. Pull of Fav on MJP 
Mean 1.8333 3.0000 2.4167 t=0.3535 t=l. 5263 
S.D. (5.1153) (6.2610) (5.4848) df=lO df=ll 
5. Competitiveness 
Mean 2.3333 1.5000 1.9167 t=0.6670 
S.D. (2.3381) (1.9748) (2.1088) df=lO 
+p<O.lO *p<0.05 **p<O.Ol (2-tailed) 
None of the variables indicate a difference between the Delta and 
Gamma groups at the 5% level of significance, though Ingroup 
Favouritism does come close (t=l.8904; p=0.088). Ingroup 
Favouritism; pull of MD on MJP+MIP and Competitiveness are all 
significantly greater than 0. The pull of Fav on MJP is not 
greater than 0 (t=l.526; p=O.l55), and the pull of MD on MJP+MIP 
just fails to be significant at the 5% level (t=2.0822; p=0.061). 
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5. 2.. Main study 
Each of the dependent variables was analyzed using a simple 3-way 
ANOVA, using the method for unweighted means to account for the 
discrepincy in cell size (Kirk, 1968). 
l/ 
5.2.1. Ingroup Favouritism 
Table S-2. Fav: Means and Standard Deviations 
Bl Delta (H.S.) B2 Gamma (L.S.) 
Cl Leg. C2 Illeg. Cl Leg. C2 Illeg. 
0.7778 0.4091 1. 5278 -0.5000 
Al N.C. (2.1413) (2.2144) (2.4731) (1.7480) 
9 11 9 10 
0.5556 1. 6136 1.1111 0.4500 
A2 C. I. (0.4468) (1.7477) (1.3982) (1. 6236) 
9 11 9 10 
0.2222 0.5000 1. 3611 0.2500 
A3 C.O. (0.8966) (2.6190) (2.1254} (2.6605) 
9 9 9 9 
Table 5-3. Fav: AN OVA Summary Table 
SOURCE ss DF MS F 
A (Cooperation) 3.3547 2 1.6773 0.~4413 
B (Status) 0.0117 1 0.0117 0.0031 
c (Legitimacy) 6:3153 1 6.3153 1.6614 
AB 2.7865 2 1. 3932 0.3665 
AC 9.2549 2 4.6275 1. 2174 
BC 17.8845 1 17.8845 4.7050 p<0.05 
ABC 0.1462 2 0.0731 0.0192 
ERROR 387.7212 102 3.8012 
'· 
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The F ratio for the interaction between Status and Legitimacy is 
significant at the 5% level. No effect due to Cooperation is 
apparent. The interaction was investigated with an analysis of 
simple main effects. 
Table 5-4. Fav: Legitimacy/Status Means 
High Status Low Status 
Legitimate 0.5185 1. 3333 
Illegitimate 0.8409 0.0667 








, .. .,...j ·~ 
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Table 5-5. Fav: Analysis of Simple Main Effects 
SOURCE ss DF MS F 
B AT c 1 9.4047 1 9.4047 2.4741 
B AT c 2 8.4914 1 8.4914 2.2339 
c AT B 1 1. 4 723 1 1. 4 723 0.3873 
c AT B 2 22.7275 1 22.7275 5.9791 p<0.025 
ERROR 387.7212 102 3.8012 
The analysis of simple main effects indicates a significant 
difference (F=5.9791; p=O.Ol6) between the Legitimate and 
Illegitimate conditions of the Low Status group, the Illegitimate 
group showing less Ingroup Favouritism. There was no such trend 
with the High Status group. The Legitimate Low Status group 
exhibited more Favouritism than the Legitimate High Status group, 
but this failed to reach significance (F=2.4741; p=O.l2). The 
Illegitimate High Status group exhibited more Favouritism than the 
Illegitimate Low Status group, but again this did not reach 
significance (F=2.2339; p=O.l38). 
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5.2.2. Pull of MD on MJP+MIP 
Table 5-6. MD on MJP+MIP: Means and Standard Deviations 
Bl Delta (H.S.) B2 Gamma (L.S.) 
Cl Leg. C2 Illeg. Cl Leg. C2 Illeg. 
1.4444 -1.7273 1.2222 -1.9000 
Al N.C. (3.0459) (4.5627) (4.4096) (5.5668) 
9 11 9 10 
0.3333 1.2727 0.0000 -0.3000 
A2 C. I. (2.0616) (3.7173) (2.5981) {2.1628) 
9 11 9 10 
0.0000 0.8889 -0.4444 -0.3333 
A3 C.O. (5.6347) {5.6224) (0.8819) {4.0311) 
9 9 9 9 
Table 5-7. MD on MJP+MIP: ANOVA Summary Table 
SOURCE ss DF MS F 
A {Cooperation) 6.0708 2 3.0354 0.1902 
B {Status) 12.3887 1 12.3887 0.7761 
C {Legitimacy) 17.0494 1 17.0494 1. 0680 
AB 3.1148 2 1. 5574 0.0976 
AC 79.8002 2 39.9001 2.4995 p<O.lO 
BC 3.0469 1 3.0469 0.1909 
ABC 2.0136 2 1.0068 0. 06:31 
ERROR 1628.2525 102 15.9633 
The interaction between Cooperation and Legitimacy is significant 
at the 10% level (F=2.4995; p=0.087). Although this indicates that 
the probability of a Type I error is greater than is generally 
considered acceptable, it was decided to investigate further. The 
~ ana·lysis of simple main effects was performed. 
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Table 5-8. MD on MJP+MIP: Cooperation/Legitimacy Means 
Legitimate Illegitimate 
N.C. 1. 3333 -1.8136 
c. I. 0.1667 0. 4864 . 
c.o. -0.2222 0.2778 
Figure 5-3. MD on MJP+MIP: Graph of Cooperation/Legitimacy Means 
MD 
on 
MIP + MJP 
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5-9. MD on MJP+MIP: Analysis of Simple 
ss DF MS 
24.7553 2 12.3777 
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93.5235 1 93.5235 
0.9652 1 0.9652 
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a significantly greater pull of MD (F=5.8587, p=O.Ol7) than the 
Illegitimate groups. The mean of the Illegitimate groups is 
strongly negative, implying that there was a tendency to 
discriminate in favour of the outgroup. 
5.2.3. Pull of Fav on F 
Table 5-10. Fav on F: Means and Standard Deviations 
Bl Delta (H.S.) B2 Gamma (L.S.) 
Cl Leg. C2 Illeg. Cl Leg. C2 Illeg. 
0.0000 1.2727 2.5556 0.1000 
Al N.C. (2.0000) (5.9681) (4.3044) (5.0651) 
9 11 9 10 
\ 
0.4444 1.7273 l. 6667 1.3000 
A2 c.I. (3.8115) (3.7707) (3.2404) (4.2439) 
9 11 9 10 
1.4444 0.4444 2.2222 0.2222 
A3 C.O. (5.6372) (4.7987) (3.9299) (1.7873) 
9 9 9 9 
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Table 5-11. Fav on F: AN OVA Summary Table 
SOURCE ss DF MS F 
A (Cooperation) 1. 7915 2 0.8958 0.0491 
B (Status) 5.8795 1 5.8795 0.3225 
c (Legitimacy) 8.3978 1 8.3978 0.4607 
AB 0.8557 2 0.4278 0.0235 
AC 18.1349 2 9.0675 0.4974 
BC 32.0106 1 32.0106 1. 7560 
ABC 9.5905 2 4.7953 0.2631 
ERROR 1859.3636 102 18.2291 
The factors do not appear to have any affect on the pull of 
Ingroup Favouritism on Fairness. 
5.2.4. Pull of Fav on MJP 
Table 5-12. Fav on MJP: Means and Standard Deviations 
Bl Delta (H.S.) B2 Gamma (L.S.) 
C1 Leg. C2 I11eg. C1 Leg. C2 I11eg. 
0.3333 0.9091 2.5556 3.0000 
Al N.C. (2.0616) (3.2697) (4.6128) (3.5590} 
9 11 9 10 
-0.2222 1. 2727 1. 0000· 0.4000 
A2 C.I. (1.0929) (4.5627) (2.0000) (5.6999) 
9 11 9 10 
0.7778 1. 5556 3.0000 -1.1111 
A3 C.O. (2.9907) (5.2228) (5.2915) (5.0360) 
9 9 9 9 
. . 















































Table 5-14. Competitiveness: Means and Standard Deviations 
Bl Delta (H.S.) B2 Gamma (L.S.) 
Cl Leg. C2 Illeg. Cl Leg. C2 Illeg. 
2.0000 2.7273 1. 3333 2.4000 
Al N.C. (1.8708} (1.9022} (1.5000} (2.1187} 
9 11 9 10 
2.5556 1.1818 2.2222 2.4000 
A2 C. I. (2.1858} (1.6624} (2.0480} (1.8379} 
9 11 9 10 
1.0000 2.5556 2.2222 2.1111 
A3 C.O. (1.2247} (1.5899} (1.3017} (1.7638} 
9 9 9 9 
.: ···:· ·········.········· ...... . .:, ... · ..... 
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Table 5-15. Competitiveness: AN OVA Summary Table 
SOURCE ss DF MS F 
A (Cooperation) 0.4396 2 0.2198 0.0694 
B (Status) 0.3519 1 0.3519 0.1111 
c (Legitimacy) 3.2828 1 3.2828 1. 0365 
AB 5.2571 2 2.6286 0.8299 
AC 12.6177 2 6.3088 1. 9919 
BC 0.0396 1 0.0396 0.0125 
ABC 12.4736 2 6.2368 1.9691 
ERROR 323.0626 102 3.1673 
Competitiveness does not appear to be affected by any of the 
factors. 
5.2.6. Homogeneity of variance 
The large error variances evident in most the dependent variables 
,/ 
appear to have obscured much of the effects. The seemingly large 
discrepancies in the size of the cell variances necessitate a 
check of the assumption of homogeneity of variance. The data ~a;e/ 
unlikely to be normally distributed, being discrete in nature, so 
a test which is not sensitive to this had to be used. This ruled 
out the more common tests: the F max or Cochran's C statistics 
(Scheffe', 1959; Kirk, 1968; Winer, 1971). Instead, a method 
described by Scheffe (1959; 83) was employed. Using this test, it 
was established that the assumption was not violated in any of the 




5.2.7. Testing Ho: )J =0 
7 
A one sample t-test was used to test whether each of the dependent 
variables 'existed', i.e. was significantly greater than 0. A 
comparison with the Control groups was also made using a two 
sample t-test. The results of the these indicate that all the 
dependent variables, with the exception of the pull of MD on 
MJP+MIP are significantly greater than 0. The contradictory 
finding with MD on MJP+MIP may be accounted for by the strong 
negative mean of the Illegitimate No Cooperation groups, which 
counterbalances the other positive means bringing the overall mean 
close to 0. None of the variables in the Main study were 
significantly different from those in the Control study. 
The details of the results of these analyses are presented in 
Appendix H. 
5.3. Concordance of group assignment 
The occurrence of Fs so small that their reciprocals are 
significant or the occurrence of many Fs less than 1 in a 
single analysis of variance merits further consideration, 
however. Such findings suggest that the model underlying the 
analysis of variance has somehow been violated. A frequent 
occurrence is the presence of some systematic effect that is 
not described by the analysis of variance model and 
consequently is not accounted for in the analysis of the 
data. • 
(Myers, 1979: 75) 
All the ANOVAs have a number of very small F ratios. Noting Myers' 
(1979) suggestion that another effect might be acting, it was 
decided to investigate the effect of the Subjects' 
self-assignments into the groups, Delta and Gamma. As recounted 
in the Method, prior to being told into which group their 
.. responses .on ·the·· Ba.rron-Welsh assigned· ·them, the "-sub}ects -had been 
~ . . . .. . ..... ~. . : ·.. .. . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . : . . 
asked to record on Questionnaire A. 2 the group 1n't<)"wh.i'ch "they 
thought they would fall". 
( 
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A frequency count showed that 55 of the subjects thought they 
would fall in Delta and 51 thought they would fall in Gamma. A 
s ~jll' fica. r, t 
Chi-Squared analysis showed that there was no A difference between 
these frequencies (~=0.151; p=.7). 
8 of the Subjects could not decide on one group. Most wrote that 
they felt they had some of both sets of traits. The scores from 
these Subjects were not used in the following analyses. 
A 2-way ANOVA was used to investigate whether the Subjects' 
agreement or disgreement with the group in which they were placed 
affected the dependent variables. Unfortunately, the numbers 
falling into the cells were considerably disproportionate, so a 
Multiple Linear Regression technique was used to produce the ANOVA 
Summary Table. This technique which is described by Kerlinger and 
Pedhazur (1973; 188), makes adjustment for the correlations 
arising from the different cell sizes. 
5.3.1. Ingroup Favouritism 
Table 5-16. Fav: Means and Standard Deviations 
High Status Low Status 
0.3158 1.1364 
In Agreement (0.9055) (2.2449) 
38 33 
1.2500 -0.0882 
In Disagreement (2.6385) (1.8644) 
18 17 
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Table 5-17. Fav: ANOVA Summary Table 
SOURCE ss DF MS F 
A (Concordance) 0.2326 1 0.2326 0.0647 
B (Status) 0.2957 1 0.2957 0.0823 
AB 27.2535 1 27.2535 7.5856 p<.Ol• 
RESIDUAL 366.4658 102 3.5928 
The - F ratio for the interaction between Status and Concordance is 
significant (F=7.5856; p=0.007). An analysis of simple main 
effects was performed. 
Table 5-18. Fav: Analysis of Simple Main Effects 
SOURCE ss DF MS F 
A at Bl 10.6565 1 10.6565 2.9670 p< .10 
A at B2 16.8260 1 16.8260 4.6832 p<.OS 
B at Al 11.8933 1 11.8933 3.3103 p< .10 
B at A2 15.6565 1 15.6565 4.3578 p< .05 
RESIDUAL 366.4658 102 3.5928 









The results indicate that in the High Status group, those who 
agreed with their membership showed less Ingroup Favouritism than 
those who did not (F=2.967: p=0.088). In the Low Status group 
those who agreed with their membership showed more Ingroup 
Favouritism than those who did not (F=4.6832: p=0.033) Of the 
Subjects who agreed with their group assignation, those in the Low 
Status group exhibited more Ingroup Favouritism than those in the 
High Status group (F=3.3103: p=0.072): whereas of those who did 
not agree with their group membership, Subjects placed in the High 
Status group exhibited more Ingroup Favouritism than those who 
were placed in the Low Status group (F=4.3578: p=0.039). 
5.3.2. Pull of MD on MJP+MIP 
Table 5-19. MD on MJP+MIP: Means and Standard Deviations 
High Status Low Status 
-0.2368 -0.6667 
In Agreement (4.3461) (3.8134) 
38 33 
1.5556 0.1765 
In Disagreement (4.1618) (3.8281) 
18 17 
Table 5-20. MD on MJP+MIP: AN OVA Summary Table 
SOURCE ss DF MS F 
A (Concordance) 41.9557 1 41.9557 2.5276 
B (Status) 14.6284 1 14.6284 0.8813 
AB 5.2620 1 5.2620 0.3170 
RESIDUAL 1693.1182 102 16.5992 
There is a trend for those who are not in concordance with the 
.thei:r_-.. •· ,g·r.o_u,p ·. as.signment to exhibit a greater degree of 
..:.as 
differentiation than those who are in concordance (F=2.5276; 
p=O.llS), though this does not reach significance. Inspection of 
the means show that it is, in fact, only the relatively large mean 
of the Subjects placed in the High Status group that leads to this 
trend. 
5.3.3. Pull of Fav on F 
Table 5-21. Fav on F: Means and Standard Deviations 
High Status Low Status 
0.8684 1.7879 
In Agreement (4.2246) (4.7484) 
38 33 
1.1667 0.8235 
In Disagreement (5.1134) (2.2426) 
18 17 
Table 5-22. Fav on F: ANOVA Summary Table 
SOURCE ss DF MS F 
A (Concordance) 2.1943 1 2.1943 0.1174 
B (Status) 6.6215 1 6.6215 0.3542 
AB 9.3355 1 9.3355 0.4994 
RESIDUAL 1906.8225 102 18.6943 
No effects are evident . 
. :o 
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5.3.4. Pull of Fav on MJP 
Table 5-23. Fav on MJP: Means and Standard Deviations 
High Status Low Status 
0.8947 1.7879 
In Agreement (3.1087) (4.6217) 
38 33 
0.6667 1. 5882 
In Disagreement (4.2565) (5.1607) 
18 17 
Table 5-24. Fav on MJP: ANOVA Summary Table 
SOURC_E ss DF MS F 
A (Concordance) 1.0786 1 1. 0786 0.0620 
B (Status) 21.4996 1 21.4996 1.2353 
AB 0.0180 1 0.0180 0.0010 
RESIDUAL 1775.2059 . 102 17.4040 
5.3.5. Competitiveness 
Table 5-25. Competitiveness: Means and Standard Deviations 
High Status Low Status 
1. 8684 2.4242 
In Agreement· (1.8184) (1.7145) 
38 33 
2.5000 1. 4706 
In Disagreemen-t (1.7905) (1.6627) 
18 17 
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Table 5-26. Competitiveness: AN OVA Summary Table 
SOURCE ss DF MS F 
A (Concordance) 0.3798 1 0.3798 0.1229 
B (Status) 0.0264 1 0.0264 0.0086 
AB 14.6955 1 14.6955 4.7565 p<. OS 
RESIDUAL 315.1374 102 3.0896 
The F ratio for the interaction between Status and Concordance is 
significant (F=4.7565; p=0.031). This was investigated with an 
analysis of simple main effects. 
Table 5-27. Competitiveness: Analysis of Simple Main Effects 
SOURCE ss DF MS F 
A at Bl 4.8725 1 4.8725 1.5771 
A at B2 10.2029 1 10.2029 3.3024 p<.lO 
B at Al 5.4560 1 5.4560 1.7660 
B at A2 9.2645 1 9.2645 2.9986 p<.lO 
RESIDUAL 366.4658 102 3.5928 
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Despite the interaction effect being significant at the 5% level 
(F=4.7565; p=0.031), none of the simple main effect F ratios reach 
this level of significance. The test for simple main effects is a 
more conservative test than the.ANOVA. In the Low Status group, 
the Subjects who were in concordance with their placement 
exhibited a greater degree of competitiveness than those who were 
not (F=3.3024; p=0.072). Of the Subjects who were in disagreement 
with their group assignation, those placed in the High Status 
group exhibited more competitiveness than those placed in the Low 
Status group (F=2.9986; p=0.086). 
0 
Regrettably, the numbers in each cell are too small to allow an ,.,.,r 
analysis of this variable (Concordance) together with the original 
three (Cooperation, Status and Legitimacy). 
\ 
5.4. Ratings on the subjective questionnaires 
An analysis of four sets of ratings was made. They were: 
1. Rating of how well Subjects felt they, personally had done 
on the maze. 
2. Rating of how well Subjects felt they1 with their partner 
had done o·n the maze. 
3. Rating of how well Sub]ects thought they would have done 
with another partner. 
4. Rating of whether Subjects felt they had been affected in 
the Prisoner's Dilemma Game by the fact that their partner 
was the same person with whom they had done the maze task. 
A further analysis was done using the difference between their 
self-rating and their rating together with their partner. This 
difference was given a negative sign if the score indicated a 
,, 
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higher assessment was given to the partnership. 
3-way anovas were performed on each of these, though the number of 
levels of factor A (Cooperation) varied. The No Cooperation 
conditions only yielded scores on the first rating. The only 
analysis which yielded any significance was on the first variable, 
the self-rating without the partner. The significant F ratio was 
for the A (Cooperation) main effect. The analysis of pairwise 
comparisons using the Tukey's HSD (Honestly Significant 
Difference) statistic indicated that subjects in the No 
Cooperation groups rated themselves lower than did both the 
St~nr"f/c~Utt 
Cooperation groups. There was no 1 difference in the self-ratings 
made by the C.I. and c.o. groups. Details of these analyses are 
given in Appendix H. 
5.5. The fairness strategy 
One of the questions asked the Subjects after filling in the 
Matrix booklet, was what strategy they had used. 55 of the 
Subjects stated unequivocally that they had been fair in their 
allocation of money. An analysis was done to see whether this was 
mirrored in their behaviour. An independent t-test determined that 
less In group Favouritism was exhibited by these Subjects 
(t=3.4643: p=O.OOl). To check that large negative scores had not 
obscured the picture, a Chi-Squared test was used to see whether 
the proportion' of these Subjects who had been fair was greater. If 
l 
a Subject's score for, Fav was between -0.25 and +0.25, this was 
considered a fair response. The results indicate that more of the 
Subjects who claimed to be fair had actually been so, than of 
t·hose who- had--made th-is claim ('X,~:::;.l.S .• -5,68: p<·O. 001) . 
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6. DISCUSSION 
6.1. Interpretation of the results 
6 .1.1. The dependent variables 
The control study was performed to check the efficacy of the 
Barron-Welsh procedure for creating groups that elicit ingroup 
bias. These created groups, Gamma and Delta, had no status or 
evaluative difference in this instance. The control study also 
provided a measure of the dependent variable for 
the main experiment, and with other studies 
methodology. 
comparison with 
using the same 
The statistical analyses indicated that all the variables except 
the pull of FAV on MJP were significantly greater than o. (The 
pull of MD on MIP + MJP just failed to reach the 5% critical 
level, but was taken as significant). Thus it was confirmed that: 
(a) the social- categorization procedure had been sufficient to 
elicit ingroup bias (FAV); 
(b) the need for positive group distinctiveness was~an important 
factor·since the pull of. maximum differentiation (MD) was 
significantly greater than the pull towards maximum gain (MIP 
+ MJP). 
(c) ingroup bias (FAV) had a stronger pull than the 'norm' of 
fairness (F) . 
-However, ingroup bias does not appear to be a stronger motive than 
that of maximum joint profit (MJP). This would seem to be in 
contradiction with the finding that MD has a greater pull than MIP 
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+ MJP. The reason for this may be the structure of the matrices 
themselves. In matrix C, which measures the pull of MD on MIP + 
MJP, the largest difference between the points to be distributed 
between the two recipients is 6 points, whereas in matrix E, 
measuring the pull of FAV on MJP, the largest difference is 18. It 







salient, resulting in responses 
centre of the matrix. The 
countervailing influence of the fairness norm has been emphasized 
by a number of authors (Branthwaite et al, 1979: St Claire and 
Turner, in preparation). The failure to detect FAV over MJP using 
the same matrix was also · recorded by Moscovici and Paicheler 
(1978). 
No significant difference was found between the groups, Gamma and 
Delta on any of the dependent variables, though there was a trend 
for the Gamma group to exhibit more ingroup favouritism than the 
Delta group. This may possibly be explained in terms of the 
relative position of gamma and delta in the Greek alphabet. In 
this culture, it is fairly standard to assume that something 
graded with the symbol A is superior to something graded B, and so 
forth down the alphabet. Since gamma comes before delta, subjects 
may have assumed that gamma group was superior in some manner. 
This was not anticipated as a confounding factor in the main 
experiment since the active status manipulations would have 
over-ridden such a tentative assumption. 
The means of the dependent variables in the main experiment, with 
the exception of the pull of MD on MIP + MJP, were all 
significantly greater than o. This exception is explained by the 
strong negative scores of this variable in some of the conditions. 
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While the means of the control study are comparable in magnitude 
to those found in other studies using the same matrices (Tajfel et 
al, 1971; Billig and Tajfel, 1973; Turner, 1975), the means of the 
main experiment are seemingly smaller. No significant differences 
between the means of the control and main studies were indicated 
by the t-tests, but this may be due to the data parameters. The 
large dicrepancies between the sample numbers (12 114) and 
between the size of the variances of the two sets of data may have 
decreased the power of the t-test. Moscovici and Paicheler (1978) 
also remarked that their means were not as high as those obtained 
by Tajfel and his associates. This may be accounted for by the 
effects of the factor manipulations. 
6.1.2. The main experiment 
The 3-way ANOVAs investigating the effects of the factors; 
Cooperation, Status and Legitimacy gave significant results with 
only two variables - FAV and pull of MD on MIP + MJP. 
Ingroup Favouritism 
The factor, cooperation, had no effect on ingroup bias, either as 
a main effect or interacting with any of the other factors. Thus 
the hypothesized three-way interaction (ABC) was not ~upported. A 
significant interaction was found between Status and Legitimacy, 
but the pattern of differences did not reflect the expectations of 
the cognitive-motivational theory. Firstly, in the Legitimate 
conditions the Low Status group exhibited greater ingroup bias 
than the High Status group. Further, this was also significantly 
greater than the ingroup bias of the Illegitimate Low Status 
group, which was neglible. This was the reverse of the 
hypothesized outcome. The Illegitimate High Status group did 
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evidence.stronger ingroup bias than the Legitimate High Status 
group as anticipated, but this difference was not statistically 
significant. The results' lack of congruence with the predicted 
outcome is illustrated in the graph below : 
Figure 6-1. Comparison between predicted and obtained FAV results 
Predicted 
--~ 
Fav ... ....... ' / .. ' / lY'" ' , ' / , ' /• '1:5. 
Obtained 
H.S. H.S. L.S. L.S. 
Leg. II leg. Leg· llleg· 
From these results it would appear that most of the variability in 
the findings stem from the low status groups. A possible 
explanation for the negligible ingroup bias in the Illegitimate 
Low Status group may have been the implications that 
'illegitimacy' held for the subjects. While the intention behind 
the concept was for the subjects to question the negative 
evaluation of their group, it is likely that subject~ interpreted 
it as implying that they may have been mistakenly assigned to the 
Low Status group. This would, predictably, lead to low ingroup 
favouritism. The high ingroup bias of the Legitimate Low Status 
group may be attributed to a number of factors: 
(1) It is possible that 'insecurity of status' was implicitly held 
by subjects. This notion is supported by a number of comments made 
on the subjective questionnaires expressing doubt that personality 
traits could be neatly parceled out in the manner described~ 
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(2) the Low Status group was ascribed with qualities such as 
'pr~icality' and 'competence'. It is possible that these 
subjects felt that their ascribed characteristics placed them at 
an advantage over the high status group on the maze task hence 
leading to a dimension of superiority. Unfortunately, this was 
not supported by the self ratings on the subjective 
questionnaires. 
Thus, the results on ingroup bias have failed to support any of 
the hypothesis. 
Pull of Maximum Differentiation on Maximum Joint Profit and 
Maximum Ingroup Profit 
The interaction between Cooperation and Legitimacy was significant 
at the 10% level. This was considered worthwhile investigating as 
this study on cooperation is essentially exploratory, so it is 
preferable to make a Type I error rather than a Type II error. No 
effect due to status was found. The results indicate that the No 
Cooperation groups behaved differently from those in the two 
Cooperation conditions. In the No Cooperation condition the 
Legitimacy conditions exhibited higher MD scores than the 
cooperation condition, though this did not reach significance. But 
I 
the No Cooperation Illegitimate groups displayed less ingroup bias 
than the other Illegitimacy conditions - they in fa~t displayed ,, 
bias towards the outgroup. 
Comparing the results with those expected under the hypothesis, it 
can be seen that the intra- and inter-group Cooperation conditions 
do slightly mirror the expectations, though this tendency was not 
statistically significant. 
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I I leg. 
The unexpected finding of note was the bias on the part of the 
Illegitimate Cooperation groups. Surprisingly, Intragroup 
Cooperation did not increase outgroup discriminations {relative to 
No Cooperation) as was found in othe studies {Dion, 1973; Louche 
and Magnier, 1978). T~e tendency for Intergroup Cooperation to 
reduce outgroup discrimination· in the Illegitimacy conditions 
{where the salience of group distinction is higher) supports the 
hypothesis, though it is reiterated that due to the high error 
variance this is not statistically significant. The unexpected 
findings in the No Cooperation conditions reflect similar trends 
to those found with variable FAV, hence similar causative factors 
may be assumed. 
Competitiveness 
The Prisoner's Dilemma game was used to investigate whether the 
factors affected the choice of the competitive versus cooperative 
strategy. The overall means of both the control and main study 
indicate that fewer competitive choices were made than cooperative 
(though this was not statistically testable). No effect due to any 
of the factors emerged. It had been anticipated that, in the very 
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least, there would be less competitive choices when the partner 
was a member of the ingroup as compared to when the partner was a 
member of the outgroup. This outcome had been obtained, using the 
Prisoner's Dilemma game, by Wilson and Robinson {1968). 
It may be significant that the only variable which was even 
slightly affected by the variable, cooperation, was MD on MIP+MJP 
This measure isolates the aspect of ingroup bias relating to the 
desire for the ingroup to 'win' over the outgroup which Turner 
{197Sa, 1978a) terms social competition. This may indicate that 
the effect that cooperation has on real competition {i.e. MIP) 
differs from its effects on social competition. This suggestion 
may account for the contradictory findings of the research on 
cooperation. 
6.1.3. Concordance with group assignment 
Prior to being told to which group their responses on the 
Barron-Welsh determined they belonged, subjects predicted their 
membership on the basis of the personality traits ·characterizing 
the groups. The concordance between their prediction and 
assignment gives a measure of subjective identification with the 
group membership. 
The effect of concordance and status of the group on the various 
dependent variables was analysed.using a 2-way ANOVA. The small 
numbers and their uneven distribution between the cells made 
simultaneous consideration of the other factors impossible. 
Significant results were obtained on two variables ingroup 
favouritism and competitiveness. 
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Ingroup favouritism 
The results indicate a different pattern of bias depending on 
whether or not subjects were in agreement with their group 
assignment (i.e. identified with their group). When there was 
concordance, the Low Status group exhibited more ingroup bias than 
the High Status group, whereas when there was not concordance the 
reverse was the case. A very interesting finding was the high 
ingroup bias of the subjects who were placed in the High Status 
group when they believed they should be in the Low. This may be 
explained as an instance of marginal group membership (Breakwell, 
1978, 1979). Breakwell (1979) defined marginal group members as 
people who "do not truly fulfil the external criteria of group 
membership; they merely pretend to so do" (pp 141). Although the 
issue of pretense is not applicable in this case, the subjects are 
marginal in the sense that they do not perceive themselves as 
really belonging to the group, but having been assigned a 
desirable group they would wish to retain membership. The 
exaggerated degree of intergroup discrimination is a 
characteris£ic of marginal identity (Breakwell, 1978, 1979; Mann, 
1974) . 
For those subjects who disagreed with their placement in the Low 
Status group, there was no motivation to accept this group 
membership. Hence, the neglible ingroup bias, and in fact slight 
outgroup bias, was predictable. 
The concordant high status group fits the description of a nomic 
majority; a high status group with secure social identity, hence 
the relatively low ingroup bias concurred with the expectations of 
Moscovici and Paicheler (1978). 
The' high ingroup bias of the Concordant Low Status groups may be 
explained in a numhe·r of ·ways: 
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(1} It is possible that those subjects who were in the 
Illegitimate conditions elevated the scores as anticipated by the 
theory~· 
(2} The perceived superiority on the maze task, as mentioned 
earlier, may have been a contributing factor~ 
(3} some of the responses on the subjective questionnaire pointed 
to the possibility that some subjects perceived the Gamma group 
traits as exemplifying scientific people. In view of the superior 
status of science in this society, this would counteract the 
supposed lower status of Gamma group by creating a new dimension 
of comparison artistic versus scientific. Hence the high 
ingroup bias may represent assertive destinctiveness. 
Competitiveness 
The results of this analysis showed a similar pattern to that of 
ingroup favouritism, though the differences were less pronounced. 
However, it cannot be stated that the degree of competititveness 
was a measure of ingroup bias in this case since each condition 
contained instances where the partners were members of both the 
ingroup and outgroup. A possible interpretation is that the other 
factors, especially Intergroup Cooperation, influenced the scores. 
It is unfortunate that a combined analysis of the effects of this 
factor of group identification, together with those of 
cooperation, status and legitimacy, could not be made. The various 
findings indicate that all four factors do affect intergroup bias, 
but it is only through a synthesis that a complete understanding 
of their interactive relationship can be reached. It is hoped 
that a future research project will achieve this. 
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6.1.4. Subjective ratings 
Analyses of the ratings of performan~es on the maze task produced 
only one significant result. It was found that subjects in the No 
Cooperation conditions rated their personal performance lower than 
did the subjects in both Cooperation conditions. This may have 
been because these subjects had direct visual feedback on the 
success of their performance and so formed a more realistic 
appraisal. It may also be hypothesized that the partnership in 
the Cooperation conditions led to diffusion of responsibility, 
hence the subjects could rate themselves higher. 
In retrospect, it is questionable whether any real information 
could have emerged from the rating scales as they were structured. 
There are too many possible explanations as to why a rating is low 
or high, eg. a high rating by a member of a low status group could 
indicate high self confidence because {a) s/he rejected the 
negative status of the group; or {b) the traits ascribed to Gamma 
practicality and competence - made her/him feel particularly 
capable on tasks such as this. 
A more direct means of measuring the subjects perception of and 
responses to the manipulations would have been more useful. 
Unfortunately, the problem of disclosure (to subsequent subjects) 
prohibited the use of direct probing. 
6.1.5. Fairness 
48% of the subjects claimed to have used the fairness strategy on 
the matrix task. But this was reflected in the actual choices of 
just overhalf -(28%). This would seem to support Turner•s (1980) 
.. 
· ...... ,. 
argument· that fairness··· is not··: .. as impqrt;:m:t.:· .-9-~· ipfluence as 
··- ... · 
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Branthwaite et al (1979) proposed. 
6.2. Evaluation of the findings 
The results of this study cannot be evaluated without considering 
the success of the experimental manipulations which produced the 
independent variables. The status hierarchy was established by 
using the Barron-Welsh Art Scale to define two groups which were 
characterized by two sets of personality traits, the one more 
favourable than the other. A similar techniq~e was used by 
Moscovici and Paicheler (1978), who used the Riguet's test of the 
trees to establish two groups, one having high creativity the 
other low. In this study ethical considerations prevented the use 
of grossly negative traits for the low status group, so it may be 
queried whether the status hierarchy was clearly perceived. At the 
debriefing session, subjects were asked whether they preceived the 
Delta group as a 'better' group. Only nine admitted to not 
thinking this. It could also be argued, in a somewhat tautological 
fashion, that the results of the Concordance/Status analysis 
demonstrated that a hierarchy must have existed. 
However, the use of personal characteristics as dimensions, on 
which the status of minimal groups are established, presents a 
major problem. Subjects do have perceptions of what their 
attributes are, so in certain circumstances they are being 
expected to accept and 
congruent with their 
identify with an image which is not 
present self-image. This problem of 
identification with the assigned group emerged as a clear 
extraneous variable in this study. There has been little research 
on the manner in which subjective identification with the ingroup 
affects intergroup relations. However, there are two findings 
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worthy of note: 
(a) Breakwell's (1978, 1979) work on marginal group identity which 
indicated that the extent to which a person feels part the group 
influences their intergroup behaviour. The study by, Thibaut 
(1950) lends support for this notion. 
(b) The work of Zavalloni (1971, 1975) which indicates that people 
can identify with a group yet not accept that they share the 
attributes of that group. 
These studies point to the immense difficulties involved in 
identification, even before understanding 
attempting to 
subjective group 
experimentally manipulate it. However, Turner and 
Brown (1978) managed to circumvent this problem by using 
'naturally' occurring groups, art students and science students, 
and associated the status dimension with these groups. This 
ensured that the subjects identified with their groups. 
While the above discussion has focused on the problem of 
identification with groups in experimental situations, it is 
important to recognize that the root of the problem lies in the 
lack of conceptual clarity of this variable at a theoretical 
level. This lack was pointed out earlier, in the overview of the 
cognitive motivational theory, and is reinforced by the results of 
this study. 
The manipulation of the variable, Legitimacy, also presented a 
difficulty. In accordance with the theoretical definition of 
Illegitimacy, the aim of the manipulation was to make subjects 
doubt the evaluation of their group. However, there were strong 
indications that the manipulations may have, instead, caused 
subjects to ooubt whether they were correctly classified, which 
establishes a different set of conditions from those hypothesized. 
Thus, while the results of the 
Cooperation) aspect the study do .not 
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Status Legitimacy (No 
lend support for Tajfel's 
cognitive motivational theory of intergroup relations, they cannot 
be said to confute the theory. The discussed problems with the 
variable manipulations make it questionable whether the actual 
precepts of the theory were tested. However, the results do call 
attention to the need for a rigorous definition of the 
experimentally created variables. It also reinforces the need for 
further replicatory 
laboratory. 
studies, both. within and without the 
The study failed to illuminate the effect of the variable, 
cooperation, which was considered within the framework of the 
cognitive - motivational theory. Again, because of difficulties 
with the experimental manipulations, it would be incorrect to 
discount cooperation as an unimportant variable. A number of 
aspects concerning the way the variable was constructed within the 
experiment should be noted. Firstly, most other studies used 
face-to-face encounters between groups to establish cooperation. 
There was no interpersonal contact at all in this study •. 
Secondly, this experiment used only one cooperative endeavour 
between groups. worchel (1979) suggested that a number of 
cooperative contacts are required before its influence'is felt. 
Thirdly, all the previous research examined measured the outcome 
of intergroup cooperation in terms of attitude towards the 
outgroup. This study used allocation of money. Finally, it is 
possible that subjects did not perceive themselves as cooperating 
with their partner since there was no direct interpersonal 
contact. In fact, a few subjects did voice the doubt that there 
was another subject in the next room. These points may account 
for the apparent lack of influence of this factor, and must be 
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considered for further research. 
The post-experimental questionnaires gave no.indications that the 
·subjects had responded to any demand effects. However, while 
excluding direct demand effects, this do~s not negate the 
influence of the experimenter : 
the form of experimenter influence is not a trivial one ; 
it is not as if the experimenters have given the subjects an 
order and the subjects obeyed it. Rather, as has already been 
shown, one of several response possibilities has been used by 
the subjects in a situation specifically designed by the 
esperimenters. Instead of invalidating the results, the role 
of the experimenter seems to define the sort of theoretical 
problems, to which the minimal intergroup experiments can be 
addressed. These problems relate to the power of a prestigious 
authority to create group divisions, which can be counter to 
the objective material interests of those who are so divided 
Thus questions can be asked about the minimal conditions 
under which authority can create a false consciousness based 
upon a group identification. 
(Billig, 1976: 356) 
6.3. Limitations of this study 
The main limitation of this study lies in its uncertain 
realization of the independent variables. As discussed previously, 
it not known whether the manipulations did produce the desired 
perceptions in the subjects. While this is a problem inherent in 
most experimental studies, it presents particular difficulties in 
studies such as this, where an attempt to consolidate or monitor 
the subjects' perceptions would influence their subsequent 
behaviour. 
A high preponderance of the subjects were in agreement with their 
group assignment (71 were in agreement, 33 were not). This may 
imply that the control procedure used was not rigorous enough. 
Although .:·the experimenter was overtly blind to the group 
members):l_ip-··'s}:t:.: ... the ·_s:ubject . at the time of describing the 
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characteristics of the Delta and Gamma - the random assignment of 
the subjects into groups had taken place some time before the 
experiment - a subliminal memory of the membership of some of the 
subjects may have remained. This may have resulted in the Gamma 
group being presented in a favourable light (via vocal intonation, 
etc.), as concern over the possible detrimental effects that low 
status assignment would have on the subjects was present 
throughout the experiment. However, it is more likely to have been 
a chance factor in the sampling variation. 
The subjects were first year psychology students, constituting a 
non-random sample. Although the use of such subjects is extremely 
co~non in psychological research, this does not detract from the 
problems implicit in this practice. Rosenthal (1970b), among 
others, argued that these subjects have certain features which 
limit the generalizability of the results. 
It was previously suggested that the sequence in which the 
experimental conditions were tested prevented contamination of 
results in the event of an experienced subject divulging the 
procedure to a naive subject. Although direct contamination was 
avoided it remains likely that any preliminary disclosure would 
have influenced subjects' behaviour in some manner. 
In summary, it seems that to avoid the problems mentioned: ethical 
concerns, subject effects, possibility of disclosure, etc., it is 
to use a truly random sample drawn from the general 
Practical considerations, unfortunately, militated 
necessary 
population. 
against such a procedure . 
. ··~ .-·· 
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6.4. Implications for theory and future research 
The methodological problems of this study precludes it standing as 
a valid test of the stated hypotheses. While not contributing 
directly to a theoretical understanding of intergroup relations, 
this study has raised certain issues: 
1. · The study illustrated the difficulties of manipulating 
2. 
variables in the laboratory situation. The problems emerged on 
two levels. Firstly, there had to be congruence between the 
conditions established and the subjects• perceptions of the 
conditions: and secondly, there had to be congruence between 
the theoretical definition of the condition and the 
experimental reality. Both requirements were difficult to 
ensure, and difficult to monitor. Future research in this 
area must endeavour to solve these issues. 
The experiment underlined 
practical research into 
identification with group 





This indicates a 
necessary direction which research on intergroup relations 
should take. 
3. The importance of ethical considerations when working with 
human subjects, and the limitations imposed by this was 
stressed. 
4. The research also emphasized a recurring theme in psychology -
the need for replication studies. 
6.5. Conclusion 
This research endeavoured to investigate the influence of 
cooperation on intergroup relations. The motivation behind this 
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was an interest in understanding the position of women as a 
minority group. While it is emphasized that cooperation is not 
necessarily the only factor, nor the the most important, that 
distinguishes women from other minority groups, it represents a 
starting point ih this analysis. The study has not produced any 
hypotheses as to how, .why or whether cooperation influences 
ingroup bias, but it does suggest that a careful distinction be 
made between its effects on the realistic competitive and the 
social competitive aspects of intergroup discrimination. 
Finally, it is clear that this research reinforces the call for a 
closer alignment between theory and research in the social 
psychology of intergroup relations. 
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INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS 
On subject's arrival: 
Thank you for taking part in this study. The object of this 
practical is to give you experience in what it is like being a 
subject in different kinds of psychological research. In the 
course of this afternoon you will do four different types of 
experiments; and on some of them you will be earning money. But 
this will be explained as you go along. After each experiment 
you will be given a questionnaire to fill in. The idea behind 
this is for you to capture how you felt about the experiment. 
This will help you remember your feelings when it comes to 
writing the essays. I will be asking you to hand in these 
questionnaires with your essays, but only I will see your 
essays. The demonstrators marking them will not. So please be 
as honest as you can. Have you any questions before I take you 
to do the first experiment? 
BARRON-WELSH TEST 
The subject was taken into a cubicle and settled at the desk. A 
Barron-Welsh booklet and a response sheet was placed on the desk. 
This is a test called the Barron-Welsh Art Scale, which I'd 
like you to complete. As you can see, the booklet contains a 
number of drawings. All you have to do is decide whether you 
like or dislike each drawing. You must register your decision 
by marking the 'L' square if you like the picture, or in the 
'D' square if you do not. There are no in between choices. 
There are 86 pictures altogether, the last 6 are on the back 
cover. Please do not leave any out, and be sure the square you 
are filling in corresponds with the number of the picture you 
are looking at. Please fill in your name here on the answer 
sheet. When you are finished do not leave the room. Just turn 
this signal switch on and one of us will come. While you are 
waiting help yourself to any of this reading material. Are 
there any questions? 
When the subject finished, the booklet and answer sheet were 
collected and the questionnaire A.l given. When this was 
completed, one of the following set of instructions was given, 
depending on which condition the subject was in. 
CONTROL: 
What did you think that test was about? ..... Let me tell you a 
little about the test. This scale was devised by Frank Barron 
and George Welsh, two Americans, in the late 1940s. It was 
devised as a test of artistic potential and creativity. On the 
basis of responses to the pictures it is possible to determine 
whether a person has what is called a GAMMA-type potential or a 
DELTA-type potential. The distinction between these are on the 
basis of such things as perception of movement, light-dark 
contrast, structures, et~. . 
Your responses have been scored - you fall 'b'lto the .... group. 
·I .wf·ll·b~ .. u-s·iJ;l-g ... these ·groups. to· divide up people in the .... · ... · . -. . . . .. ·.·: . .. ·-· .. 
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practical. It just makes administration easier, and one of·the 
experiments requires it. 
I will now take you down to the computer room for the next 
experiment. 
Control subjects were taken to do the maze task at this point. 
LEGITIMACY AND ILLEGITIMACY CONDITIONS: 
What did you think that test was about? •.... Let me tell you a 
little about the test. This scale was devised by Frank Barron 
and George Welsh, two Americans, in the late 1940s. It was 
devised as a test of artistic potential and creativity. On the 
basis of responses to the pictures it is possible to determine 
whether a person has what is called a GAMMA-type potential or a 
DELTA-type potential. The distinction between these are on the 
basis of such things as perception of movement, light-dark 
contrast, structures, etc. 
But, besides this, the test also acts as a projective, indirect 
type of personality assessment. Do you know what an indirect, 
projective personality test is in contrast to a direct 
self-report one? .... [THIS WAS EXPLAINED AS IT HAD RELEVANCE 
TO THE ASSIGNMENT THE SUBJECTS WERE REQUIRED TO PRODUCE] 
Barron and Welsh found that specific personality traits were 
associated with the type of artistic potential - Delta or Gamma 
- people have. For instance, they found that people who have a 
Delta-type potential tend to be highly creative, innovative, 
individualistic, unpredictable, energetic and questioning. 
Whereas people with a Gamma-type potential tend to be 
competent, conservative, practical, worrying, peaceable and 
accepting of authority. 
This has been verified by numerous 
repeated the studies and found the same 
please fill in this questionnaire. 
finished your responses on the Barron 
scored. 
other researchers, who 
thing. Will you now 
By the time you have 
Welsh will .have been 
Questionnaire A.2 was left with subjects in the legitimacy and 
illegitimacy conditions to complete. 
When the questionnaires were complete: 
LEGITIMACY CONDITION: 
Your Barron-Welsh has been scored, and you fall into the 
group. Are you surprised? ... Before we go on to the next 
experiment I just want to tell you that I will be using the 
groups - Delta and Gamma to divide the people in the practical. 
It makes administration easier, and one of the tasks requires 
it.(#) 
I will now take you down to the computer room for the next 
experiment. 
ILLEGITIMACY CONDITION: 
Your Barron-l"lelsh has been scored, and you fall into the 
.... group. Are you surprised? ... Before we go on to the next 
experiment I must tell you that there·is some c9n~~qyersy about 
the Barron-Welsh Scale• This controversy rests on three main 
arguments. Firstly, the test is forc~d choice - you had to like 
-130 
or dislike the picture, there was no measure of degree of this 
feeling. This, according to some arguments, makes it an 
insensitive test which oversimplifies matters. Secondly, the 
population on which the test was standardized was small town 
American college students. A pretty homogeneous population with 
a restricted range of personality traits and talent. So how 
generalizable are the results? Finally, a number of other 
researchers have failed to find the personality correlates with 
Gamma and Delta. In fact, two researchers Goolsby and Helwig 
(1975) compared the creativity scale of the Barron-Welsh with 
another widely used test of creativity, the Torrance and found 
there was no correlation between the results. This implies the 
tests are measuring different things. So, all in all, the 
validity of the Barron-Welsh is being queried.(#) I will now 
take you down to the computer room for the next experiment. 
In the COOPERATION CONDITIONS the following was inserted at (#): 
In the next experiment you will be working with a partner. But 
you will never know who your partner is, and your partner will 
not know who you are. But you will work together to increase 
your money. All I can tell you about your partner is that he or 
she is also in ..... group (COOPERATION WITH INGROUP MEMBER)/ in 
·····group (COOPERATION WITH OUTGROUP). Please come with me. 
MAZE TASK 
The subject was taken down to Room A or B, depending on which 
~ondition or role s/he was in. 
CONTROL AND NO COOPERATION CONDITIONS: 
This is a test of perceptual motor skill. Depending on how well 
or badly you do on the test, you will increase or decrease your 
earnings. The way it works is this: On the screen in front of 
you is a maze with a figure 'X' at the entrance. The object of 
the task is to move the X through and out the maze as quickly 
and accurately as possible. The way you move the X is with 
these discs here. If you touch this one the X will move one 
step to the right, this one - to the left, this - upwards and 
this downwards. Be careful the discs are very sensitive. If you 
direct the X into a barrier, a tone will sound but it will not 
move. This is recorded as an error and will be deducted from 
your score. Let me explain how your earnings on the test will 
be calculated.Your score is a function of the speed with which 
you do the task adjusted for the number of errors you make. 
This score is converted into a percentage which is added to 
your allocation. E.g. if you have been allocated R2, and do 
very well, coming out with a score that converts to 80%. Then 
you will receive R2+Rl.60. You can also do badly and end up 
with a negative score resulting in money being removed from 
your allocation. 
Lets do this practice maze to check everything is O.K. 
Subject completed the practice maze under supervision. 
Ready to start on the real thing? .. You will do two mazes, one 
after the other. The time it takes the computer to draw the 
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maze will not be included in your score. 
In the COOPERATION conditions, the subject placed in Room A, 
observing the maze, was called the Instructor. The subject in Room 
B, controlling the •x•, was called the Responder. 
INSTRUCTOR: 
This is a test of perceptual motor skill. Depending on your 
performance you will increase or decrease your earnings. You 
are working with a partner whose identity you do not know, and 
you both have different roles. You are the Instructor and your 
partner is the Responder. You are working together to earn as 
much money as possible. Here on the screen is a maze with a 
marker •x•. The object of this task is to move this marker 
through and out of the maze as quickly and accurately as 
possible. Your partner is in control of the X, but cannot see 
the maze. So you have to instruct your partner how to direct 
the X, using these signal switches here. If you press this one, 
a light bulb will go on in the next room instructing your 
partner to move the X one step to the left. This switch 
indicates a move to the right, this up and this down. After 
each instruction you must cancel it by pressing this switch, 
otherwise that light bulb will remain on and confuse your 
partner. You should start off with all the switches on, then 
cancel it as a signal to your partner that you are about to 
begin, just as when finished the maze you should switch them 
all on at once to indicate its completion. If one of you makes 
a mistake and the X is directed into a barrier, a tone will 
sound but the X will not move. This is recorded as an error and 
will be deducted from your score. 
Let me explain how your earnings on the test will be 
calculated. Your score is a function of the speed with which 
you do the task adjusted for the number of errors you make. 
This score is converted into a percentage which is added one 
the X will move one step to the right, this one - to the left, 
to your allocation. E.g. if you have been allocated R2, and do 
very well, coming out with a score that converts to 80%. Then 
you will receive R2+Rl.60. You can also do badly and end up 
with a negative score resulting in money being removed from 
your allocation. 
Lets do this practice maze to check everything is O.K. 
Subject completed the practice maze under supervision. 
Ready to start on the real thing? .. You will do two mazes, one 
after the other. The time it takes the computer to draw the 
maze will not be included in your score. 
RESPONDER: 
This is a test of perceptual motor skill. Depending on your 
performance you will increase or decrease your earnings. You 
are working with a partner whose identity you do not know, and 
you both have different roles. You are the Responder and your 
partner is the Instructor. You are working together to earn as 
.... m.uch money as possible. 1;!1. :the ·n~xt·· room there is a screen 
displazing_ . a~ maze· with.:a ·mark~_r: ~x· ·ot;l· ·i:.t:,. similar.. to .this .. one 
drawri. on .. this· card. The object of the task . is .. to .. move .this 
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marker through and out of the maze as quickly and accurately as 
possible. Your partner can see the maze but cannot control the 
X. You can control the X using these touch pads here. If you 
touch this one the X will move one step to the left, this one -
to the right, this up and this down. Be careful, the discs are 
very sensitive. Your partner has to direct you how to move the 
X, and she or he does so via these light bulbs. If this one 
goes on you are being told to move the X up, this one down, 
left, right. If one of you makes a mistake and ~he X is 
directed into a barrier, a tone will sound but the X will not 
move. This is recorded as an error and will be deducted from 
your score. 
Let me explain how your earnings on the test will be 
calculated. Your score is a function of the speed with which 
you do the task adjusted for the number of errors you make. 
This score is converted into a percentage which is added to 
your allocation. E.g. if you have been allocated R2, and do 
very well, coming out with a score that converts to 80%. Then 
you will receive R2+Rl.60. You can also do badly and end up 
with a negative score resulting in money being removed from 
your allocation. 
Lets do this practice maze to check everything is O.K. 
Subject completed the practice maze under supervision. 
Ready to start on the real thing? .. You will do two mazes, one 
after the other. The time it takes the computer to draw the 
maze will not be included in your score. 
When the maze task was over, the subject was taken to another room 
and given questionnaire B to complete. 
MATRIX TASK 
When the questionnaire had been completed, the experimenter 
entered with the matrix booklet. The following instructions were 
identical for all conditions. 
This is a judgement task and this is the way in which the money 
is allocated. I have a pool of money, which is not mine by the 
way, so do not worry about me - it has been provided by the 
university. This money has to be distributed to everyone doing 
this practical. But I am not going to do this. I am getting 
everyone to allocate money to a number of other people.So the 
money you will be allocated, which you have just increased or 
decreased on the maze task, is a result of a number of other 
people giving you small amounts of money. Now the way this is 
done is with this booklet. Everyone receives one of these 
booklets, quite randomly within each group. On the cover of the 
booklet it says "BOOKLET FOR MEMBER NO ..•.. OF ..... GROUP". 
This is your code name. Using the booklet you will be 
allocating money to a number of different people who are 
identified by their code names only. So you will never know 
who you are giving money to, as you will not know who gave you 
money. Let me explain how the booklet works. It contains 20 
pages, each one looking something like this: 
Two page examples, using matrices that do not appear· ;.-±f.i·. ·t:he. actu'al 
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booklet, and addressed to members of groups X and Y, and to Y and 
Y were used for demonstration purposes. 
On each page you give money to 2 people, in this case Member 
No... of •. group, and Member No ••• of .• group. This is the 
classic version of the test. But as I told you we are going to 
use the Delta and Gamma groups. You'll find those names in the 
booklet. Now, 1 point equals 1 cent. You have to choose one of 
these boxes which will result in the top number of points 
(cents) being given to the top recipient, in this case Member 
No •.. of •.. group, and the bottom number of points being given 
to the bottom recipient. Once you decide which box you want to 
give out you must tick the box under it and transfer the number 
of points in the box to the lines below. You can only choose 
one box and you cannot mix the points from different boxes. So 
on this example if you select this box you will be allocating 
(THE TOTAL OF THE 2 POINTS IN THE BOX) cents such that .• 
goes to Member No .•. of •• group and •• goes to Member No. 
of group. You will find three types of matrices in the 
booklet. One, like this, has boxes which all add to the same 
amount. So there is no choice about how much money is to be 
given, only to whom. Another has boxes whose total increases 
in value as you go across the page, and the third has boxes 
which decrease in value. - But the boxes will never vary 
sporadically. 
Both examples were completed and queries answered. 
I'll leave you to do the booklet. When you have finished please 
check that you have filled in all 20 pages, and be sure your 
name is on the front, before switching on the signal. 
Wnen the subject signalled, the matrix booklet was taken away, and 
questionnaire C given. 
PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME 
When the questionnaire had been completed, the booklet for the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game was brought in. The instructions for this 
varied slightly for the different conditions, at the point marked 
( *) • 
This last experiment is a decision-making task. The story is 
this; you and your partner (*) have committed a crime, but 
you've been caught ....•. 
The 'story' is then given exactly .as written on the first page of 
the Prisoner's Dilemma booklet. The variations at (*) are: 
CONTROL AND NO COOPERATION CONDITIONS: 
(someone else participating in this practical, who 
randomly be paired with you) 
COOPERATION CONDITIONS: 
(the same person you did the maze task with) 




When subjects had completed this, the booklet was taken away and 
questionnaire D given. Once this was completed the Subject was 
given questionnaire E to answer at home, reminded that the 
questionnaires had to be submitted with their assignments and 
instructed to be at the debriefing meeting, where they would 
receive their earnings. They were thanked for their participation •. 
When they had finished D, the CONTROL group was given 
questionnaire A.2 with the following explanation. This served the 
function of making their experience similar enough to the other 
groups to enable their completion of the required assignment. 
CONTROL 
Do you remember me telling you about the Barron-Welsh test? I 
am now going to tell you of another aspect of the test. The 
test also acts as a projective, indirect type of personality 
assessment. Do you know what an indirect, projective 
personality test is in contrast to a direct self-report one? 
[THIS WAS EXPLAINED AS IT HAD RELEVANCE TO THE ASSIGNMENT 
THE SUBJECTS WERE REQUIRED TO PRODUCE] 
Barron and Welsh found that specific personality traits were 
associated with the type of artistic potential - Delta or Gamma 
- people have. For instance, they found that people who have a 
Delta-type potential tend to be highly creative, innovative, 
individualistic, unpredictable, energetic and questioning. 
Whereas people with a Gamma-type potential tend to be 
competent, -conservative, practical, ·worrying, peaceable and 
accepting of authority. 
This has been verified by numerous other researchers, who 
repeated the studies and found the same thing. Will you now 
please fill in this questionnaire. 






1. Diagram of Mazes. 
2. Circuit Construction of the Control Box. 
3. Computer Programme Controlling Maze Task. 
Practice maze 
Test mazes 
I .. _ .. ____________ , 








: .. : 
MAZES 
__ u. •t'r"•·:·~·. ~ · .. •· .. ; ....... ::::tl tlH lfFt~ ·--}f ; I I. ~·I··· · ... .... 
[: 







._ ......... _;_;_ 
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CIRCUIT DESIGN OF CONTROL BOX 
The control __ box consisted of 
housing four stimulus lamps 
form of touch pads. 
a purposely-made . instrument box, 











Four of the above were constructed, for each of the touch pads. 
Basically, each consisted of an FET detector/buffer at the input 
which triggers a Schmidt gate. The latter was configured from 
three triple nand gates and controls the bias at the output stage. 
I am indebted to Mr. Alec Reynolds for the design and construction 
of the above instrument and all related apparatus. Mr. Reynolds 
provided the above account of the ciruitry . 
.. 
COMPUTER PROGRAMME CONTROLLING THE MAZE TASK 
This programme controlled the following functions: 
1. The 'drawing' of the maze on the VDU. 
2. The movement of the marker 'X' through the maze. 
3. The sounding of a tone when the marker was directed 
into a barrier. 
4. The measurement of the time taken to do the mazes. 
5. The recording of this time and of the number of 
errors (attempts to cross barriers) onto disc. 
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MAZE<0:101l, TIME, LATENCY, MAZE NO, START 
CO ORII START<2l, CO ORD FIN(2) 
ECNT 
/MBLK/ MAZE, MAZE NO 
/IBLK/ START, CO ORD START, CO O~II FIN 
/TBLK/ TIME, LATENCY 
IEBUU ECNT 
INITIALIZE 








IF <MAZE NO .EG. 0) PAUSE READY TO BEGIN? 






















ROW, COL, I, M, BIT 
MAZE<0:101l, MAZE NO, COORD START (2), COORD FIN (2) 
STAF:T 
BTEST 
/MBLK/ MAZE, MAZE NO 
/IBLK/ START, CO ORD START, CO ORD FIN 
/DBLK/ ROIJ, COL 
0 
ROW = 2, 20, 2 
2000 COL = 18, 63, 5 
M = M + 
IIO 1 000 I = 1 , 4 
BIT = 4 - I 
IF <.NOT. BTEST<MAZE<M)~Billl CALL DRAW LINE !Il 
I : 1 :: LEFT 
2 = RIGHT 
3 = UP 
4 = DOIJN 














CO ORD START, MAZE<O> 
COORD FIN, MAZE<101) 
CO ORD STAHT ) 
DRAWLINE ( DIRECTION I 
.. •· . ···. 
~ . . . . 
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INTEGER ROIJ PLUS 1 ' ROU LESS 
INTEGER COL PLUS 2, COL LESS ·1 .. 
INTEGER DIRECTION, ROIJ, COL 
COMMON /ItBUU ROIJ, COL 
ROIJ PLUS = I~OW + 
ROW LESS = ROt~ -
COL PLUS 2 = COL + 2 
COL LESS 2 = COL - ~. .:. 




1000 I= ROW LESS I, ROIJ PLUS 













I= ROW LESS 1, ROW PLUS 
(I' COL PLUS 2' "!II) 
I = COL LESS 2, COL PLUS 2 
IROU LESS 1, I, "·-" J 
I = COL LESS 2, COL PLUS 2 
I ROW PLUS 1, I, "·-" J 
NOSTACI< 













POSITION 12), MASK, ROW, COL, BIT 
BTEST 
/IrBLK/ ROI.~, COL 
POSITION ( ·1 J 
POSITION 12) 
I ·- 1 , 4 
4 - I 
IF (.NOT. BlEST <MASK,BITJ ) CALL DRAW LINE (IJ 














INTEGEF: POSITION (2) 





















CURSOR (2), M~ N 
MAZEI0:101l, MAZE NO, MASK, TIME, LATENCY 
COORD START 121, COORD FIN (2) 
START 
CURSOF: 
/MBLK/ MAZE, MAZE NO 
/IBLK/ START, CO ORD START, CO URD FIN 
/TBLK/ TIME, LATENCY 
::: co ORD STr~RT i 1) 
- co 01~£1 ST r~HT ( 2) 





CALL MGETEX (LATENCY, MOVE, 1,2,3,41 TIME = MS; MOVE = SWITCH 
1,2,3,4 ARE SWITCHES FROM 







TIME (LATENCY / 1000 
ACCUMULATED TIME IN SECONDS 
IF 
CALL 
(ILLEGAL MOVE IMOVE, MASKll CALL ERROR MESSAGE 1$10001 
MOVE CURSOR !CURSOR, MOVE) 
IF <M .LE. 0 .OR. M .GE. 101) M =START 
CALt H UPDATE (M, MOUE) 
N = N + 1 
IF (M .LT. OJ M = 0 
IF <M .GT. 101 i M :: 101 
MASf( = MAZEIM) 

















--) REPEAT UNTIL END OF MAZE 
1000 
:2000 
CALL APPEND \1, "I~ESUL.TS.IIT", 3, IEF:H, 128) 










EI~A':3E \POSITION J 
;-------------------------------
INTEGE~: PO~:liTION L::J 




LOGICAL FUNCTION ILLEGAL MOVE (MOVE, MASK> 
·--------------------------------·----------------' 
BIT MASf( (4) INTEGER 
DATA BIT MASK I 10K, 04K, 02K, 01K I 
ILLEGAL MOVE = lAND ( BIT MI~SI< (MOVE), MASI< 
RET UR~l 
END 








CALL XLOCO (23,1,"") 
TYPE "t.JRONG MOVE" 
TYPE 11<00?>11 
DO 1000 I = 1' 3 
CALL ON ('I) 
c" ! HLI- WI~ I i (5(i) 
CALL OFF ( 1) 
CALL WtHT ( '15()} 
CONTINUE 
CALL WAIT (350) 
DO 2000 I ·- ., ' 3 
CALL ON ( 1 } 
CALL WtHT ( i 50) 
CALL OFF ( 1) 





CALL WiUT ( :.3!~0) 
DO 3000 I ·- 1' 3 
CALL ON \ 1 ) 
CALL I.JAIT (50) 
CALL OFF (1) 















MOVE CURSOR <CURSOR, MOVEI 
INTEGER CURSOR (21, MOVE 
CALL ERASE \CURSOR) 
CALL C UPDATE (CURSOR, MOUE) 
CALL .DRAW X iCURSORl 
F:ETUi~N 
END 
C011F' I LEI·< 
SUI1ROUTINE 
N!J::5T ACi< 


























ROY, COL, CHARACTER, CH, VERT, HORIZ, SP, X~ Y, BCD 
VERT, HORIZ, SP I 13K, 20K, 40K I 
= COL/10*16 + MOD (COL, 10) 























• PC HAl~ 



















C UPDATE (CURSOR, MOVE) 
;--------------------------------------
INTEGER CURSOR(2), MOVE· 
GO TO ( 1 , .2, 3, 4), MOVE 
CURSOR\2i = CUHSOI~ ( :2) ·- 5 
RETURN 
CURSOF:(2J = CURSOR(2J + ·:· ..J 
F:ETLIRN 
CURSOR ( 1 ! = CURSOR ( 1 ) - 2 
RETURN 

















INTEGER M, MOVE 
GO TO < 1 , 2, 3, 4 > , MOVE 
M = 11 - ; ~EFT 
RETURN 
M = M + ; RIGHT 
RETURN 
M = M - 10 Uf' 
RETURN 










ECNT, TIME, LATENCY 
MAZE<0:101>, MAZE NO 
IEBLK/ ECtH 
/TBLK/ TIME, LATENCY 
/MBLK/ MAZE, MAZE NO 
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'100 FORMAT (1//1///" <Oli>FOR THE TRIAL MAZE, YOU MADE", B, "IJRONG MOVES", 
& II" (011>*** TIME : ", 14, II SECONDS***"/) 
200 FORMAT II2, 12> 
300 FORMAT <I3l 
... ~ . . 
...... · .. 
TYPE "<014>" CLEAR SCHEEN 
IF <MAZE NO .EQ. O.l WfllTE \ 10,100) ECNT, fiME 
WRITE (1,200) "OERROR COUNT FOI~ MAZE", MtUENO, II II ECNT 



















CO ORit START < 1) 
CO ORB START 12) 
COORDFIN(1) 





BUFFER(0:12l>, MAZE<0:101l, MAZE NO, STAHT 
COORD START12J, COORD FIN <2> 
/MBLK/ MAZE, MAZE NO 
/IBLK/ START, CO ORD START, CO ORD FIN 
REAIIR 10, MAZE NO, BUFFER, I, IERRi 
!=0,101 












( 104 ). 
( 1 0~5) 
( 1 06) 
( 1 0?) 
;--------------------
INTEGER EXPERIMENTER 120) 
100 FORMAT <20A2l 
:.?00 FORMAT(/////, II 11 2CIA2) 
TYPE "<014>" 
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TYPE ''PLEASE ENTER NAME OF EXPERIMENTER <FOLLOU BY ~NE~LINE~ KEY>" 
READ ( 11,100 > EXPERIMENTER 
TYPE "<015>" 





1. Face sheet of the matrix booklet, and page 
examples showing each type of presentation. 
2. Details of the method of scoring the matrices. 
3. Fortran programme for converting the box choices 























"" ....... I 
. : 
"THESE NlffiER) ARE TO BE AWARDED TO: ·::·l ·.: . 
,·· 
'- . ·' 
~\:MBER NO. OF DELTA GROUP 14 l J 15 ll 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 l J 25 l J 26i 
f1EMBER NO. OF GArvv"A GROUP 14 l J l3 ll 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 l]Jll 
TICK PREFERRED BOX: DDDDDDDDDDDDD 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~-----------
PLEASE FILL IN THE DETAILS OF THE SELECTED BOX: 
JlmiJNT .. . . 
:. 
PoiNTS FOR NO. OF DELTA GROUP 
I I I I I I I I 
PoiNTS FOR NO. OF ~ GROlP 
I I I I I I I I 
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MATRIX SCORING 
On each matrix, the boxes were numbered from 1 to 13 or 14 (as 
applicable) starting on the left. The number of the box 
constituted the basic data from which the dep~ndent variables were 
calculated. The method of calculation is described below. To make 
the logic behind the method clearer the position of the ideal 
choice for the relevant strategies is marked: 
(i) Fairness (F) 
(ii) Maximum Joint Profit (MJP) 
(iii) Maximum Ingroup Profit (MIP) 
(Iv) Maximum Differentiation (MD) 





lil f2ll3114llsl 161171 (] f9l flo1 lillT121 Q ~ 



















MJP is constant throughout. 








'•'.' .. .. \ 
,. ,. 
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On these matrices, each of the presentations (I/O and 0/I) yield a 
score. Let the number of the chosen box be symbolized by Y Then 
for the I/O presentation of A and the 0/I of B, the dependent 
variable: 
Fav = y - 7.5 
E.g. If the chosen box on A was 8/15, then Y=ll and 
Fav = 11 - 7.5 = +3.5 
On the 0/I presentation of A and the I/O of B: 
Fav = 7.5 - y 
The final measure of the dependent variable, Ingroup Favouritism 
was the mean of these four FAV scores. 
Matrix C 
OJ[][]I 1~11 1 ~11 ~til gil ~~11 gil ~~11 ~rll ~~~~~~1 
ITJC2JC2JG~GD[I]DJ~[I!]C!2lG2J 








The dependent variable measured by C is the pull of MD on MJP+MIP. 
Let the chosen box on each presentation be Y. Then: 
MD on MJP+MIP = Y(O/I) - Y(I/0) 
E.g. Let the chosen box on I/O be 13/13, so Y(I/0)=7 and let the 
chosen box on 0/I be 15/17. Then Y(0/1)=9: 
MD on MJP+MIP = 9 - 7 = +2 














Matrix D measures the pull of Fav on F. Let the chosen boxes be Y. 
Then: 
Pull of Fav on F = Y(I/0) - Y(O/I) 
E.g. Let the box chosen on I/O be 17/11. Then Y(I/0)=4. Let the 
















The pull of Fav on MJP is measured by matrix E. 
Pull of Fav on MJP = Y(O/I) - Y(I/0) 
E.g. Let the choice of boxes on the I/O and 0/I presentations be 
13/13 and 10/19, respectively. Then Y(I/0)=7 and Y(0/1)=10: 
Pull of Fav on MJP = 10 - 7 = +3 
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PROGRAMME TO CONVERT BOX CHOICES INTO DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
This Fortran programme was self-written for use on a UNIVAC 1108 
computer. This programme took as raw data the number of the chosen 
box on the relevant matrix presentations and converted these to 
the dependent variables as described in the last section. The 
dependent variables were stored in separate files for subsequent 
analysis. 
1 0 C PROORAft TO WORK OUT SCORES 
20 PARAMETER NUH•114 
30 DIHENSION NAHE<NUH>,IC<NUH>,IS<NUH>,IL<MUH>,IGP<NUH> 
40 DIMENSION A1<NUH>,A2<NUH),AJ<NUH>,A4CNUH> 
50 DIHEHSIOH B1<1UH>,B2<NUH>,BJ<NUH>,B4(NUH> 
60 DlHENSIOH C1<NUH>,C2<NUH>,CJ<NUH>,C4<NUM> 
70 DIHENSION D1<HUH>,D2<NUH>,D3<NUM>,D4<NUH) 
80 DIMENSION E1<NUH>,E2<NUH>,E3<NUH>,E4<NUH> 
90 DIHEMSION X<NUH>,Y<MUH>,Z<NUH>,U<NUH>,PD<NUH> 
100 CHARACTER DV•20<5> 
110 DATA DVFINGP FAVOlRITISM' ,-'HD ON HJP+IIP' ,'FAV ON FAIRNESS' 
' 120 & 'FAV ON ttJP', 'PRIS DILEHHA "I 
130 DO 1 I•1,NUH 
140 1 READ<8,5) NAHE<I>,IGP<I>,IC<I>,IS<I>,IL<I>,Al<I>,A2<I>, 
150 &AJCI>,A4<I>,B1<I>,B2<I>,BJ<I>,B4<I>,C1<I>,C2<I>,C3<I>,C4<I>, 
160 101 <I> ,.D2<I) ,DJ< I>, D4<I > ,£1 <I> ,£2<1 > ,E3< U ,E4<I) ,PD< U 
170 5 FORHAT<IJ,T6,I1,T8,3I1,T14,20<F2.0,1X),T77,F1.0) 
180 DO 10 I•1,NUH 






250 GO TO 10 





310 10 CONTINUE 
320 DO 20 I=1,NUH 
330 20 WRITE <13,25> NAttE<I>,IGP<I>,IC<I>,IS<I>,IL<I>,X<I> 
335 DO 21 1=1,NUH 
340 21 WRITE (14,25> NAHE<I> ,IGPU> ,IC<U ,IS( I) ,lUI> ,·Y<u 
345 DO 22 1•1,HUH 
350 22 WRITE <15,25> NAHE<I>,IGP<I>,IC<I>,IS<I>,IL<I>,Z<I> 
355 DO 23 1=1,NUH 
360 23 WRITE <16,25> NAHE<I>,IGP<I>,IC<I>,IS<I>,IL<I>,Y<I> 
365 DO 24 1=1,NUH 
370 24 URITE <17,25) NAHE<I>,IGP<I>,IC<I>,IS<I>,IL<I>,PD<I> 
395 25 FORHAT<1X,I3,T6,I1,T9,3I1,T20,F20.15> 
400 URITE<S,30) <DV(J),J=1,5) 
410 30 FORHAT<1H1,T12,5A20,1,T10,105<~-~)/) 
..420 DO 40 1=1 ,NUH 
. :·.·. 4.3Q. 4~ .... ·: . · ~JTE<5,35) ~<I> ,IGPU>,I.C<I))·lS( I>·,IL<I> ,X<U, Y< U ,Z<I> 





· &· UH).,PDU) 




PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME 
The following two pages contain the five situations 
presented in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The pages 
were cut along the marked lines and fastened together 
forming a six-page booklet. 
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NAME 
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PRISON ER'S DILEMMA GAME 
The situation is as follows: 
You and your partner have committed a crime. You have been apprehended, 
but the evidence against you is rather scant. So the prosecutor is hoping 
to persuade at least one of you to confess (turn State's evidence), in order 
to have a water-tight case. He keeps you in different rooms so you have no 
way of knowing what your partner is doing. The offers the prosecutor 
makes, and the consequences are spelled out on the following pages. These 
consequences have been converted to add or detract from your money. Eg. on 
page 1, if you both confess you both lose 5% of your earnings, so if your 
earnings to date are R3.00 you will lose 15c. On each page a different set 
of rewards and penalties are presented. You must choose, independently for 
each, whether to confess or not. This will be matched with what your partner 
has decided to determine your wins or losses. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------· 
-1-
If you BOTH confess, you will both go to gaol for a year 
If NEITHER of you confess you will probably get off 
If ONE of you confesses and not the other, 
the confessor gets off and gets a reward 
and the other goes to gaol for 5 years 
Your decision: Will you confess? (Yes/No) 







If you BOTH confess, you will both go to gaol for 2 years 
If NEITHER ,f you confess you will get off and get away 
with some of the booty 
If ONE of you confesses and not the other, 
- 10%) 
+ 5% ) 
the confessor gets off and gets a reward ·( + 20%) 
while the other goes to gaol for 5 years ( - 20%) 
Your decision: Will you confess? (Yes/No) 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
-3-
If you BOTH confess, you will both go to gaol for 5 years 
0If NEITHER of you confess you will probably get off 
If ONE of you confesses and not the other, 
Your decision: 
the confessor gets off with a reward 
while the other goes to gaol for 10 years 
Will you confess? (Yes/No) ............... 
- 20%) 
0% ) 
( + 30%) 




If you BOTH confess, you will both go to gaol for 10 years ( - 30%) 
If NEITHER of you confess you will both go to gaol for a year - 5% ) 
If ONE of you confesses and not the other, 
Your decision: 
the confessor gets off with a reward 
while the other goes to gaol for 15 years 
( + 40%) 
( - 40%) 
Will you confess? (Yes/No) ................... 
-5-
If you BOTH confess, you will both go to gaol for 10 years - 10%) 
If NEITHER of you confess you will both go to gaol for a year ( - 5% ) 
If ONE of you confesses, and not the other 
the confessor gets off with a reward + 60%) 
while the other goes to gaol for 20 years - 50%) 
.... ... . .. 
Will you confess? . . . . . . . (Yes/No) . ~ ~:.• ...... •:. ~ ...... •·• .... ·. ..... ... ... . . ····· ............ ,• .. 
. . . . ., . · ....... ,. · .. 
Your decision: 






To be answered after completing the Barron-Welsh Scale. 
1. What, exactly, do you think this test was measuring? 
2~ How "stable" do you feel your responses were - i.e. do you think you would 
have given the same responses on a different day? 
3. Situational variables are things such as1 the time of day, the noise in the 
testing room, the temperature, the presence or absence of other people in the 
room, the room itself, etc. Do you think any situational variables affected 
your responses in any way? 
4. Experimenter effects are such things as the personality, the age, the sex, 
the status or the manner of the experimenter- i.e. any'attribute of the 
experimenter as a person. Do you think your responses were affected by 
any such factorsi 
5. To 'cue' someone means to indicate to that person, in very subtle, often 
unconscious ways how one wishes them to act. Did you feel the experimenter 
was cuing you to respond in any particular way? Elaborate. 
SECTION A.2 
To be completed when the Barron-Welsh Scale has been explained. 
1. Were you surprised at the real. function of the test? Why? 





people who tend to be highly creative, innovative, 
individualistic, unpredictable, energetic and 
questioning. 
people who tend to be competent, conservative, 
practical, worrying, peaceable and accepting of 
authority. 
3. If you had known about this aspect of the test prior to doing it, do you 
think you could have completed it in a way which would ensure that you 
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would fall into whichever group you chose ? (i.e. could you have selectively 
responded in order to appear to be a delta-type, or a gamma-type person?) 
4. Below is an extract from a direct, self-report type of personality test: 
I. Do you often long for excitement? 
2. Do you often need understanding friends to cheer you up? 
3. Are you usually carefree? 
4. Do you find it very hard to take no for an answer? 
5. Do you stop and think things over before doing anything? 
Do you think you would have been able to manipulate you responses on this 








5. Do you think you would have more faith in the assessment made of your 
personality from a projective, indirect test (e.g~ the Barron-Welsh) or 
from the self-report, direct test (e.g. the above extract from the EPI -
· Eysenck Personality Inventory} ? Why? 
6. General comments - please include anything you think might be remotely 
pertinent. 
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SECTION A.2 (coi'I'TltOL.) 
To be completed when the Barron-Welsh Scale has been explained. 
1. Were you surprised at the real function of the test? Why? 




people who tend to be highly creative, innovative, 
individualistic, unpredictable, energetic and 
questioning. 
people who tend to be competent, conservative, 
practical, worrying, peaceable and accepting of 
authority. 
3. If you had known about this aspect of the test prior to doing it, do you 
think you could have completed it in a way which would ensure that you 
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would fall into whichever group you chose ? (i.e. could you have selectively 
responded in order to appear to be a delta-type, or a gamma-type person?) 
4. Below is an extract from a direct, self-report type of personality test: 
I. Do you often long for excitement? 
2. Do you often need understanding friends to cheer you upr 
3. Are you usually carefree r 
4. Do you find it very hard to take no for an answer! 
5. Do you stop and think things over before doing anything? 
Do you think you would have been able to manipulate you responses on this 








5. Do you think you would have more faith in the assessment made of your 
personality from a projective. indirect test (e.g. the Barron-Welsh) or 
from the self-report. direct test (e.g. the above extract from the EPI -
Eysenck Personality Inventory} ? Why? 
6. General. comments - please include anything you think might be remotely 
pertinent. 
/ 
. ~.. . 
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SECTION B. 
To be completed after the maze task. 
1. What, exactly, do you think this task was measuring? 
2. Were you affected by the fact that this task involved complex equipment 
(the computer) ? In what way? 
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3. How did the fact that you were earning or losing money, as a consequence of 
your performance, affect you ? 
4. On the following 1 to 5 rating scale, where 
1 = Very Badly 
2 = Badly 
3 As Well As Anyone Else 
4 Well 
5 Very Well 
rate how well you think you have done, relative to how you expect 
other people have done. 
RATING = Elaborate, if you wish • . . . . . . . . . . 
5. Using the following scale, where 
1 Much Better 
2 Better 
3 = The Same 
4 = Worse 
5 Much Worse 
rate how you think you could have done on a different day and I or time. 
RATING = ............. 
6. Do you think you were affected by any situational variables (refer to 
question A.1. No.3 for the definition, if necessary) ? 
7. Do you think you were affected by any experimenter variables (refer to 
question A.1 No.4 for definition, if necessary) ? 
8. Did you feel you were being cued to respond in way ? 
9. General comments: 
-164 
SECTION B. -165 
To be completed after the maze task. 
1. What, exactly, do you think this task was measuring? 
2. Were you affected by the fact that this task involved complex equipment 
· (the computer) ? In what way? 
3. How did the fact that you were earning or losing money, as a consequence of 
your performance, affect you ? 
4. Do you think you would have performed better in the other role - i.e. if 
you were the 'instructor' do you think you would have performed better as 
the 'responder'. or vice-versa ? 
5. On the following 1 to 5 rating scale, where 
1 = Very Badly 
2 Badly -~ 
3 = As Well As Anyone Else 
4 = Well 
5 Very Well 
rate how well you think you and your partner did relative to how you 
expect other people have done ? 
RATING . Elaborate, if you wish • . . . . . . . . . . 
6 I 
6. On the same scale, rate how well you think you personally performed on 
the task. 
RATING = 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
7. Using the following scale, where 
1 = Much Better 
2 = Better 
3 = The Same 
4 = Worse 
5 = Much Worse 
rate how you think you could have done with a different partner 
RATING = 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
8. Do you think you were affected by any situational variables (refer to 
question A.1. No.3 for the definition, if necessary) ? 
9. Do you think you were affected by any experimenter variables (refer to 
question A.1 No.4 for definition, if necessary) ? 
10, Did you feel you were being cued to respond in way ? 
.·-··: .. ·· .. ··:. ·: :;·. 
11. General comments: 
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SECTION C. -167 
To be completed after the matrix task. 
1 •. Rate how difficult you found this task on the following scale; 
1 Very Easy 
2 = Easy 
3 = Average 
4 Difficult 
5 = Very Difficult 
RATING 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
2. Explain. if possible, how you decided which box to choose. 
3. Did any situational factors affect your responses ? 
4. Did any experimenter variables affect your responses ? 
5. Did you feel you were being cued to respond in a certain manner ? 
6. What~ exactly. do you think this task was measuring ? 
7 I .. · · · 
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7. In most experiments where payment is given to the subjects, the procedure 
is usually to tell the subjects exactly how much s/he will receive. 
Subjects are usually told prior to doing the study, and in some cases 
are actually paid first. What effect do you think not knowing the amount 
of money you will receive, has had on your performance ? 
B. Do you think you would have responded differently if you were receiving 
no payment ? 
9. How did you feel about allocating money to anonymous people ? 
10. General comments: 
• 
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·SECTION 0 • 
. To be completed after the ~risonner's Dilemma Game. 
1. What, exactly, do you think this test was measuring ? 
2. Did you give the same, or variable responses for each page I situation ? 
3. Explain, if possible, what made you decide whether to confess or not ? 
4. On the following 1 to 5 scaleJ 
1 = Not At All 
2 Possibly 
3 = Slightly 
4 = To a Certain Extent 
5 = Definitely 
rate whether you were influenced by the fact that the identity of the 
other 'Prisonner' was unknown to you. 
RATING= ••••••••• Elaborate. 
5. Did any situational variables affect your response ? 
6. Were you affected b,y any experimenter variables ? 
.. ··· 
7 I •• 
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7. Did you feel you were being cued to respond in a certain manner ? 
B. General comments: 
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SECTION D. 
To be completed after the Prisonner's Dilemma Game. 
1. What, exactly,. do you think this test was measuring ? 
2. Did yqu give the same, or.variable responses for each page I situation ? 
3. Explain, if possible, what made you decide whether to confess or not ? 
4. On the following 1 to 5 scaleJ 
1 = Not At All 
2 = Possibly 
3 = Slightly 
4 = To a Certain Extent 
5 = Definitely 
rate whether you were influenced by the fact that the other 'Prisonnerr 
was the same person with whom you did the maze task. 
RATING= ••••••••• Elaborate. 
5. Did any situational variables affect your response ? 
6. Were you affected by any experimenter variables ? 
··-:·.:··· .... ~ ..... . .. 
,, ·: ..... . 
·---------~-
7 I •••.•• 
SECTION E. 
To be completed at the end of the session. 
1. Of all the tests I experiments you have done today~ which do you 
think is (are) the one (s) to be used for the actual research 
study ? 
2. What would you guess is the 'real' hypothesis or question the 
study was designed to answer ? 
3. Please comment on how you found this afternoon's session. 
e.g. did you find it enjoyable. boring. stressful. etc. 
Do you think you learned anything from it. etc • 
. . ·. ··: .·· 
. . ·~ . . .. ~ . . . . . . 
•' .. ·· 
-173 
-174 
We/sit 1ipure PrejereHCC rest 
START 
•••• HERE :* 
"' lite IJilrrPH- Wdslt Art s,:ale 
L.
_o __ ·•_e_c_r_IO_N_S_: -B-e _·_u•_e_t_o_f_i'_' -in-y-ou_r_n_•_m_._._"_d_o_th_e_r -i-nf-or_m_•_tio_n_r·-q-ue-s-te_d_. ~ DL r1li~'~ Then o~~nswer LIKE (l) or DON'T LIKE (D) for each drawing by mo~~king e hee~y .. 
m•r• in the eppropriete box, es in the example et right. 
- -1- "'"'2-~~ t-4 1-6-t-8 "'"''- f-8- f- ·-HO-f-11 lZ :>. 
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1. Box choices. 
2. Dependent variables. 
BOX CHOICES 
SS: The code numbers of the subjects. 
SF: The group to which the subject thought slhe should belong; 
1 = Delta 
2 = Gamma 
A: Cooperation; 0 = Control group 
1 = No Cooperation 
2 = Cooperation with a member 
3 = Cooperation with a member 
B: Status; 1 = High Status (Delta group) 
2 = Low Status (Gamma group) 
C: Legitimacy; 0 = Control group 
1 = Legitimate 
2 = Illegitimate 
A - E: Matrices as depicted in chapter 
1 = recipients are members of 
2 = recipients are members of 
3 = recipients are members of 






of the Ingroup 





PD: Competitive choices on the Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
Control study 
55 ABC A1 A2 A3 AA B1 B2 B3 B4 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 E1 E2 E3 E4 PD 
664 010 9 3 a a 11 11 7 7 9 7 3 11 6 2 7 5 7 6 2 3 3 
666 010 11 7 7 6 6 7 6 8 8 9 7 13 1 1 3 1 9 10 6 13 0 
634 010 8 7 8 7 7 8 7 9 7 7 6 8 1 1 1 1 7 7 6 7 0 
679 010 8 8 7 8 7 7 7 813131313 1 1 1 1 13 7 13 13 5 
680 010 5 12 5 10 5 13 9 7 13 8 10 8 8 3 1 5 7 8 8 2 1 
678 010 7 7 10 3 7 8 5 11 11 6 5 7 4 1 11 1 7 7 3 11 5 
77 020 14 7 7 7 8 7 7 8 13 13 13 13 1 1 1 1 9 11 7 13 2 
17 020 8 7 7 8 7 7 8 7 13 13 13 13 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 0 
76 020 7 7 5 14 a 7 14 1 7 13 13 3 1 2 1 7 7 7 13 3 2 
73 020 7 7 3 14 7 7 6 1 3 7 13 3 1 1 1 7 7 7 9 1 0 
51 020 4 10 3 14 1 214 5 13 8 8 11 5 1 1 6 9 6 13 6 5 




ss SF: ABC A1 A2 A3 ~4 81 B2 83 B4 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 E1 E2 E3 E4 PD 
657 2 111 7 8 8 7 7 8 8 7 8 3 3 7 1 1 2 2 7 3 7 8 1 
656 1 111 7 8 7 8 8 8 8 7 13 13 13 13 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 0 
667 2 111 9 6 7 1 7 9 4 4 7 8 4 10 3 3 1 5 11 7 3 8 3 
6~0 2 111 8 7 7 9 6 7 7 7 8 7 7 6 1 2 1 1 7 8 7 7 5 
621 1 111 7 8 7 7 8 8 8 8 7 8 7 13 1 3 5 1 6 7 10 7 0 
631 1 111 7 7 8 7 7 8 8 7 7 6 8 6 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 2 
628 1 111 7 7 7 7 8 7 8 7 7 7 7 7 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 "' 632 1 111 8 8 8 8 7 8 7 9 13 -13 13 13 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 3 
6~3 0 111 1 7 14 1 7 13 1 13 13 13 13 13 13 1 13 13 11 1 13 13 0 
641 1 112 6 7 s 10 9 9 7 4 3 7 7 4 1 13 1 13 7 7 7 7 2 
675 1 112 8 7 7 8 7 8 7 7 7 13 13 7 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 1 
665 2 112 8 7 1 ~ 1 7 8 1 14 7 1 1 7 1 1 13 1 7 7 1 8 0 
6~7 1 112 7 7 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 0 
650 1 112 3 10 7 14 14 7 9 14 5 4 13 1 1 7 13 6 3 8 5 1 3 
601 1 112 10 7 10 6 9 9 9 10 7 7 2 2 7 9 7 1 6 1 4 11 5 
60~ 1 112 7 7 8 7 7 7 7 8 7 7 13 13 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 5 
603 1 112 7 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 11 7 11 7 2 2 3 2 7 7 a 7 2 
602 2 t 12 8 8 t 7 7 8 8 a 7 7 7 7 13 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 3 
620 1 112 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 7 13 13 13 13 1 1 1 1 7 8 7 8 5 
618 1 112 8 7 7 7 7 8 7 8 7 7 7 7 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 4 
65 0 121 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 13 13 13 13 1 1 1 1 13131313 2 
7~ 2 121 14 9 8 1 7 7 11 7. 7 7 7 11 1 1 . 2 1 7 7 7 7 2 
i 
70 2 121 9 7 1 12 7 8 11 1 1 1 8 6 1 1 1 7 7 13 11 2 1 
61 1 121 7 8 8 7 7 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 0 
63 2 121 7 8 1 14 6 1 14 7 13 7 13 13 1 1 113 7 7 7 7 3 
6~ 1 121 7 8 6 12 7 8 13 3 1 7 13 1 11 1 1 6 1 7 13 1 0 
60 0 121 7 7 8 7 7 7 7 8 10 9 8 9 1 1 1 1 7 7 8 8 0 
65 1 121 7 8 7 8 7 a 8 7 13 13 13 13 1 1 1 1 7 10 7 7 0 
56 0 121 8 8 7 8 8 8 8 7 7 9 8 6 1 1 1 2 7 7 8 6 4 
6 2 122 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 0 
8 2 122 6 8 ~ 6 s 2 a 9 5 10 9 7 3 12 5 12 3 a 12 4 5 
10 2 122 7 8 8 7 8 7 7 1 13 13 13 13 1 1 1 1 13 7 13 7 1 
1 1 122 13 10 10 9 2 13 14 12 13 2 3 12 7 1 4 5 1 13 13 7 3 
9 2 122 7 7 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 13 7 7 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 5 
53 2 122 8 1 14 1 7 7 1 8 7 1 1 13 1 1 13 1 1 1 13 13 2 
5 1 122 7 9 5 5 9 1 7 14 7 7 13 12 2 3 1 7 10 9 9 1 3 
~ 0 122 7 7 7 8 7 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 0 
2 2 122 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 13 13 13 7 13 1 13 13 1 13 13 13 5 
3 2 122 8 7 8 8 8 5 9 8 12 7 4 11 2 1 .2 
., 8 7 8 6 0 
654 2 211 5 8 8 9 11 7 7 10 13 7 13 13 1 1 1 1 7 12 10 8 s 
663 t 211 6 5 10 1 6 7 14 9 4 7 7 7 1 5 3 1 4 7 7 7 1 
662 1 211 8 7 8 7 8 7 7 8 7 7 7 8 1 1 2 1 7 7 6 8 0 
649 2 211 7 8 8 8 7 8 7 7 13 13 13 13 1 1 1 1 13 13 7 7 5 
657 t 211 7 7 8 8 7 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 0 
674 2 211 7 7 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 1 
676 1 211 8 7 8 7 7 7 7 8 7 7 7 7 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 5 
646 2 211 8 5 13 9 6 8 6 7 3 1 8 5 11 5 1 8 11 7 4 3 4 
652 t 211 5 7 7 4 12 10 9 10 6 7 3 8 1 3 11 3 6 8 7 6 2 
627 2 212 7 14 8 14 8 14 1 7 13 13 13 13 1 1 13 13 7 7 7 7 2 
629 t 212 7 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 0 
606 1 212 7 7 9 6 8 7 4 10 7 7 6 \0 1 1 3 1 7 7 7 8 0 
607 2 212 14 7 11 1 1 4 1 14 9 10 9 2 8 10 1 1 7 9 6 9 5 
608 2 212 7 9 7 7 7 7 1 8 13 13 13 13 4 2 7 2 8 7 13 7 1 
605. 1· 212 · --7· 7 .14···7···?.· .. :8:·-·z.. -9..· 7 ·7. ·1 · 7 .. 1 .. =·1 2 1 7 7 7 8 0 
622 ··2- -2-1:2 .. :..,. .... ?.< :r-::·a.-·~ ·::;:--:.-.:-7.·.-.:·:-7>7·:~·.·8,-::]_::-:-.,. ·· 6 ·· 7 ·· 1 ·' 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 0 
625 2 l1l.;.·.~~ .8- 8 s 6 8 · "7· · · .9· · 9 ... ··s 8 10 2 8 1 2 7 8 6 11 3 
626 1 212 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 13 7 13 13 1 1 1 1 6 7 7 8 0 
624 1 212 2 7 14 1 6 7 14 14 7 1 6 13 1 1 13 1 12 1 1 13 2 
623 1 212 7 6 13 6 8 9 13 9 11 7 9 10 3 7 2 2 8 8 11 8 0 
-··-·· ----- . ---·-




MD on FAV on FAV on 
ss SF ABC FAV MJF'+MIF' FAIR 11 .. P Pit 
664 010 0.00 8.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 
666 010 0. 7~i 6.00 2.00 ?.00 0.00 
634 010 0.75 2.00 0.00 ., .oo 0.00 
679 010 o.oo 0.00 o.oo o.oo 5.00 
680 010 -1 • ?~'i -:2.00 -4.0Q ·-6.00 1.00 
678 010 3.25 2.00 10.00 8.00 ~5 .00 
77 020 -.25 () . ()() 0.00 ·-6. 00 2.00 
17 020 0.50 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00 
76 020 5.50 10.00 6.00 '10.00 2.00 
73 020 4.00 10.00 6.00 8.00 0.00 
51 020 5.0() ·-3.00 ~.5. 00 7.00 ~5. 00 
72 020 1 '7'"' . , ... , 0.00 4.00 ·-1 .00 0.00 
Main experiment 
HD on fAV on FAV on 
SS SF ABC FAV 11JP+I1IP FAIR H..P PD 
657 2 111 0.00 4.00 o.oo 1.00 1.00 
656 1 111 -.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
667 2 111 1. 50 6.00 -4.00 5.00 3.00 
640 2 111 -.so -1.00 o.oo o.oo 5.00 
621 1 111 o.oo 6.00 4.00 -3.00 0.00 
631 1 111 o.oo -2.00 o.oo 0.00 2.00 
628 1 111 -.25 0.00 0.00 o.oo 4.00 
632 1 111 0.50 o.oo o.oo 0.00 3.00 
643 0 111 6.25 o.oo o.oo 0.00 o.oo 
641 1 112 -2.00 -3.00 -12.00 0.00 2.00 
675 1 112 -.25 -6.00 0.00 o.oo 1.00 
665 2 112 6.50 6.00 12.00 7.00 o.oo 
647 1 112 0.25 o.oo o.oo o.oo o.oo 
650 1 112 -.50 -12.00 7.00 -4.00 3.00 
601 1 112 1.25 o.oo 6.00 7.00 5.00 
604 1 112 0.50 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 5.00 
603 1 112 0.25 -4.00 1.00 -1.00 2.00 
602 2 112 -1.50 o.oo o.oo o.oo 3.00 
620 1 112 -.25 o.oo o.oo 1.00 5.00 
618 t 112 0.25 o.oo o.oo o.oo 4.00 
65 0 121 o.oo o.oo o.oo o.oo 2.00 
74 2 121 -.75 -4.00 -1.00 0.00 2.00 
70 2 121 5.25 2.00 6.00 9.00 1.00 
61 1 121 -.25 o.oo o.oo o.oo 0.00 
63 2 121 5.00 o.oo . 12.00 0.00 3.00 
64 1 121 4.00 12.00 5.00 12.00 0.00 
60 0 121 -.50 -1.00 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 
65 1 121 0.50 o.oo o.oo 0.00 o.oo 
56 0 121 o.so 2.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 
6 2 122 -.25 0.00 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 
8 2 122 0.25 2.00 7.00 8.00 5.00 
10 2 122 1.25 0.00 o.oo 6.00 1.00 
1 1 122 0.25 -9.00 1.00 6.00 3.00 
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HD on FAV on Ft\V on 
SS SF ABC FAV HJP+HIP FAIR HJP PD 
9 2 122 -.25 o.oo 0.00 0.00 5.00 
53 2 122 -5.00 -12.00 -12.00 o.oo 2.00 
5 1 122 -1.75 1.00 6.00 8.oo 3.00 
4 0 122 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
2 2 122 o.oo 6.00 0.00 o.oo 5.00 
3 2 122 0.25 -7.00 -1.00 2.00 o.oo 
654 2 211 0.50 o.oo 0.00 -2.00 5.00 
663 1 211 1.00 0.00 2.00 o.oo 1 ~00 
662 1 211 0.50 1.00 1.00 2.00 o.oo 
649 2 211 o.oo 0.00 0.00 o.oo 5.00 
657 1 211 0.00 0.00 o.oo o.oo o.oo 
674 2 211 0.25 0.00 o.oo o.oo 1.00 
6761 211 0.50 0.00 0.00 o.oo 5.00 
646 2 211 1.25 -3.00 -7.00 -1.00 4.00 
652 1 211 1.00 5.00 8.00 -1.00 2.00 
627 2 212 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 
629 1 212 o.oo 0.00 0.00 o.oo o.oo 
606 1 212 2.25 4.00 2.00 1.00 o.oo 
607 2 212 5.75 -7.00 0.00 3.00 5.00 
608 2 212 1.75 o.oo 5.00 -6.00 1.00 
605 1 212 2.25 6.00 1.00 1.00 o.oo 
622 2 212 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
625 2 212 1.25 2.00 -1.00 5.00 3.00 
626 1 212 o.oo o.oo 0.00 1.00 o.oo 
624 1 212 3.25 7.00 12.00 12.00 2.00 
623 1 212 0.75 1.00 o.oo -3.00 o.oo 
71 0 221 o.oo 0.00 0.00 o.oo 4.00 
79 2 221 2.25 0.00 -2.00 0.00 3.00 
80 1 221 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 
78 2 221 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.00 1.00 
72 2 221 3.50 3.00 8.00 6.00 1.00 
68 2 221 1.25 -6.00 4.00 2.00 5.00 
69 1 221 -.25 o.oo o.oo o.oo 1.00 
66 2 221 0.50 o.oo 0.00 0.00 5.00 
67 2 221 2.75 3.00 5.00 1.00 0.00 
25 1 222 0.25 0.00 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 
20 2 222 4.75 0.00 • 12.00 12.00 0.00 
19 2 222 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
18 2 222 0.75 1.00 o.oo ·-3.00 4.00 
24 2 222 0.50 1.00 o.oo -2.00 4.00 
16 1 222 -.25 o.oo 0.00 0.00 3.00 
12 2 222 -.75 0.00 o.oo -6.00 2.00 
13 1 222 -1.25 2.00 -3.00 1.00 3.00 
14 1 222 0.25 -1.00 -1.00 a.oo 5.00 
15 2 222 0.25 -6.00 5.00 -6.00 3.00 
630 1 311 -.25 -2.00 0.00 o.oo 2.00 
653 2 311 2.00 5.00 8.00 -4.00 0.00 
669 1 311 0.75 9.00 1.00 5.00 o.oo 
644 1 311 0.50 0.00 -8.00 0.00 3.00 
659 1 311 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
670 1 311 -1.00 -12.00 12.00 6.00 o.oo 
673 1 311 0.50 o.oo o.oo 0.00 2.00 
632 1 311 -.50 0.00 0.00 o.oo o.oo 
651 1 311 -.50 o.oo 0.00 0.00 2.00 
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MD on FAV on FAI.) 0\1 
SS SF ABC FA'J MJF'+MIF' FAil~ M.JF' F'[l 
611 1 312 0.50 o.oo 0.00 1.00 4.00 
661 2 312 -3.75 -1.00 -5.00 -7.00 3.00 
672 1 312 0.00 -5.00 -4.00 o.oo 2.00 
645 1 312 0.25 5.00 0.00 9.00 5.00 
639 1 312 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 2.00 1.00 
671 1 312 0.50 -7.00 0.00 -2.00 4.00 
658 0 312 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 
648 2 312 0.50 4.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 
677 2 312 6.50 12.00 12.00 10.00 2.00 
59 2 321 2.50 -2.00 2.00 12.00 4.00 
57 2 321 0.25 o.oo o.oo -1.00 3.00 
53 1 321 1.75 -2.00 o.oo 4.00 3.00 
52 2 321 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
48 1 321 0.25 0.00 o.oo o.oo 3.00 
46 1 321 1.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 o.oo 
47 2 321 0.25 0.00 0.00 o.oo 3.00 
55 1 321 -.25 o.oo 2.00 o.oo 1.00 
58 2 321 6.50 0.00 12.00 12.00 2.00 
54 1 322 -5.50 0.00 o.oo -12.00 o.oo 
42 2 322 0.50 5.00 0.00 o.oo o.oo 
41 2 322 1.00 -6.00 o.oo 0.00 2.00 
50 1 322 -.25 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 
49 2 322 2.25 -3.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 
44 0 322 1.50 o.oo 0.00 -5.00 4.00 
45 2 322 0.25 -5.00 -3.00 -2.00 4.00 
7 2 322 4.00 6.00 1.00 4.00 3.00 
43 2 322 -1.50 o.oo 0.00 0.00 2.00 
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APPENDIX G 
PROGRAMMES FOR DATA ANALYSIS 
1. T-tests for independent and single samples. 
2. 3-way ANOVA 
3. Scheffe's test for homogeneity of variances. 
4. Programme to code data for multiple linear regression. 
5. Programme to calculate a 2-way ANOVA summary table 
from regression coefficients. 
6. Programme to count the numbers choosing each group. 
These Fortran programmes were all self-written for use on 
a UNIVAC 1108 computer. 
\ 
T-TESTS 
















































DO 1 I=l,N 
READ<8,2) IC<I>,IS<I>,IL<I>,D<I> 











































500 URITE<5,50) DV 
510 50 FORHAH1H1,T30,A25,1'T30,25<,-')IIT10, 
520 & "DIFFERENCE BETUEEN DELTA <X> AND GAHt1A (Y)·' ,II> 
530 URITE<5,55) XH,YH,XS,YS,T,IDF 
540 55 FORHAT<T21 ,·'DELTA·', HO, ... GAHHA ... IT20,40<·'-,)II 
550 & T 10, 'HEAtV, T20,2<f8.4, 12X>I IT1 0, ··sr. DEVS', T20,2<F8.4, 12X >I I 
560 & T20,40('-')I//IT30,'T = ",F10.5,3X,'Df =',IS> 





620 URITE<5,70) DH,BS,TS,IDF 
630 70 FORHAT<III/T10,'TEST FOR DV GREATER THAN 0,11 
640 & T10,'HEAN = ... ,F8.4,SX,.'ST. DEV = ·',F8.4/II 
650 & T30,'T = ',F10.5,3X, ... DF = ',15) 
660 STOP 
670 EHD 




3-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
This programme uses the technique for unweighted means, 
extrapolated from the procedure described by Kirk (1968: 200) for 
2-way ANOVAs. 
10 C 3-YAY ANOVA 
20 PARAMETER NA*3,NB=2,NC=2,NX=15 
25 PARAMETER IVAR=~SELF RATING ON HAZE~ 
60 DI"ENSION N<NA,NB,NC>,X<NA,NB,NC,NX>,AN<NA,NB,NC> 
70 DI"ENSION CH<NA,NB,NC>,CSD<NA,MB,NC>,AB<NA,NB>,AC<NA,NC> 






















































DATA 10/""A·', ''B"", ""C"", ""AB"', ,.AC,, ""BC,., ""ABC"", "'ERROR"" I 















DO 10 I=1 ,NA 
DO 10 J=1 ,NB 
DO 10 K=1 ,NC 
DO 5 L=1 ,N<I,J,K) 
READ<B, 1 > ID< I ,J,K,L>, ICU ,J,K,L), IS <I ,J,K,U, IU I ,J,K,U, 
& X <I ,J,K,U 
FORKAT<1X,IJ,T8,JI1,T18,F1.0> 
IF<IC<I,J,K,L) .NE. I> 60 TO 9 
IF <IS<I,J,K,L> .NE. J) GO TO 9 
IF <IL<I,J,K,L> .NE. K> GO TO 9 
GO TO 5 
WR1TE<5,2> ID<I,J,K,L>,I,IC<I,J,K,L>,J,IS<I,J,K,L),K,IL<I,J,K, 







DO 15 J=1 ,NB 




DO 20 1=1 ,NA 



































































DO 30 J=1,NB 
AB<I,J>=O. 























DO 60 I=1,NA 
DO 60 K=1,NC 
AC<I,K>=O. 




DO 70 J=1,NB 
DO 70 K=1,NC 
BC<J,K>=O. 






DO 80 1=1 ,HA 
EA<I>=O. 






DO 90 J=1,HB 
EB<J>=O. 






DO 100 K=t,NC 
EC<K>=O. 







1210 DO 110 1=1 ,NA 
1220 DO 110 J=1,NB 
1230 110 ZAB=ZAB+<AB<I,J>*AB<I,J)) 
1240 ZAB=ZAB*R 
1250 ZAC=O. 
1260 DO 120 1=1,NA 
1270 DO 120 K=1,NC 
1280 120 ZAC=ZAC+<AC<I,K>*AC<I,~>> 
1290 ZAC=ZAC*O 
1300 ZBC=O. 
1310 DO 130 J=1,NB 
1320 DO 130 K=1,HC 


















1510 DO 150 I=1,8 
1520 150 MS<I>=SS<I>IDF<I> 
1530 DO 160 1=1,7 
1540 160 F<I>="S<l)/MS<S> 
1550 F<B>=~ ·' 
1551 DO 410 1=1,NA 
1552 410 EA<I>=EA(l)/Q 
1553 DO 420 J=1,NB 
1554 420 EB<J>=EB<J>IP 
1555 DO 430 K=1,NC 
1556 430 EC<K>=EC<K>IP 
1560 C CALCULATION OF F MAX 
1 570 FU=-3t:t•11 
1580 FL=3**12 
1590 DO 400 I=t,NA 
1600 DO 400 J=1,NB 
1610 DO 400 K=1,NC 
1620 VAR=CSD<I,J,K)*CSD<I,J,K) 
1630 IF <VAR .GT. FU> THEM 
1640 FU=VAR 
1650 ELSE IF <VAR .LT. FL) THEN 
1660 FL=VAR 
1670 END IF 




1720 DO 170 1=1,10 
1730 170 IDF<I>=INT<DF<I>> 
1740 C CELL MEANS 
1750 WRITE<5,200> IVAR 
1755 200 FORMAT< 1H1, T30,A30,/T30,30( ~-·' )/ /T20, 
1760 & 'CELL MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS~//) 
1770 YRITE<5,201) <<<J,K>,K=1,NC>,J=1,NB> 
1780 201 FORMAT<T13,4(-' B·',It,-' C-',I1,15X)) 
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1785 URITE<5,66) 
1790 DO 205 1•1 ,NA 
1800 URITE<5,210) I,<<OH<I,J,K>,K=1,NC>,J-1,NB>, 
1810 & <<CSD<I,J,K>,K=1,1C>,J=1,NB>,<<N<I,J,K>,K•1,NC>,J=1,NB) 
1820 210 FOR"AT<T3,~A ~,I1,T10,4(F10.4,10X)//T10,4<F10.4,10X>II 
1830 & T10,4(110,10X)//T2,130<~-~)) 
1840 205 CONTINUE 
1850 ~RITE<5,220) ((J),J=t,NB> 
1860 220 FORHAT<T40,'AB HEANS~//T1~,2(~ B~,I1,6X>> 
1865 URITE<5,66> 
1870 DO 225 I=1,NA 
1880 URITE<5,230> I,<AB<I,J>,J=1,NB>,EA(l) 
1890 230 FORMAT<T3,·'A ~,I1,T10,3F10.4> 
1900 225 CONTINUE 
1905 233 FORHAT<T3,~B ~,I1,T10,3F10.4) 
1910 URITE<5,235> <EB<J>,J=1,NB> 
1920 235 FORt1AHT10,30<~--·)JT10,2f10.4) 
1930 WRITE<~,240) <<K>,K=1,NC) 
1940 240 FORHAT<T40,~AC HEANS~//115,2(~ c~,I1,6X)) 
1945 URITE<5,66) 
1950 DO 245 !=1 ,NA 
1960 245 URITE<5,230> I,<AC<I,K>,K~1,NC) 
1970 ~RI1E<5,235> <EC<K>,K=1,NC) 
1980 URit£<5,250> <<K>,K•t,NC> 
1990 250 FOR"AT<T40,'BC "EANS~//115,2<~ c~,I1,6X>> 
1995 URITE<5,66) 
2000 DO 260 J=1,NB 
2010 260 URITE<5,233> J,<BC<J,K>,K=1,NC> 
2020 WRITE<5,300) 
2030 300 FORMAT< 1H1, T40,-'ANOVA .SU"HARY TABLE~// I 
2040 & T5,~SOURCE~,T15,~ss~,T25,'DF~,T35,~HS',145,'F~> 
2045 URITE<5,66> 
2050 DO 310 1=1,8 
2060 310 URITE<5,320> IO<I>,SS<I>,IDF<I>,HS<I>,F<I> 
2070 320 FOR"AT<T5,A5,F10.4,110,2F10.4) 
2080 ~RITE<5,66> 
2090 66 FORKAT<1X,132(~-'>> 
2100 WRITE<5,330> FHAX,IDF<9>,IDF<10) 
2110 330 FORMAT(///T10,'F HAX = ',F10.4,5X,~DF = ',215) 









2210 DO 490 1=1,NA 
2220 DO 490 J=1,N8 





2280 490 CONTINUE 
2290 DO 500 I=1,N1 
2295 WRI1E<5,*) ~<I> 
2300 500 URITE<13,*) W<I> 
2310 STOP 
2320 END 
END OF FILE 
-> 
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SCHEFFE'S TEST FOR HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE 
10 C PROGRAH TO TEST FOR HOHOGENEITY OF VARIANCES. 
20 C REF SCHEFFE <1959:83) 
30 PARAMETER IPOP=4,ISHP=3 
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40 DIHENSION S<IPOP,ISHP>,Y<IPOP,ISHP>,NA<IPOP,ISHP>,N<IPOP,ISHP) 
50 DIHENSION XU POP) ,NI<IPOP) ~ 
60 CHARACTER IV*30 
65 IV=·''INGROUP FAVOURITISM" 
70 1 FORHAT<3<F6.4,1X,I2,2X)) 
80 DO 5 I=1,IPOP 
90 READ<S,O <S<I,J>,NA<I,J>,J=1,ISHP) · 
100 DO 5 J=1,ISHP 
110 Y<I,J)•ALOG<S<I,J)*S<I,J)) 
120 N<I,J>=NA<I,J>-1 
130 5 CONTINUE 
140 DO 10 I=1.IPOP 
150 NI<I>=O 
160 X<I>=O. 
170 DO 15 J=1,ISHP 
180 15 NI<I>=NI<I>+N(l,J) 
190 DO 20 J=1,ISHP 
200 20 X<I>=X<I)+<N<I,J>*Y<I,J)/NI<I>> 
210 tO CONTINUE 
220 NE=IPOP:to< ISHP-1 ) 
230 C THE ABOVE LINE HOLDS ONLY FOR EQUAL SAHPLES PER POPULATION 
240 NN=O 
250 XH=O. 
260 DO 25 1=1,IPOP 
270 25 NN•NN+NI<I> 
280 DO 30 1=1, IPOP 
290 30 XH=XH+<X<I>*Nl(l)/NN> 
300 A=O. 
310 B=O. 
320 DO 35 I=1,IPOP 
330 A=A+<NI<I>*X<I>*X<I>> 
340 DO 40 J=1,ISNP 
350 40 B=B+<N<I,J>*Y<I,J>*Y<I,J)) 






420 URITE<5,45) IV,<<<S<I,J>,NA<I,J>>,J=1,ISHP>,I=1,IPOP) 
430 45 FORHAT<1Ht,T30,A30//4(15X,3<F6.4,1X,I2,2X>I)) 
440 URITE<S,SO> F,IDF1,IDF2 
450 50 FORHAT<I//T20,F10.4,5Xr'DF = ",14," ,' ,I4> 
460 STOP 
470 END 
..... :E.NJ) ()ffll£ 
... : : .... :·.:: ... :.:. :·:.;··.-:.":. > :: ::.:- .. ... 
CODING OF DATA FOR MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION 
1 0 C PROGRAHHE TO CODE DATA FOR HLR. 
20 PARAMETER 11•114 
30 DIHENSIOH Y<N>,NA<N>,NB<N>,NAB<N>,X<N> 
35 K=O 
40 DO 10 I•1,N 
50 READ<8,1> IC,IP,X<I> 
60 IF <IC .EO. O> GO TO 10 
65 t<=t<+1 
70 IF <IC .EO. 1) THEN 










180 END IF 
185 END IF 
190 IF <IC .EO. 2> THEN 





2_50 ELSE IF UP .EO. 2) Tt£H 
260 Y<K>=X<I> 
270 NA <10=-1 
280 NB(t<)=1 
290 NAB<K>=-1 
300 END IF 
305 END IF 
310 tO CONTINUE 
320 DO 20 1=1 ,K 
330 URITE<5,2) Y<I>,NA<I>rNB<I>,NAB<I> 
335 20 URITE<t3,2) Y<I>,NA<I>,NB<I>,NAB<I> 
340 1 FORHAT<T6,I1,T9,I1,T20,F20.15) 
350 2 FORKAT<1X,F10.4,3I10) 
360 STOP 
370 END 
END OF FILE 
-> 
', ~ :_ ... ··~ 
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2-WAY ANOVA SUMMARY TABLE FROM REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 
This programme uses the technique described in Ker1inger & 
Pedhuzer (1973: 188}. 
., 
10 C PROGRAHHE TO CONVERT RESULTS OF REGRESSION INTO ANOVA TABLE. 
20 DIMENSION SS<5,4>,AHS<5,4>,F<5,4>,IDF<5,4),Y(5) 
21 DIHEHSION R1<5>,R2<5>,R12<5>,R123(5) 
30 CHARACTER TABLE*B<5),1V•25<5>,SRC•15(4) 
40 HEAD='ANOVA SUKHARY TABLE' 
41 DATA SRC/"A <AGREEMENT>' ,"B <GROUP>' ,'AB' ,'RESIDUAL·'/ 





























DATA IV/"INGROUP FAVOURITISM', ·'Pt.LL OF HD ON HIP+HJP", 
&'PULL OF FAV ON FAIRNESS','PULL OF FAV ON HJP', 
& 'PRISONERS DILEHHA'/ 
















DO 30 1=1,5 
WRITE<5,2> IV<I>,HEAD,<TABLE<J>,~1,5) 




FORMA"f< 1H1, T30 ,A25/T30,25< '-' )///T20,A20//T5,5A10/1T?,60< '-') 
310 3 · FORHAT<IT2,A15,F10.4,I5,5X,2F10.4) 
320 4 FORHAT<IT2,60<"-')) 
330 STOP 
340 END 
END OF FILE 
-> 
. : . ~ 
;.·• . 
FREQUENCY COUNT OF GROUP CHOICES 







































DIMENSION IC<NUft) ,IP<NUH>,N<2,2) 
MBOTH--0 
DO 2 1=1,2 
DO 2 J=1,2 
N<I,J>=O 
DO 10 I=1 ,NUH 
READ<8,5> IC<I>,IP<I> 
IF <IC<I> .EO. 0) THEN 
NBOTH =MBOTH+1 
GO TO 10 
END IF 
IF <IC<I> .EO. 1> THEN 
IF <IP<I> .EO. 1) THEN 
M<1, 1 >=N<1, 1 >+1 






IF <IC<I> .EQ. 2) THEN 
IF <IP<I> .EO. 1) THEN 
N<2,1>=N<2,1)+1 








FORMAT< 1 X, I ERROR·~) 
URITE<5,20) <<N<I,J>,J=1,2>,I=1,2> . 
FORHAT<1H1 TJO •'PLACED'//T25 ... DELTA,. 5X ,.GAHMA,.//T22 15("-')/ , , , , , '· . 
320 & T1 O,-"'DELTA", T20,2110//1X, "CHOICE", T22, 15( "'-··>I I, T10, "GAHHA", 
330 & T20,2I10//T22,15('-")) 
340 URITE<5,25) NBOTH 
350 25 FORHATU/////T10,-"'Ntl1BER NOT DECIDING= ",I5> 
360 STOP 
370 END 
END OF FILE 
-> 
. ... ·.· ... ,., .. 
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/ 
SCHEFFE'S TEST FOR HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCES 
Using the programme given in Appendix G, each dependent variable 
was checked for violation of the homogeneity of variance function. 
In each case the I populations specified by Scheffe (1959; 83) 
were taken to be the four Status-Legitimacy combinations, and the 
J samples from each taken to be the Cooperation conditions. 
The resulting F ratios are presented below: 
Table 7-1. Scheffe's Test for Equality of Variances 
Dependent Variable F Ratio df 
Fav 1. 2740 3, 8 p>.lO 
Md on MJP+MIP 0.9738 3, 8 p>.lO 
Fav on F 0.4325 3, 8 p>.lO 
Fav on MJP 3.0468 3, 8 p>.05 
Competitiveness 0.4338 3, 8 p>.lO 
None of the F ratios are significant at the 5% level, though the 
pull of Fav on MJP is at the 1% level. 
.···. 
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TESTING Ho:)-1 =0 and Comparison with the Control Groups 
Single sample t-tests were used to test whether the variables 
'existed', and 2-sample t-tests were used in the comparison with 
the control groups. The results are summarized in the table below: 
I 
Table 7-2. Testing Ho: =0 and Comparison with Control Study 
Control Study 
1. ~ 
Mean 1. 6250 
S.D. (2.2900) 
2. MD on MJP+MIP 
Mean 2.7500 
S.D. (4.5751) 
3. Fav on F 
Mean 2.4167 
S.D. (3.7769) 





























.·. ·· .. · 
t-test 
(Ho~ =0) 












Rating: Self Assessment on the Maze. 
This was seen as a possible indicator of how the group assignment 
may have affected the Subject's self-confidence. It was 
anticipated that the Subjects placed in the Low Status group would 
have a lower morale and assess themselves lower. 
The scale points are: 
5: Very well 
4: Well 
3: As well as anyone else 
2: Badly 
1: Very badly 
Table 7-3. Self-Assessment: Means and Standard Deviations 
High Status Low Status 
Leg. Illeg. Leg. Ille_g. 
A 1 3.0000 2.8182 2.7778 3.1000 
(0.8660) (1.1677) (0.6667) (0.3162) 
9 11 9 10 
A 2 3.2222 3.6364 3.5556 3.7778 
(0.6667) (0.9244) (0.8819) (0.9718) 
9 11 9 9 
A 3 3.5556 3.5556 3.0000 3.6667 
(1.1304) (0.7265) (0.8660) (0.7071) 
9 9 9 9 
Table 7-4. Self Assessment: AN OVA Summary Table 
SOURCE ss DF MS F 
A (Cooperation) 8.3751 2 4. 1876 5.6836 p<O.Ol 
B (Status) 0.0064 1 0.0064 0.0086 
c (Legitimacy) 1.6255 1 1.6255 2.206J 
AB 0.9918 2 0.4959 0.6730 
AC 0.4086 2 0.2043 0.2773 
BC 0.7473 1 0.7473 1. 0143 
ABC 0.9737 2 0.4868 0.6608 
ERROR 74.4152 101 0.7368 
The F ratio for Cooperation was significant (F=5.6836; p= ), so 
a test of pairwise comparisons was done, using Tukey's HSD 
statistic. 
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Table 7-5. Self-Assessment: Tukey's Test of Pairwise Comparisons 
Overall A Means 
Al A2 A3 
2.9240 3.5480 3.4444 
Difference between Means DF t' 
Al-A2 0.6240 3,101 4.4591 p<O.Ol 
Al-A3 0.5204 3,101 3.7159 p<0.05 
A2.-A3 0.0036 3,101 0.7432 
The results indicate that the Subjects in the No Cooperation 
groups rated themselves significantly lower than the Subjects in 
both Cooperations groups. There was no difference between the 
ratings of the subjects in the two Cooperation conditions. 
Rating: Assessment of Self and Partner on the Maze 
This assessment was a possible indicator of how the group 
membership of their partner would affect the Subjects' perception 
of their 'product'. It was expected that the teams where both 
members were in the same group would rate themselves higher than 
the teams of mixed group memberships. This was expected to apply 
to the Delta (High Status) Subjects, but not to the Gamma (Low 
Status) Subjects. Thus an AB interaction was anticipated. 
The rating scale was the same as for the Self ratings. 
A 2 
A 3 




























Table 7-7. Team Assessment: AN OVA Summary Table 
SOURCE ss DF MS F 
.A (Cooperation) 0.2172 1 0.2172 0.4804 
B (Status) 0.2172 1 0.2172 0.4804 
c (Legitimacy) 0.4963 1 0.4963 1. 0977 
AB 0.0518 1 0.0518 0.1145 
AC 0.2378 1 0.2378 0.5360 
BC 0.0001 1 0.0001 0.0002 
ABC 0.0518 1 0.0518 0.1146 
ERROR 29.8384 66 0.4521 
None of the F ratios were significant. 
Difference between Self Rating and Rating with Partner 
This difference was given a positive sign if the rating of Self 
was higher than of the team, and a negative if the ratinf of the 
~earn was higher than that of the Self. 
Table 7-8. Difference Self/Team: Means and Standard Deviations 
High Status Low Status 
Leg. I1leg. Leg. Illeg. 
A 2 -0.2222 0.0909 0.2222 0-1250 
(0.4410) (1.0445) (0.6667) {1. 1260) 
9 11 9 8 
A 3 0.3333 0.1111 -0.1111 0.2222 
(0.8660) (0.3333) ( 0. 6009 )' (0.4410) 
9 9 9 9 
Table 7-9. Difference Self/Team: AN OVA Summary Table 
SOURCE ss DF MS F 
A (Cooperation) 0.1307 1 0.1307 0.2345 
B (Status) 0.0239 1 0.0239 0.0429 
c (Legitimacy) 0.1212 1 0.1212 0.2174 
AB 0.7468 1 0.7468 1.3399 
AC 0.0124 1 0.0124 0.0223 
BC 0.0239 1 0.0239 0.0429 
ABC 1. 0571 1 1. 0571 1.8966 
ERROR 36.2285 65 0.5?74 
Anticipated Ra'ting with_ )\nothex Partner 
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This was a measure of •hostiltiy• or otherwise the Subject felt 
towards their partner. It was anticipated that the Status of the 
partner would influence this assessment. 
The scale used was 
1 = Much better 
2 = Better 
3 = The same 
4 = Worse 
5 = Much worse 
Table 7-10. Team-Assessment: Means and Standard Deviations 
High Status Low Status 
Leg. Illeg. Leg. Illeg. 
A 2 ..:S • .llll 3.0000 3.0000 .2.8750 
(0.3333) (0.7746) (0.7559) (0.6409) 
9 11 8 8 
A 3 2.8889~ 3.2222 2.8750 2.8889 
(0.6009) (0.4410) (0.3536) (0.7817) 
9 9 8 9 
Table 7-11. Another Partner: ANOVA Summary Table 
SOURCE ss DF MS F 
A (Cooperation) 0.0136 1 0.0136 0.0356 
B (Status) 0.3738 1 0.3738 0.9823 
c (Legitimacy) 0.0136 1 0.0136 0.0356 
AB 0.0136 1 0.0136 0.0356 
AC 0.3738 1 0.3738 0.9823 
BC 0.1221 1 0.1221 0.3208 
ABC 0.1026 1 0.1026 0.2695 
ERROR 23.9722 63 0.3805 
None of the F ratios are significant. 
Rating whether their previous partnership influenced responses on 
the Prisoner•s Dilemma Game. 
It was expected that Subjects who cooperated with members of their 
ingroup would be more influenced than those who did not. The 
scale used was 
.......... 
·.· · ..... ···.·.·:: 
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Table 7-12. Influenced in P.D.G.: Means and Standard Deviations 
High Status Low Status 
Leg. Ille_g. Leg. Illeq. 
A 2 2.0000 2.2727 2.1111 2.2000 
(1.2247) (1.1909) (1.5366) (1.6193) 
9 11 9 10 
A 3 1.7778 1.6667 2.8889 2.0000 
(1.3017) (0.8660) (1.6159) (1. 2247) 
9 9 9 9 
Table 7-13. Influ.enced on P.D.G.: AN OVA Summary Table 
SOURCE ss DF MS F 
A (Cooperation) 0.0732 1 0.0732 0.0405 
B (Status) 2.5640 1 2.5640 1. 4184 
c (Legitimacy) 0.4752 1 0.4752 0.2629 
AB 2.3053 1 2.3053 1.2753 
AC 2.1619 1 2.1619 1.1960 
BC 1. 0783 1 1. 0783 0.5965 
ABC 0.4113 1 0.4113 0.2276 
ERROR 121.1152 67 1.8077 
None of the F ratios reach significance. 
·, ·. ·· .. 
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FAIRNESS STRATEGY 
A check was run to see whether Subjects who claimed to have used 
the fairness strategy had in fact done so. 55 Subjects stated 
unequivocally that they had been fair in their choices. A t-test 
was used to see whether the degree of ingroup bias was less for 
these Subjects, than for others. 












The difference between the sets of Subjects was highly significant 
(t=3.4643; p=0.00075), the Fair Subjects having a much smaller 
degree of ingroup favouritism than the others. 
To check that some strong negative ingroup biases did not 
contaminate the results, a chi-squared test was also performed to 
check whether more of the Fair subjects actually gave fair 
responses than of the other set. For this test, an Ingroup 
Favouritism score of between -0.25 to +0.25 was taken as Fair 
responses. 
Table 7-15. Frequency of Fair Responses 
Responses 
s Fair Other 
t 
r Fair 32 23 
a 
t 
e Other 13 46 
g 
y 
The chi-squared statistic was significant (~~=15.5677, df=l; 
p<.OOl) This and the pattern of frequencies indicate that the 
Subjects who claimed to have been fair had done so. 
